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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The idea that members of

a

society should be treated

justly and fairly under the law is

fundamental tenant of

In order to guarantee this idea of fair-

legal philosophy.
ness,

a

the concept of due process of law has evolved.

Due

process of law can be found in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as the framers of this great document saw the need to restrain the Federal Government from de-

priving its citizens of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.

However, the use of the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as

a

device to guarantee

other constitutional rights is of fairly recent vintage.
The importance of the due process clause today cannot
be overstated.

It has been used by courts as the vehicle to

extend constitutional protection to rich and poor, black and
white, and young and old alike.

Especially important in the

eyes of the highest court has been the constitutional protection of "fundamental freedoms", such as free speech, process,

religion, and assembly.

Through

a

general expansion of the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme

Court of the United States has ruled that most aspects of the
to
Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution are applicable

impingement.
all citizens against state as well as federal
coa "
These far-reaching decisions mean that the rundamentai

2

cepts of fairness found in the Bill of Rights are sacrosanct
and beyond any government's denial, as

matter of due pro-

a

cess of law.

Bernard Schwartz says of the Fourteenth Amendment, "In
the century since it became

part of the fundamental law,

a

the Amendment has become, practically speaking, perhaps our

most important constitutional provision

-

not even second in

significance to the original basic document itself.
On the subject of the due process clause, Justice Felix

Frankfurter, one of the Supreme Court's most accomplished

scholars asserted, "Due process is, perhaps the least frozen

concept of our law - the least confined to history and the
most absorptive of powerful standards of
ciety.'^

He also wrote that the,

a

progressive so-

"Due process clause of the

Fifth and particularly of the Fourteenth Amendment comes as
close to providing

a

mechanism for dealing with the versatil-

ity of circumstance as is to be found in the Constitution

The mechanism for dealing with the versatility of circumstance, mentioned by Justice Frankfurter has given the Con-

stitution the flexibility necessary for changing times.

Jus-

Bernard Schwartz, "The Amendment in Operation: A
Historical Overview," The 1 4 th Amendment Centennial Vol ume
Edited by Bernard Schwartz (New York: New York Press, 1970),
1.

p. 29
2*

Griffin v. Illinois

.

351 U.S.

12,

20

(1956)

Helen Shirlev Thomas, Felix Frankfurter Scholar on
p.150.
the Bench (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, I960;,
3.

,

3

tice Brandeis recognized this problem fifty years ago when he
"Our Constitution is not

wrote,

living organism.

a

straightjacket.

It is a

As such it is capable of growth, of expan-

sion and of adaptation to new conditions.

Growth implies

changes, political, economic, and social.

Growth which is

significant manifests itself rather in intellectual and moral
conceptions than in material things." 4

This concept of

"growth" of our Constitution suggested by Justice Brandeis

has been accomplished in the area of individual rights to

considerable extent through

a

a

broad interpretation of the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether it is

a

judicial philosophy of constitutional

"growth" or the use of due process as

a

vehicle for dealing

with versatility of circumstance, constitutional rights have
been extended to
cent years.

a

greater number of society's members in re-

Within this broad legal framework which has seen

the blanket of constitutional protection reaching many hereto-

fore ignored, profound changes have resulted in the legal

status of school students.
in the 1967 Gault case that,

Once the Supreme Court declared

"Neither the Fourteenth Amendment

nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,"

5

new relation-

ships between the student and the institutions of society in-

Children could, after 1967, no longer be

evitably developed.

4

„

5.

United States v. Moreland
!n Re Gault

,

287 U.S.

1

.

258 U.S. 433 (1922)

(1967)

4

treated as non-citizens by the state.

In a recent signifi-

cant case relating to schools, Justice Fortas, speaking for
the court said that,

"First Amendment rights, applied in

light of the special characteristic of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students.

It can hardly be ar-

gued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the

schoolhouse gate. "6
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

broadly in terpretated has helped to open

a

door to

a

new body

of Constitutional law, student's constitutional rights, the

subject to be examined in this paper.
Need for the Study
Lee 0. Garber, and Newton Edwards, possibly the two most

eminent scholars in the field of school law, published

a

case

book on student rights in 1962, called The Law Governin g Pu -

pils

In that volume,

.

the authors point out that,

lit is well

established by many court decisions that school boards have
authority to make and enforce any reasonable rules governing
the conduct of pupils.

Since 1966, however, this concept has

dramatically changed as pupils have been winning suits

m

federal courts on grounds their constitutional rights were

Tinkpr V. Des Moines Independent Commu nity. School,
(19691
District ™89~tr Ct .~7J
a

3~6"

(

the

5

violated.

Since a marked change in judicial philosophy has

taken place in such

a

relatively short time, an analysis of

this emerging decisional law is deeemed necessary.

Literally hundreds of legal and pedagogical articles,
position papers, books, and pamphlets have dealt with various
aspects of student constitutional rights in recent years.

Voluminous writing also has appeared in the related area of
legal rights of college students.

However, no study has

dealt particularly with due process as the mainspring of the

newly acquired rights of secondary school pupils.

There is

a

need to examine the extent to which the trend toward judicial

expansion of constitutional rights is part of

a

broader con-

cept of the judicial extension of due process to all.
a

Also,

study of student constitutional rights as they have evolved

through

a

broad interpretation of the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment should help clarify recent court de-

cisions for administrators and teachers in public education.
Finally, conclusions drawn from this work might enhance the

development of new relationships between the student and his
educational institution, which in the long run will benefit
all.

Purpose of the Study

Recognition and expansion of student consti tutional
rights has been having
schools.

a

tremendous impact on the public

Questions regarding the status of the law of stu-

6

dent rights, school policies, and administrative regulations

affecting student freedoms have been raised with increased
frequency.

through

The primary purpose of this study is to determine

legal,

research and analysis, the impact of the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the constitutional rights of public school pupils.

A secondary purpose

is to update the substantive knowledge in the field of stu-

dents

1

rights which should help educators understand the con-

cept of due process as it might be made applicable to public

school administration.
The Approach

Since a broad interpretation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to have been

a

signifi-

cant legal key in unlocking the door to student constitutional rights,

the approach in this study will be to concentrate

on the evolution of the due process clause as a means to

guarantee constitutional rights to all people in general and
to public school pupils in particular.

For convenience, the study will be divided into two

parts.

First, secondary sources such as legal periodicals,

books, position papers, and pamphlets will be reviewed for

specific points related to the topic.

Secondly, the sub-

stance of the study itself will consist of an examination of
all litigation reaching a court of record where students seek
to evoke the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
for relief against invasion of constitutional freedoms

7

Together

,

the primary and secondary sources will provide the

basic content necessary for this study.

For purposes of or-

ganization the basic substance of the study will be divided
into chapters dealing with specific constitutional provisions:

such as, First Amendment rights, searches and seizures out-

lined in the Fourth Amendment, and Fifth and Sixth Amendment

procedural rights.
Delimitations

Involved in this study will be an examination of decisions of courts of record relating to the due process clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

wherein the rights of public school pupils are adjudicated.
Cases arising in whole or in part out of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will not be considered only when

a

constitutional question is raised.

Further-

more, decisions involving college students will be examined

only where they are directly related to the question at hand,
the due process rights of public school pupils.

Finally, the

issue of freedom of religion will not be included in this

study of student constitutional rights.

Related Literature
Prior to 1968 the major publications on the constitutional

rights of public school pupils were annual reviews of the

important court decisions effecting their legal status.

The

8

Law

XfiiU&flQji SlL -ScJiq.qI

formed the task

,

and The Student's Day in Court

8

per-

with some editorial comment of keeping those

interested abreast of the latest court decisions on student
rights.
In 1968 Seymore Schwartz completed a doctoral disserta-

tion on the topic, The Civil Liberties of the American Public

— An

Schoo l

S t u den

dents

Rights and the Philosophical Impl ications for Curricu-

1

lum Development

.

Examination o f the Lega 1 Aspects of Stu—

Chapter IV, titled "Legal Findings" reviewed

and analyzed major court decisions on public school pupils'

constitutional rights.

Many of his conclusions had to be

drawn without substantive legal decisions in the field of students' rights.

However, Mr. Schwartz accurately predicted

that subsequent court decisions would expand the scope of con-

stitutional protection to students in the public schools.

As

the number of decisions affecting the legal status of stu-

dents' rights grew,

the amount of literature relating to the

field proportionately increased.

There followed two important publications of position papers, one by the American Civil Liberties Union,

9

the other by

Lee 0. Garber and E. Edmund Reuther, Jr., The Yearboo k
of School Law, Interstate publishers and printers, Inc.
TDanviile, 111., 1969-1970)
The Student s Day in Court N.E.A. Research Division,
8.
(Washington, D C .T
Academic Freedom and Civil Li ber ties of Students in
9.
Colleg es and Universities American Civil Liberties Union,
(New York, 19681
7.

'

,

'

.

,

9

The National Association of Secondary School Principals, 10
that summarized the legal positions of the courts of stu-

dent rights.

Both papers suggested trends that have come a-

bout in the early 1970'

s.

The papers offered educational administrators guide-

lines in dealing with students so that they might avoid le—

battles in court.

The Reasonable Exercise of Authority

in particular offered to principals the pragmatic advice on

the legal status of student rights in 1969.

As evidence of the growing concern expressed by educators on the topic of student rights, the National Organization
of Legal Problems of Education sponsored the publication of

five volumes in

a

Monogram Series relating to

pupil's legal and consti tutuinal rights.
ly publications are:
t ivitie s by.

a

public school

These five scholar-

Legal Aspects of Contro l of Student Ac-

Public School Authorities

,

by E. Edmund Reuther,

Jr., Rights and Freedoms of Public School Students

tions from the 1960

1

s

,

:

Direc -

Legal Aspects of Crime Investigation
,

in the Public Schools by William G.

Studen t Records by Henry

E.

Buss, Legal Aspects of

Butler, Jr. and Suspension and Ex -

pulsion of Public School Students by Robert

E.

Phay. Of these

five publications Rights and Freedoms of Public School Stu-

dents

:

Directions from the 1960

'

and Suspension and Expul -

Robert L. Ackerly, The Reasonable Exercise of Author ity The National Association of Secondary School principals
(Washington D.C. 1969)
10.

,

,

10

sion of Public School students are most
important to this
study for they examine legal trends in student
rights and assess the status of those rights.

Numerous scholarly articles have appeared in the
various
law school journals in recent months on the subject
of
stu-

dent constitutional rights.

Many of these articles offer pe-

netrating analysis of specific aspects involving student judicial controversies.

Of particualr importance to this work is

Stephen R. Goldstein's "Reflections of Developing Trends in
the Law of Student Rights," 11 "Developments in the

demic Freedom," 1
als"

13

Law— Aca-

"Due Process and Secondary School Dismiss-

by C. Michael Abbott, and "With Temperate Rod:

Main-

taining Academic Order in Secondary Schools" 14 by Arnold
Taylor.
In a 1971 doctoral dissertation Academic Freedom in His-

torical Legal Context

.

Maurice M. Sullivan traced the devel-

opment of academic freedom in the United States and concluded
that the forces that characterize the larger society are the

controlling factors that influence academic freedom in public

Stephen R. Goldstein, "Reflections on Developing
11.
Trends in the Law of Student Rights," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 118 (February, 1970).
12.

Law Review

"Developments in the Law
,

vol. 81

(March,

— Academic

Freedom," Harvard

1968).

C. Michael Abbott, "Due Process and Secondary School
13.
Dismissals," Case Western Reserve Law Review vol. 20 (Febru,

ary,

1969.

Arnold Taylor, "With Temperate Rod: Maintaining A14.
cademic Order in Secondary Schools," Kentucky Law Journal
vol. 58 (1969-1970).
,

11

education
It appears that many more studies will be published
in

the coming months on student constitutional rights.

These

studies will all add to the growing body of literature on
the
topic of student constitutional rights, literature that is

needed at
creases.

a

time when the number of student legal suits in-

CHAPTER

II

THE EXPANSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THROUGH THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Introduction
Our body of law is undergoing a continuous change.

It un-

doubtedly reflects the social, economic, and political pressures of the time.

This ability in our legal system to change

does not infer instability, but, on the contrary enables the

democratic process to survive through necessary adaptationsadaptations to the forces of change that have made the law
more just.
The judicial system in the twentieth century, reacting to
the forces of change, has expanded the scope of constitutional

protection to citizens heretofore denied that protection.

The

major vehicle used to effect the expansion of justice has been
a

broader interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

The Fourteenth Amendment states:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privilege or immunities of Citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
By insisting that the states were not allowed to deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law,

the courts expanded the Bill of Rights to more citizens.

In the late 1960 's the broader interpretation of the Fourteenth

Amendment began to be applied to public school pupils as well

13

as adults in court litigation.

began to

gam

a

measure of constitutional protection while
at-

tending public schools.
tional rights is

The result was that students

a

Thus,

the study of student constitu-

study in change, change that has seen the

evolution of law leading to

a

more just society.

Tracing the

historical development of the due process clause as

a

vehicle

that effected this change is important.

Historical Background of the Fourteenth Amendment

Arguments were offered at the constitutional convention
to make all the rights found in the Bill of Rights
applicable

to the states.

the states,

Advocates of this idea wanted to insure that

as well as the national government, would not en-

croach upon an individual's fundamental rights.

However, the

founding fathers rejected these suggestions because they felt
that it was the prerogative of each individual state to deter-

mine what rights should be guaranteed to their respective citiThe framers of the constitution concluded that to force

zens.
a

federal bill of rights upon state governments would violate

the spirit of the newly established federal system of govern-

ment.

This point was emphasized by Hamilton as he wrote in the

Federalis t. "There is one transcendent advantage belonging to
the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to

place the matter in

a

clear and satisfactory light

—

-I

mean the

ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice." 1

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Pa per (New York:
The New American Library of World Literature, Inc.), p. 120.
1.

14

Following Hamilton's advice, the Bill of Rights,
when adopted
by the convention, applied to the federal
government.
The question of whether or not the Bill of Rights
might

inhibit dCtions by
in Barron v.

1833,

a

state arose in the courts as early as

Baltimore

.

The city of Baltimore by the

paving of its streets diverted streams from their natural
courses rendering Barron's wharf practically useless.

Barron

felt he was being deprived of his property by the city of Bal-

timore without due process of law.

He insisted that the Fifth

Amendment, which forbids taking private property for public
use without just compensation, ought to be construed to re-

strain the states as well as the national government.

In re-

jecting Barron's contention, Chief Justice Marshall pointed
out that if the framers of the Bill of Rights had intended
them to be incumbent upon the state governments, they would

have expressed that intention.^

Prior to the Civil War citizens looked to the state con-

stitutions for protection of individual rights and liberties.
The national government was not expected to step in and protect citizens from state denials of civil rights.

After the

Civil War, however, the newly enfranchised freedmen needed national protection from state abuses.

A direct result of this

concern led to the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2

.

7

Pet.

243 (1833)

15

The purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment,
which abolished
slavery and the Fifteenth Amendment, which
granted Negroes the
vote, were quite clear.
What was meant by the Fourteenth Amendrnen t

,

on the other hand, became subject to
question.

The

task of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
was up to the
Supreme Court.
For example the Supreme Court has had to
strug-

gle with such questions as:

munities of citizens?

What are the privileges and im-

What is meant by due process of law?

Is due process concerned only with court procedures
found in

the lifth Amendment?
ly,

What does equal protection mean?

Final-

the important question relevant to this study, does the

Fourteenth Amendment extend part or all of the civil rights
and liberties found in the Federal Bill Of Rights to the citizens of the various states against state encroachment?

Be-

cause of these questions and many more, there have been more
cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment than any other

phase of Constitutional Law.'
In 1873,

just five years after the Fourteenth Amendment

was adopted, the Court rendered its first significant interpretation of the new amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases

.

The

case did not concern civil rights of personal liberties but

rather dealt with the right of the State of Louisiana to grant
a

monopoly to

a

single company in the slaughterhouse business.

Robert E. Cushman and Robert F. Cushman, Cases in
Constitutional Law (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts Inc.,
3.

,

1958), p.

542.

16

Plaintiffs sought

a

declaration that Louisiana's action was

unconstitutional on the grounds it violated the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States.
ing decision was quite significant.

The result-

The court distinguished

between state citizenship and national citizenship, and em-

phasized that the rights and privilege of federal citizenship
did not include the protection of ordinary civil liberties
such as freedom of speech, press, and religion. 4

The issue

of the dual system of governments was a primary consideration,

for the Court pointed out,

"...

[T]

hese consequences are so

serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great

a

departure

from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the

effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of

powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most or-

dinary and fundamental character...."

As a result,

the states

were to continue with the responsibility for the protection
of their respective citizens' civil rights and liberties.

A second major interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment came in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883.
issue was racial discrimination.

This time the

Congress passed the Civil

Rights Act of 1875 in the waning days of Reconstruction to insure continued federal protection of the Negro's civil rights.

4

.

5.

Ibid

.

Slaughterhouse Cases

,

16 Wall.

36,78 (1833)

17

The law made it

crime and

a

civil wrong for any person to

a

deny anyone full and equal enjoyment of
public accommodations.

Much to the chagrin of the Negro community,
the Supreme Court
held the act unconstitutional. The language
of the Fourteenth
Amendment was followed explicitly. The Amendment
states,

"No State" shall deny equal protection
of the laws or due pro-

cess of the law.

The Court distinguished between "no state"

and

Since the Amendment designated the state and

no person".

not private persons, Congress, in passing laws to enforce
the
Amendment, could not make it
did not forbid.

action of

a

a

crime to do what the Amendment

In the language of the Court:

"It is State

particular character that is prohibited.

Individ-

ual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
£

of the Amendment."

Again, the concern of encroachment over state prerogatives

under the federal system was evident in the Civil Rights
Cases.

The court makes this point by declaring the Civil

Rights Act of 1875, "...

[w]

ould be to make Congress take the

place of State Legislatures and supersede them."

n

Thus the

Civil Rights Cases refused to expand the scope of the Four-

teenth Amendment to protect civil liberties and, furthermore,

prevented Congress from exercising control over acts of private

6.

109 U.S.

7

Ibid

.

.

,

p.

3,

13

10

(1883)

18

racial discrimination

9

8
.

A thiid significant pre-twentieth century
case interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, dealt squarely
with the due process clause.
In Hurtado v. California
the defendant, Hurtado

was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged
without
first being indicted by

a

grand jury.

did not require an indictment by
cases.

a

California statutes

grand jury in all criminal

Hurtado claimed the state was depriving him of his

life without due process of law.

He pointed out that Article

V of the United States Constitution requires indictment
by

a

grand jury for federal crimes and the state should also be
bound to the same as

a

matter of due process.

Unfortunately

for Hurtado, his contention was rejected and his conviction

was sustained.
In this case,

as in the two previous cases,

the Supreme

Court refused to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in such

a

way as to usurp state legislative control over civil rights.
In assur ing California

it

could establish criminal procedures

which differed from federal criminal procedures, the Court
10.

said,

"It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public

authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly de-

vised in the discretion of the legislative power, in further-

8.

Cushman and Cushman, p. 835.

9.

110 U.S.

Ibid

.

,

516

p.537.

(1884)

19

ance of the general public good, which regards and preserves

these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be

due process of law...."

Hurtado is similar to the earlier

Barron decision because in each, the claimants sought to re-

quire due process in state actions.

In both cases the Supreme

Court refused to apply federal standards to state court procedures.

The difference rests in the fact that Hurtado sought

relief under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was not part of the constitution when Barron v.

Baltimore was adjudicated.
In the decades following the Civil War the Fourteenth

Amendment underwent

a

strange metamorphosis.

Instead of pro-

tecting the civil rights of the Negro, as the amendment intended,

the Fourteenth Amendment became

a

device for big business

interests to thwart state legislative control over their activities.

As the abuses of big business, particularly the

railroad industry, became more flagrant, demands for reform
were heard from an increasingly large number of discontented
citizens.
lav:s

State legislators responded by enacting various

regulating such things as rates and freight.

Proponents

of big business sought relief in federal courts asserting

that the states, by regulating their activities, were depriving

them of property without due process of law.

Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,

11.

Ibid.

20

the concept of due process of law
was confined only to procedures used by the federal government
in bringing an offender
of the law to court.
Pressure from vested interests upon
the

court to accept the theory that the
substance of a law itself
could be held void for want of due
process of law began to increase in the last quarter of the Nineteenth
Century. 12 The
court did depart from the strict interpretation
of "procedural
due process as the only kind of due process
of
law. At

first the majority of the Court was not in sympathy
with business as they ruled in Munn v. Illinois that the only
way relief could be sought from an unjust rate was to elect

legislature to enact

a

a

new

just one. 13

During the next twenty years, however, the make-up of the
court changed to members whose judicial philosophy supported
the

substantive" due process idea.

For example, the court a-

bandoned the Munn doctrine and declared in Chicago, M. & St
Co

v.

Minnesota

.

1890,

.

that the court could review acts

of the legislature regulating rates in order to insure the re-

quirement that due process of law would be met.' 4

There are

literally hundreds of cases similar to this wherein the court

expanded the breadth of the due process clause to include substantive as well as procedural due process.

12.

Cushman and Cushman, p. 554.

13.

94 U.S.

14.

134 U.S. 418 (1890)

113

(1877)

The concept of

21

substantive due process was to have significant implications
for court rulings in the Twentieth Century.

Cases arising

out of the struggle for civil rights saw the Supreme Court
ap-

ply the doctrine of substantive due process to individual

rights and liberties,,
In

v. Dow

i:axv; e 1

jury of eight

,

Maxwell was convicted of murder by a

.

which was legal under the state laws in Utah.

His lawyers argued the state of Utah should be required to

provide

a

jury of twelve as required by the Sixth Amendment

Also, the Court was further urged to apply federal standards

found in all of the first ten amendments.

The Court dealt

with the issue squarely.
It is now urged in substance that all the provisions
contained in the first ten amendments, so far as
they secure and recognize the fundamental rights of
the individual as against the exercise of federal
power, are by virtue of this amendment to be 4 regarded as privileges or immunities of a citizen of
the United States, and therefore the states cannot
provide for any procedure in state courts which
could not be followed in a federal court because of
the limitations contained in those amendments . 16

The Court refused to broaden the scope of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Rejecting Maxwell's plea they stated, "...DQhen

the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the abridgment by the

states of those privileges or immunities which he enjoys as

such citizen, it is not correct or reasonable to say that it

15.

94 U.S. 113

16

Ibid .

,

p.

(1900)

587
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covers and extends to certain rights which he does not enjoy
by reason of his citizenship, but simply because those rights

exist in favor of all individuals as against Federal governmental powers." 17

Thus,

it can be seen here as early as 1900

an attempt was made to have the rights in the Constitution ap-

ply to state actions.

However, as seen, it was rejected by

the Supreme Court.

The last landmark decision to be considered before turning to cases that gradually shifted the pendulum toward

a

broader interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is Twining v. New Jersey

.

1908.

In Twining

,

the court rejected the argument that the due process clause

of the the Fourteenth Amendment was what Cushman and Cushman

concluded

a

"shorthand for the first eight amendments."

Twining, who after refusing to testify on his behalf, was sub-

jected to some prejudicial remarks directed to the jury from
the presiding judge, contended this violated his right to re-

main silent,

protection of the Fifth Amendment.

a

The ques-

tion the court had to consider was an important one.

judicial remarks by

a

judge when

a

Do pre-

defendant refuses to testi-

fy constitute a denial of due process of law?

The question

was difficult because compulsory self-incrimination is consid-

ered particularly repugnant to our idea of what is just.

595-596.

17.

Ibid

18.

Cushman and Cushman, p. 604.

.

,

pp.

In
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reaching the decision, the Court considered the historical

plications of due process of law and its relationship with
our judicial philosophy.

The law of the land of Magna Carta

had been interpreted to mean due process of law and the practice of compulsory self-incrimination was not regarded as

part of due process of law.

Finally, the court in Twining

went on to warn that the application of the due process of
law test to ancient English common law would act like

a

"straight jacket" upon American jurisprudence to be unloosened
only by constitutional amendment.

Incidentally, Justice

Harlan dissented sharply from the court's holding that the

protection against self-incrimination was not

a

"fundamental"

right which is protected against abridgment by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Growth of First Amendment Rights
By conceding the point that some "fundamental" rights

might be protected by the due process clause, the Court had
to face future cases in which "fundamental" rights were al-

legedly violated by the states.

Thus,

it became the task of

future justices to determine what would be so "fundamental"
that no government could violate it.

19.

211 U.S.

20.

Ibid.

78

(1908)

24

The first major breakthrough in expanding the liberties
in the Constitution to prevent encroachment by the states

came in Gitlow v. New York

.

1925.

21

Benjamin Gitlow,

a

So-

cialist, had been convicted in New York under the Criminal

Anarchy Act of 1902 for distributing

a

document,

"The Left

Wing Manifesto," which advocated the violent overthrow of the
United States Government.

Gitlow contended that the statute

was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

His position was summed up by the Court;
The argument in support of this contention rests
primarily upon the following propositions: first,
that the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the liberty of speech and of
press; and second, that while liberty of expression
'is not absolute,' it may be ‘restrained' only in
circumstances where its exercise bears a casual relation with some substantive evil, consummated,
attempted, or likely; and as the statute 'takes no
account of circumstances,' it unduly restrains this
liberty, and is therefore unconstitutional 22
.

The Court rejected Gitlow'

s

argument, because in 1925 it

was felt that advocating the overthrow of organized govern-

ment by force could not be allowed.
state,

The Court said, "That

a

in the exercise of its police power may punish those

who abuse this freedom by utterance inimical to the public
welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime,
or disturb the public peace,
for]]

is not open to question... [however

more imperative reasons,

21

.

45 S. Ct. 625

22

.

U2i&., p.629.

(1925)

a

state may punish utterances

25

endangering the foundations of organized government
and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These
imperil its
own

existence as

constitutional state."

a

23

Even though Gitlow's

appeal was adjudicated against him, the importance
of this
case for the study undertaken here is the position
taken by
the Court on fundamental personal rights.
Gj_Jilj3w,

It was stated in

For present purposes we may and do assume that free-

dom of speech and of the press

— which

are protected by the

First Amendment from abriagment by Congress— —are among the

fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the states. ..."

From this beginning the door was opened

for future interpretations expanding further the Bill of

Rights to all.

After 1925 state statutes restricting freedom

of speech and press could be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Federal standards of speech and press would thus be applied
to the states.

Federal protection of civil rights and liber-

ties had begun.

Near

v.

Minnesota

.

the next case to be considered here,

represents the climax of the evolution in constitutional law

whereby freedom of speech and press are at last "nationalized,"
Thereafter, federal constitutional standards governing free
speech and press would apply to the states.

23.

Ibid

24.

Ibid.

.

,

p.630.

Near had been

26

publishing

a

weekly expos£ on the scandalous behavior of pub-

lic officials during the prohibition era.

A Minnesota statute

now known as the "Minnesota gag law", provided for the
"padlocking, by injunctive process, of

a

newspaper for printing

matter which was scandalous, malicious, defamatory, or ob—
scene’.'.

25

The injunction could be lifted if the publisher

could prove in court none of these conditions existed.

This

process, in the view of the Supreme Court, amounted to prior

censorship and violated
speech and press.

a

long-established canon

The majority of the Court felt,

of free
"...

[t]

hat

liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by
the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although ex-

clusively, immunity from previous restraints of censorship." 26

What is even more important to note in this study of the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is the precise
statement regarding its position on speech and press.
quote the Court.

To

"It is no longer open to doubt that the

liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty

safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action." 27
be reviewed in

a

later section on "A Student's Right to

Ct. 625

25.

51 S.

26.

Ibid.

,

P-

631.

27.

Ibid

,

p

628

.

This case will also

.

(1931)

a

Free

27

Press",

for Near v. Minnesota also defines important
boundaries

for the responsible press to follow.

The other liberties mentioned in the First Amendment

quickly became incorporated under federal judicial scrutiny
and discipline.

In Ham i 1 ton v.

sity of California

.

1934,

Boar d o f Regents of the Univer—

freedom of religion was held to be

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff's religious liberty was not abridged by compulsory military drill as

mg

the state university.

a

Freedom of assembly became effec-

tively "nationalized" in DeJonqe v. Oregon
a

condition of attend-

.

1937.

De Jonge

Communist, had been convicted by an Oregon statute that pro-

hibited members of the Communist Party from assembling for
any reason.

The Court in reaffirming its decision in Near

went on to include peaceful assembly as

a

.

fundamental right

no government may encroach upon only in rare and exceptional

circumstances.

Again,

the vehicle used to extend this right

to all was the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.

Freedom of speech and of the press, the Court declared,

"•••DQre fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal

28.

293 U.S.

29.

Ibid.

30.

299 U.S.

245 (1934)

353

(1937)

28

Constitution

.
.

.

31

.

Cushman and Cushman accurately assess the
judicial position after DeJonge.
The Court in case after
case had been

classifying the provisions of the Bill of Rights
into those
which are fundamental freedoms binding the
states through the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment and those
which

are not

essential to due process and not binding upon the
states.
effect,

In

the Court had established what Cushman and
Cushman

perceive as an "honor roll" of superior rights which
would
bind both the state and national governments.

3

'

5

Under these

circumstances the Court could pick and choose what it wanted
to "incorporate"

— what

provisions found in the Bill of Rights

they wanted applied to the states.
By 1947, Justice Hugo Black of the Supreme Court was call-

ing for

a

total incorporation of the first eight amendments.

In a vigorous dissent,

in Adamson v.

Black stated his position.

California

He wrote,

"

.

.

.

.

Court con-

*Thej

cludes that although comment upon testimony in

1947, Justice

a

federal court

would violate the Fifth Amendment, identical comment in

a

state court does not violate today's fashion in civilized de-

cency

and fundamentals and is therefore not prohibited by the

federal constitution as amended." 33

Black,

31.

Ibid

32.

Cushman and Cushman, p. 592.

33.

332 U.S. 46,

.

,

p. 364.

69

(1947)

the Court

0

s

strong-

29

est proponent of the incorporation theory
until his recent
death, could not reconcile himself to a
double standard for

state and national governments where civil
rights and liberties were under attack. He sought to support
his position by
historical analysis. Black continued in Adamson
.

My study of the historical events that culminated
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the expressions
of those who sponsored and favored, as well as th
those who opposed its submission and passage, persuades me that one of the chief objects that the
provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states. 34

m

Black concluded his dissent by flatly stating that, "...

I

be-

lieve JJLtj was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to extend to all people of the nation the complete Bill
of Rights.

"

Black's position was challenged in

a

scholarly article by

Professor Charles Fairman in the Stanford Law Review.

Profes-

sor Fairman noted first the strange course of evolution the

Fourteenth Amendment had taken in constitutional law since its
ratification.
No one", he stated, "could foresee that Section 2
would prove abortive-— that the most interesting feature of Section 1, the privileges and immunities
clause, v;ould^be virtually read out of the Constitution in 1873 ^Slaughterhouse CasesJ
that the due

—

34.

Ibid .

,

p.

35

Ibid .

.

p c 89.

0

71.

30

process clause would become, from the point of view
of litigation, one of the two most important clauses in the entire Constitution or that it would be
the judiciary, not the congress, that most concerned itself with the protection of life, liberty, and
property. 36

—

In his article, he examined at length 1868 congressional com-

mittee hearings, congressional debates, state legislatures’
debates and public reactions to the amendment via newspapers
and concludes,

"Certainly that evidence, fairly, presented,

counts heavily against the theory of incorporation." 37

He

continued, "If it was understood in the legislatures that con-

sidered the proposed amendment, that its adoption would impose upon the state governments the provisions of the federal
Bill of Rights,

then almost certainly each legislature would

take note of what the effect would be upon the constitutional
lav?

and practice of its own state."

38

Fairman alludes to the

point that "incorporation", or forcing the states to abide by
federal standards spelled out in the Bill of Rights, would

certainly have been rejected by the states, especially Amendment VII which requires jury trial in suits at common law ex38. twenty dollars.
ceeding

A survey of debates where states considered the proposed

Fourteenth Amendment centered around ratification and not in-

Charles Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,"
Stanford Law Review Vol. 2 (December, 1949), 8-9.
36.

,

37.

Ibid.

,

p.

81.

Ibid.

,

p.

82

31

corporation.

39

Professor Fairraan concluded his lengthy arti-

cle by asserting,

"In his

[Black's]

contention that Section

was intended and understood to impose Amendment
the states,

him."

40

I

I

to VIII upon

the record of history is overwhelmingly against

Black retorted that as

a

United States Senator, he

could better interpret what really was meant in the congressional committee hearings and debates.
The Warren Court

The movement for racial equality in the 1950's provided
the force that made the judiciary see the importance of ex-

tending the scope of constitutional protection to all.
The Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Warren, quickly made its position on civil rights known to
the country in the famous 1954 Brown decision.

41

Bernard

Schwartz assessed the impact of Brown on society as equal only
to a political revolution or a military conflict.

and Cushman stated of Brown

,

a

decision of greater

.

Ibid

.

,

p

40.

Ibid

.

,

p.

41.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

.

83

Cushman

"It is doubtful if the Supreme

Court in its entire history has rendered

39

^

*

.

139.
,

347 U.S. 483

(1954)

Bernard Schwartz, "The Amendment in Operation: A
Historical Overview," The 14tn Amendment Centennial Volume, EdiNew York Press), p. 32.
ted by Bernard Schwartz ~CNew York:
42.
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social and ideological significance than this." 4 "

With

a

sweeping decree, the Court held invalid the "separate but
equal" doctrine which had legalized racial discrimination for

over fifty years.

Where the executive and legislative branch-

es had failed to act,

the Court thrust itself into the fore-

front as the guardian and perpetrator of egalitarianism.

The

"equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment was the

constitutional vehicle used to deliver this historic judgement,
not the due process clause.

Chief Justice Warren in rendering

the unanimous decision declared,

We conclude that in the field of education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place.
Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether
such segregation also violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 44

Even though the due process clause was not an issue,

Brown is mentioned because it was

a

result of the strongest

force in current constitutional development, the demand for

racial justice.

4

'*

This force has also extended the idea of

43.

Cushman and Cushman, p. 793.

44.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

,

347 U.S. 483

495 (1954)

Archibald Cox, The Warren Court, Consti tu tional De45.
cision as an I nstrument of Reform TCambridge, Massachusetts:
p. 5.
Tfarvard University Press, 1968
)

,

33

egalitarianism to cover

a

state's basic obligations to its

citizens.

As a result, the Court has concerned
itself with
the protection of personal liberties and
privacy against gov-

ernment intrusions as well as significant reforms
in criminal
procedures for federal and state courts.
Thus, a vigorous

period of judical activism, revived after
years, had begun in 1953.

a

period of twenty

The Warren Court, its defenders say,

spearheaded progress in civil rights, administration of criminal justice, protection of individual liberty and strengthened and extended political democracy.

46

By the time Chief

Justice Warren retired from the highest bench sixteen years
later, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had

been held to incorporate virtually all of the Bill of Rights.
The final say in civil liberties had been effectively trans-

ferred to the federal court system thereby causing

a

basic

institutional change--the expansion of federal judicial power
at the expense of the states.

The W arren Court was, of course, not without critics.

The members of the highest court have been criticized for er-

ratic subjectivity of judgment, analytical laxity, intellectual incoherence, and imagining too much history.

Opponents

of the Warren Court assert that the failure of society to a-

bide by the school desegregation decree of 1954 is an example

46

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

34

where judicial supremacy can not work in broad areas
of social
policy.
For the purpose of this study of students’
constitutional rights,

in spite of the criticism,

most significant.

the Warren Court is

It was this court's determination to ex-

pand the concept of egalitarianism which ultimately came to
include school students as well as other members of society.
It was also this court that made the individual liberties found
in the Bill of Rights

a

reality for all citizens.

By 1960, The Supreme Court had

a

majority of members who

either believed in the "selective incorporation" theory or who

would vote with the theory's proponents ir/cases involving
civil liberties.

As

a

result,

in decision after decison,

the

Court made various aspects of the Bill of Rights applicable
to the States.

The most important decisions are reviewed here

in chronological order.

The Expansion of Constitutional Rights in the 1960's
In 1961 Mapp v. Ohio

48

the Court held that evidence seized

in an illegal search could not be admissible in state court

proceedings.

The State of Ohio had convicted Mrs. Mapp for

knowingly having had in her possession lewd and lascivious

Alexander M. Bickel The Supreme C ourt and the Idea
47.
of Progress (New York: Harper and Row, 1970T7 p.45.
,

48.

367 U.S. 643 (1961)

35

books, pictures, and photographs.

sibly been seeking

a

Police officers had osten-

person in connection

with

a

recent bomb-

ing when they forcefully entered Mrs. Mapp's home
without

search warrant.

a

During the course of the search, pornograph-

ic material was seized and used as evidence to convict
the

defendant.
saying,

The Supreme Court frowned upon such action by the

"...

T/Tj

to the Federal Government,

s

the Fourth and

Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from un-

conscionable invasions of privacy... do enjoy an 'intimate relation'

in their perpetuation of principles of humanity and
civil liberty...." 49 The Court went on to say:
•

•

Moreover, our holding that the exclusionary rule is
an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior
case, but it also makes very good sense.
There is
no war between the Constitution and common sense.
Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of
evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney
across the street may, although he supposedly is
operating under the enforcible prohibitions of the
same Amendments.
Thus, the State, by admitting
evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage
disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it
is bound to uphold.
The problem of the double standard in criminal justice recog-

nized by the Court was to be solved by applying federal standards to the states.

reasoning in Mapp

.

It is worth examining further the Court's

"Federal state cooperation in the solution

of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted,

49.

Ibid

50.

Ibid.

.

,

p.657.

if

36

only by recognition of their now mutual obligation
to respect
the same fundamental criteria in their approaches." 51
Here,

the Court is convinced,

in the essence of justice,

all law

enforcement agencies should be bound to the same standards.
Finally,

the importance of due process is stressed.

"The ig-

noble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends
to

destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on
which the liberties of the people rest.

Having once recogniz-

ed that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment
is enf orcible against the States...

becomes enforcible in

it

\

the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secur-

ed by the Due Process Clause." 52

Gideon v. Wainwright 5 3 in 1963 dealt with the conviction
of

a

Florida indigent who was denied counsel by the state.

Florida statutes provided for
in capital offenses.

a

state-appointed attorney only

Gideon, defending himself as best he

could, was convicted of

a

crime.

Justice Black, the most vi-

gorous proponent of the "total incorporation" theory, delivered the opinion in Gideon

.

He said,

"

.

.

.

Tr]

eason and re-

flection require us to recognize that in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too

51.

Ibid

.

,

p.

658.

52

Ibid
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,

p.

660.

.

53.

372 U.S.

335 (1963)
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poor to hire

lawyer, cannot be assured

a

counsel is provided for him.

a

fair trial unless

This seems to be an obvious

54

truth.

Rights and liberties considered by the
Court to be fundamental would be protected by due process
as they were outlined earlier in Palko v. Connecticut 5 the
Court reasoned in
G id eon

.

Using the Palko formula, the Court determined
the

right of counsel was deemed "fundamental" and
therefore guaranteed to all citizens as a matter of due process
of law.

The Court confirmed its belief by saying, "The
right of one

charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it
is in
ours.

56

thereafter, the right of counsel bacame

a

protected

right of all citizens prescribed in Article VI of the United
States Constitution.
In Malloy v.

57

Hogan

the Supreme Court incorporated the

self incrimination section of the Fifth Amendment through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

tioner had refused to testify in

a

The peti-

Connecticut investigation

into alleged gambling activities for fear of self-incrimination.

54.

Ibid

55.

302 U.S.

56.

Gideon v. Wainwriqht

57 .

378 U.S.
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,
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For his refusal he was sent to jail.

Justice Brennan in de-

livering the opinion of the Court, applied the Fifth
Amendment to cover state proceedings.

He said,

"We hold that the

Fourteenth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
and that under the applicable federal standard,

the Connecti-

cut Supreme Court of Errors erred in holding that the privilege was not properly invoked." 58
The number of rights found in the Constitution continued
to bo nationalized as the decade progressed.

Nineteen sixty-

five saw the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment which allows
the accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

Pointer was arrested on

a

charge of robbery in Texas.

Before

the trial took place the only witness against him moved and a

transcript of the account was submitted
appearance.

confront

a

in.

lieu of

a

personal

Pointer claimed he was being denied the right to
witness against him. 59

ing through Justice Black again,

The Court agreed and speakstated:

"We hold today that

the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the wit-

nesses60.against him is likewise

a

fundamental right and is

made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment."

50

The Court went further in its reasoning, "The fact that this

right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights re-

58.

Ibid

59.

Pointer v. Texas
Ibid

.

.

,

,

p.

p.

3

403.

,

380 U.S. 400 (1965)
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fleets the belief of the framers of those
liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental
right essential
to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution." 61

Here Justice

Black indicates the framers had intended this
Sixth Amendment
right to be enjoyed by all. As earlier noted,
this point is

historically debatable, nevertheless, federal standards
in the
Sixth Amendment became applicable to the states through
the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Another landmark decision in 1965 was Griswo ld
ticut.

62

v.

Connec-

The case was taken on appeal from the Supreme Court

of Errors of Connecticut over the conviction of the Executive

of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut for

promoting birth control in Connecticut.
The General Statutes of Connecticut,

53-32 and 54-96

stated
Any person who uses any drug, medical article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes,
hires or commands another to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the
principal offender.
In overturning the conviction and declaring the Connecti-

cut statutes unconstitutional on the grounds it violated the

First Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court estab-

61.

I bid

62.

381 U.S. 479

.

,

p.
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lished the concept that, "The First Amendment
has

a

penumbra

63
privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion."

V7here

The "penumbra doctrine" creates various
zones of privacy around the right of association. Webster
defines the word
penumbra as "a surrounding or adjoining region
in which something exists in a lesser degree." Griswold
contends that the
right of association, although not mentioned in
the First

Amendment, is

First Amendment right.

a

Speaking for the Su-

preme Court, Justice Douglas delivered the opinion stating:
The right of 'association' like the right of belief
|_Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
is
more than the right to attend a meeting;
it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation
with it or by other lawful means. Association in
that context is a form of expression of opinion:
and while it is not expressly included in the First
Amendment its existence is necessary.^
1

The Supreme Court,

in,

fact, made privacy

a

"fundament-

al" right protected by the United States Constitution.

The

Court in Griswold further elaborated upon the zones of privacy created by the "penumbra doctrine" in respect to other

constitutional rights of citizens.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet

63.

Ibid

64.

Ibid.

.

,

p.483.

4.1

of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly
Y
affirms the right of the people to
be secure in
heir person, houses, papers, and
effects against
unreasonable searchers and seizures.
The'Fifth
Ch ^ overnmen t may not force him
Y W
to surSnd^
render.
The enumeration in the Constitution,
of
certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or
disparage others retained by the people
Two years later in 1967, a North
Carolina legal proce-

™

dure brought

challenge to another Sixth Amendment
right,
that of a speedy trial.
In the resulting case, Klopfer v.
North Ca rolina 66 the court held
unconstitutional a state
procedure known as n olle prosequi which allowed
a prosecua

,

.

tor to discharge

defendant and at some future day to be de-

a

termined by him, restore the case to the court
docket.
er,

a

leave
ed.

zoology professor at Duke
a

Klopf-

University had refused to

restaurant when ordered.

A trespassing charge result-

Instead of being tried, Klopfer'

s

case was postponed

for eighteen months under nolle prosegui

his case to court but to no avail.

.

He tried to bring

The charges against him

restricted his travel and professional activities to the point
of being burdensome.

Klopfer sought relief claiming that

prosequi denied him his constitutional right to

a

speedy

trial

The Supreme Court agreed, declaring that,
that the right to

65.

Ibid.

66.

386 U.S.

a

"We hold here

speedy trial is as fundamental as any of

213

(1967)
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the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment^ That
right has its

roots at the very foundation of our English law
heritage. 68
The Court concluded that, "History has established
that

it is

one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution." 69
In concurring in the IClopfer case, Justice Harlan
reminded the court,

"I am unable to subscribe to the constitutional

premises upon which that result is based— quite evidently the

viewpoint that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" or "absorbs" as such all or some of the specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights." 70

He also went on to say that,

"I do not

believe that this is sound constitutional doctrine."

7^

Even

though Justice Harlan was against the "incorporation" theory,
his concurrence in the decision helped make it

constitutional law.

a

reality in

Incorporation of the Bill of Rights ad-

vocated by Justice Black twenty years earlier in Adamson was
being accomplished on

case by case basis.

a

In Duncan v. Louisiana 72 the Supreme Court reviewed
,

its previous decisions that had dramatically increased the

scope of an individual's rights and liberties.

67.

Ibid

68.

Ibid.

69.

Ibid

70.

Ibid.

71.

Ibid

72.

391 U.S.
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,

p
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,

p.

226.
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The Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of
for guidance many of the rights guaranteed
by the first eight amendments to the Constitution
have been held to be protected against state action
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That clause now protects the rights to compensation for property taken by the State; the rights
°f free from unreasonable searches and seizures and
to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence
illegally seized; the right guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to be free of compelled self-incrimination;
and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, to a
speedy and public trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses
and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. ^
;

1

Duncan expanded the scope of nationalization of the Bill
of Rights by including the right to

a

jury trial.

Duncan,

a

black youth of nineteen, was found guilty of simple battery
and sentenced to serve sixty days in prison and was fined

He was denied

$150.

a

jury trial in the State of Louisiana

wherein statutes provided for

a

jury trial only in capital

offenses or where imprisonment at hard labor could result.

Court overturned Duncan's conviction stating,

" .

.

.

[b_

The

ecause we

believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees

a

right of jury trial in all criminal

cases which--were they to be tried in

a

federal court would

come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."

73.

Ibid

.

,

p.

75

148.

Witnesses testified that Duncan, a Negro, and his
two cousins, during a confrontation with four white youths,
allegedly slapped one of the white boys on the elbow which
resulted in his sentence by a Louisiana judge.
74.

75.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
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Summary
The Supreme Court in the Twentieth Century gradually

expanded the Bill of Rights to cover actions by the states.
This has been accomplished through a broader interpretation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Whether

or not the framers of the Amendment intended it to be expand-

ed to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights is an academic argument

since that is what has occurred.

The Warren Court in particu-

lar made many of the federal standards found in the Bill of

Rights applicable to the states in criminal proceedings.
The reason that the Bill of Rights has been expanded to

cover state actions is because the Supreme Court has interpreted various cases in such a way to guarantee all citizens

fundamental fairness and due process of law.

by the Supreme Court that all individuals

,

The insistence

non-adult as well

as adult, be accorded due process of law has led to the growth

of constitutional rights for public school pupils, the sub-

ject of Chapter Three

<,

CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Societal Pressures and the Public Schools Today
Until quite recently discretion over pupil
control was

very broad.

Questions were raised by courts only where

a

board's discretion did not meet the test of reasonableness.
The reasonableness of

a

rule was determined by the facts in

each case and the courts traditionally were reluctant to sub-

stitute their wisdom for

a

school board’s.

Furthermore, the

courts never explored to see if the particular rule in question performed

a

proper educational function.

Finally, judg-

es tended to agree with the view of most school boards that

a

definite threat to the educational process existed if all
their rules were not upheld.'*'
However, with the growth and expansion of due process
the courts today are increasingly called upon to act as arbi-

ters of disputes between students and school administrators.

The insistence by the courts that students should be accorded
a

measure of due process in their relationships with schools

has provided the legal framework for judicial involvement in
these disputes.

In addition,

social forces acting upon the

schools have also contributed immensely to this increased in-

1.
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volvement
Schools by and large have traditionally
derived their authority to administer control over students
from a number of
sources. 2 Of primary importance is the very
fact that parents
of school pupils have quite willingly
sanctioned school
con-

trol over their children while in school.

Equally important

has been the fact that the pupils themselves
have acquiesed
to the authority over them in the
educational institutions they

attend.

Furthermore,

backed by

a

a

school, as an agent of the state, is

legislative mandate.

To put it quite succinctly,

A state school is an arm of the state, performing

a

public

function, exercising discretion committed to it by the
legislature,

and regulating citizens affected by its activities by

means of combined governmental functions.

ments as
a

a

3

Legislative enact-

source of school authority can best be seen through

typical school board enabling act.
The board shall make rules for its own government
and that of the directors, officers, teachers, and
pupils, and for the care of the schooihouse, grounds
and property of the school corporation, and aid in
the enforcement of the same, and require the performance of duties by said persons imposed by law
and the rules. 4

2.
Stephen R. Goldstein, “Reflections on Developing Trends
in the Law of Student Rights," University of Pennsylvania Law
Review vol. 118 (February, 1970T] 613-614
,

Douglas Wilson, "The Emerging Law of Students' Rights,"
Arkansas Law Review vol. 23 (Winter, 1970), 622.
3.

,

4.

Iowa Code 279.8 (1966)
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Still another source of school authority
is the accepted
status of the teacher acting in a quasijudicial capacity to
control students and to administer punishment
in the maintenance of order.
Students who violate school rules have
been
subjected to immediate punishment as proscribed
by the teachers.
Finally, one of the most important sources
of school
board authority has arisen out of the concept
of _in loco pa r entis
Briefly, in loco parentis is an extension of
the idea
of the state as parens patriae --the state
.

succeeding

to the

duties of the parent whenever the later is unable to
attend
to them.

6

The courts obviously have had to modify and revise
this

concept over the years.

For example, schools can not render

medical assistance or teach religion to public school pupils.

Recently in the area of control of pupils, in loc o parentis
has been challenged with increased vigor by dissatisfied students.

The basic problem of the concept centers around the

technical difficulties created by judicial interpretations of
the definition and the conflict between parents and teachers

over disciplinary approaches of teachers.
bluntly,

_in

6

To put it more

loco paren tis breaks down when pupils violate

school rules with parental permission.

The "long hair" con-

5.
Arnold Taylor, "With Temperate Rod: Maintaining
Academic Order in Secondary Schools," Kentucky Law Journal,
vo 1
58 (1969-1970)
.

6.

Taylor, p. 619.
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troversy in the public schools is

case in point.

a

Backed by

parents, students challenging in loco parentis in court,
point
out that by requiring short hair in school, long hair
can not
be worn once the student is again under the custody
of the

parent.

Thus,

bn loco parentis is seen more and more as a

means to control pupil behavior merely for control's sake.
l.°£P.

parentis is being replaced by

a

In

more fundamental concept,

that of due process of law.

Today rules and regulations promulgated by schools for

controlling pupils are being judged by the courts on the grounds
of fundamental fairness.

Since due process guarantees protec-

tion of the individual from governmental intrusion, then it

also would hold that the same constitutional concept protects
the individual from the state's agents,

personnel

the school and its

7

The change from the traditional sources of school authority over pupils to the emerging concept of due process is

a

complex one requiring an examination of the forces that have
influenced this change.

There is

a

strong strain of auto-

Q
cracy in the American public schools atributable to two factors.

H. C. Hudgins, Jr., "The Discipline of Secondary Stu7.
dents and Procedural Due Process: A Standard," Wake Forest Law
Review, vol. 7 (December, 1970), 35.

Edward T. Ladd, "Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior
and the Legal Authority of School Officials," Journal of Public
Law vol. 19 (1970), 218.
8.

,
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First, there is the tradition of autocratic treatment
of students arising from New England Puritanism.
Such ideas as

blind obedience to one's elders,

"middle-class" idealism that

a

inhibits nonconformity, and discipline for discipline's
sake,
stems directly from the Protestant Ethic.

orit Y

i-

n

Near absolute auth-

the public schools was therefore necessary to
instil

these ideals.

Secondly, there is

a

natural tendency of school

officials to dominate those over whose admission to the school
they have no say but for whose behavior they are held responsible.

Control for the maintenance of order became deeply in-

grained in educational administration.
Public school students now challenge the authoritarian

structure of educational institutions for
In the broadest sense,

a

number of reasons.

resistance to school authority comes

from "Man's inner drive to achieve full re-cognition of his

rights and freedoms." 9

The United States Office of Education

reports the major issues of student concern are:

1.

Dehumani-

zation of institutional life.

2.

Educational irrelevancies

Racial and cultural discrimina-

tion.^

.

4.

Inequities in society.

3.

Because of student concern for these issues, violence

has sometimes errupted in and around educational institutions.

Dale Gaddy, "Rights and Freedoms of Public School
9.
Students:
Directions from the 1960's," N. 0. L. P. E. Mono Serie
graph
s, No. 2 (1971), 1.

Robert E. Phay, "Suspensions and Expulsions of Pub10.
lic School Students," N. O. L. P. E. Monograph Series No. 3
(1971), 1.
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The threat of disruptions and violence
has prompted many educators to view the necessity for maintaining
their authority
to control pupils more essential
than ever.
A number of basic incidents leading
to disruption of the
educational process have been identified
and categorized as
the following:
a. Violence arising out of
racial conflicts,
b.

Disruptions following political protests.

over dress regulations.

d.

Resentment

Objections by students to disci-

plinary actions toward other students.
cational policy.

c.

e.

Questioning of edu-

11

Others point out that educational violence is caused
more

specifically in the public schools from:
!•

A permissive society in which persons adopt the atti-

tude that they will obey those laws they like and ig-

nore those they do not like.
2.

Substandard schools, oftentimes in the very areas
where the best teachers and facilities are needed.

3.

Untrained and unqualified administrators who are unable to cope with such subjects as mob psychology
and guerrilla tactics.

4.

Highly educated teenagers with time on their hands
and

a

high degree of social consciousness and impa-

tience with the slow progress in solving problems.

11 .

Ibid.
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Professional trouble-makers who create
disruptions.
6.
Increasingly militant teachers who
side with students.12
School officials who have sought to
stand by the traditional attitudes toward control over
students have thus
5.

found them-

selves involved in an increasing number
of legal controversies.
Courts today, particularly the federal
courts, now are willing
to intervene to reverse or enjoin
disciplinary actions involving public school pupils where one of
the following conditions
exist.
First, if there is a deprival of due process,
that is,

fundamental concepts of fair play.

Secondly, if there is evi-

dence of invidious discrimination, for example
on account of
race or religion.
Thirdly, if there exists a denial
of fed-

eral rights, constitutional or statutory, protected
in the aca-

demic community.

Finally, if the schools exhibit clearly un-

reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious action. 13

Because of the courts' willingness to intervene in areas

heretofore reserved to the discretion of school officials,

a

new body of constitutional law has emerged from their subse-

quent decisions-- the law of student constitutional rights, which
is a study in the expansion of the concept due process to in-

clude public school pupils.

Through the Supreme Court's deter-

mination to expand the scope of constitutional protection to
all, public school pupils inevitably became recipients of that

12.

Gaddy, p.

2.

"A Judicial Document of Student Discipline," Educa tional Record vol. 50 (Winter, 1969), p. 15.
13.

,
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protection.

Legal scholars now assert that,
"We are beyond
the point of no return in
guaranteeing the applicability of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights to all, regardless of age or status." 14
The vehicle used to expand
constitutional protection to
public school pupils, as well as to a
greater number of citizens
our society, has been the due process
clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as seen in Chapter Two.
Robert E. Phay
his work S^ension and Expulsion of
Public School Students
suggests that, "The main assault against
school limitations is

m

m

application of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment "
The study of this new incohate body of
constitution.

al law is a study of the process of
replacing the archaic ideas

of school authority, especially in loco parentis

emerging concept of due process of law.

,

with the

The process by which

this has come about can be perceived through

a

case study of

the major decisions affecting the law of students'
rights.

Past Judicial Attitude Toward Student Suits
Until recently public school pupils seeking judicial re-

lief from school abuses had little or no chance of successful

litigation.

The legal status of student suits that challenged

14.
Michael C. Abbott, "Due Process and Secondary School
Dismissals," Cas e Western Reserve Lav; Review, vol. 20 (Febru-

ary,

1969), p. *380.
15.

Phay, p. 4.
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rules, regulations,

and administrative procedures was
best sum-

med up by Lee 0. Garber and Newton Edwards
in the Law Governing
Pupils. The authors point out, “It is well
established by many

court decisions that school boards have
authority to make and
enforce any reasonable rules governing the
conduct of pupils.
The reasonableness of

board rule will be determined by the

a

facts in each particular case.

ness of

a

rule,

In determining the reasonable-

court will not substitute its own discretion

a

for that of the board;

the enforcement of the rule will not be

enjoined unless the rule is clearly unreasonable.
authors also stated that,
a

The

"A board of education may discipline

pupil for misbehavior wherever committed provided it direct-

ly affects school discipline and is calculated to impair its

efficiency."

Finally,

in respect to any rights the students

might have, "Unless the statute requires it, it is not necessary to give the pupil notice of his suspension or

a

hearing

before excluding him from school." 18
The extent to which school rules were upheld by the courts
can be seen in Pugsley v. Sellrneyer

1
.

Q

Miss Pugsley, an 18

16.
Lee 0. Garber and Newton Edwards, The Law Governing
Pupils (Danville:
Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc.,
1962
p. 7.
)

,

.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

8

18 .

Ibid

.

,

p.

9

19.

250 S.W.

17
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year old high school student, was suspended
from school because she wore talcum powder on her face. Citing
the school
board rule, "The wearing of transparent hosiery,
low-necked

dresses or any style of clothing tending toward
immodesty in
dress, or the use of face paint or cosmetics, is
prohibited,"
the principal refused to readmit Miss Pugsley
until she re-

moved the powder.

A lower Arkansas Court held the particular

school rule unreasonable and arbitrary.
to the Arkansas Supreme Court,

However, upon appeal

the lower court's decision was

overturned
The higher court refused to consider the substance of the

school rule or whether it performed any educational function.
Instead,

the Court decided,

"The question, therefore, is not

whether we approve this rule as one we would have made as directors of the district, nor are we required to find whether
it was essential to the maintenance of discipline.

On the

contrary, we must uphold the rule unless we find that the di-

rectors have clearly abused their discretion, and that the
rule is not one reasonably calculated to effect the purpose intended,
do so

that is, of promoting discipline in the school, and we

find."^
Two key points are important in considering the Court's

reasoning in this case.
termines

20.

a

First, the interpretation of what de-

clear abuse of discretion by the court indicates

Ibid

.

,

p.

539.
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they would frown upon only major acts of unreasonable,
arbi-

trary and capricious rule making.

Secondly, and equally im-

portant, is the Court's view that any rules promoting disci-

within the school should be upheld by the courts.

Ob-

viously, almost any rule can be justified by school officials
on the grounds it promotes discipline,

would be its original intent anyway.

for most likely that

These points are signi-

ficant in reviewing subsequent cases.
The Pugs ley decision went further in explaining the judicial philosophy at the time by pointing out that, "Courts

have other and more important functions to perform than that
of hearing the complaints of disaffected pupils of the public

schools against rules and regulations promulgated by the school

boards for the government of the schools."

The judiciary's

reluctance to usurp the prerogatives of school officials is
most evident as they concluded "...that the courts hesitate to

substitute their will and judgment for that of the school
boards' which are delegated by law as the agencies to prescribe

rules for the government of the public schools of the state,
22
which are supported at the public expense."

As late as 1965,

the judicial position on school rules

and regulations remained basically consistent with previous de-

21.

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

.
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cisions.

In Leonard v.

School Committee of Attleboro 23 the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused
to consider
the validity of

school committee rule requiring male students

a

to wear short haircuts.

The plaintiff contended such

a

rule

was unreasonable and arbitrary since it was in no way
connected with the successful operation of

a

public school.

The

Court rejected this notion stating, "The Court's function
in

reviewing this type of ruling is limited in the light of the
broad discretionary powers which the law confers upon
committee.

a

school

Je will not pass upon the wisdom or desirability

of a school regulation ." 2 ^

The Court went on to suggest that

any unusual hair style could disrupt and impede the mainten-

ance of

a

proper classroom atmosphere or decorum and conspicu-

ous departures from generally accepted customs in the matter
of haircuts could result in the distraction of other pupils. 25

This mode of judicial philosophy mentioned earlier by

Garber and Edwards began to change by the middle nineteensixties.

At this time forces undermining this philosophy be-

came so pervasive the courts were compelled to examine school

rules from

a

substantive point of view.

As

a

result of judi-

cial intervention, rules, regulations and decisions slowly

became to require the rudimentary elements of fair play

23.

212 N.E.

24.

Ibid

25.

Ibid.

.

,

p.
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of due process of law.

As seen in Chapter II of this study

the expansion of the concept of due process of law
which in-

corporated the Bill of Rights to prevent state governmental
intrusion on these rights was

a

slow,

step by step process.

Ci-

tizens heretofore denied basic constitutional protection gra-

dually gained the fuller protection of the United States Constitution.

The process by which public school pupils also

have gained

a

measure of constitutional guarantees through the

idea of due process is closely analagous to the broader expan-

sion of due process to all.

The Courts gradually recognized

the need for school rules to possess the fundamentals of fair

play, of due process of law.

It was accomplished by using the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as

a

vehicle to

broaden the scope of constitutional protection to include public school pupils.

This process can best be seen by examining

the most significant court decisions involving student legal

controversies in chronological order.

Landmark Student Suits 1923-1961
Meyer v. State of Nebraska, decided in 1923, has significance for study because the Supreme Court in this decision
struck down

a

state statute forbidding the teaching of

a

for-

eign language to children below the ninth grade, on the grounds
it deprived citizens of their "liberty" without due process of

law found in the Fourteenth Amendment.

26.

43 S. Ct. 625

(1923)

26

When

a

teacher was

57

prosecuted for teaching German in the eighth grade
and the
Nebraska's Supreme Court ruled the statute a
valid exercise of
the state's police powers, the teacher
appealed to the
Supreme

Court of the United States for relief.

In declaring the Ne-

braska law unconstitutional, the Supreme Court summed
up its
reasoning by stating, "We are constrained to conclude
that the
statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable
relation to any end within the competency of the state.

This

type of thinking, however, was not applied to lesser
policies

and rules made by agents of the state,

the school boards.

Another important school case came to the Supreme Court
in Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education

The Barnette decision struck down

a

,

1942.

West Virgina statute re-

quiring all public school pupils to salute the American flag.
Children who were Jehovah's Witnesses refused to salute the
flag in accordance with their religious beliefs and were ex-

pelled from school.
tended,

Seeking readmission, the plaintiffs con-

"...PTjhat the regulation amount 34. to

ligious liberty and

[_wasd

a

denial of re-

violative of rights which the First

Amendment to the Federal Constitution protects against impairment by the federal government and which the Fourteenth Amendment protects against impairment by the States."

The Court

agreed with the students reasoning, "To justify the overriding

27.

Ibid

28.

319 U.S. 624 (1943)

.

,

p.

628.
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of religious scruples, however,

there must be

clear justifi-

a

cation therefore in the necessities of national
or community
life.

Like the right of free speech, it is not to be
over-

borne by the police power, unless its exercise
presents
clear and present danger to the community." 29

a

The Court went

on,

The salute to the flag is an expression of the homage of the soul.
To force it upon one who has conscientious scruples against giving it is petty tyranny unworthy of the spirit of this Republic and
forbidden, we think by the fundamental law. This
Court will not countenance such tyranny but will use
the power at its command to see that rights guaranteed by the fundamental law are respected. 30

This case is clearly the first major victory for students'

constitutional rights.

Also,

the vehicle used to extend the

constitutional right of freedom of religion found in the First

Amendment to public school pupils was the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
a

However, Barnette did not have

significant impact on broader aspects of students' constitu-

tional rights because the case was limited only to the issue
of religion.

The landmark Brown 31 decision has had

a

tremendous impact

on the constitutional rights of public school pupils even

though the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was

not used in the ruling.

29.

Ibid

.

30.

Ibid

.

t

,

p

Q

p.

Instead, the Supreme Court applied

626
630.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
U.S. 294 (1954)
31.

,

Kansas

,

349
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the equal protection of the laws clause
found in the Fourteenthe Amendment to the Constitution to declare
racial discrimina-

tion unconstitutional.

What is significant, with respect to

the subject of students’

rights, is the overwhelming emphasis

placed by the Court on education.

Chief Justice Warren,

speaking for the Court, asserted,
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of the state and local governments.
Comoulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society.
It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of
good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. 32

Courts considering subsequent cases in the field of education
now have a precedent for viewing them in

a

more important light.

Anything thereafter, that might inder or dgny
portunity to an education, would be

a

a

child the op-

serious question before

the courts.

Bolling

Sharpe

v.

1954, decided on the same day as Brown

,

provides insight into the Supreme Court's rationale for later
expanding the due process of law concept to the field of pubThe essential facts in Bolling centered around

lic education.

the refusal of school officials to allow Negro children admit-

32

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

493

.
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tance to a white segregated school in the
District of Columbia.
Since federal laws apply in the District of
Columbia, the

plaintiffs contended their Fifth Amendment rights
of life liberty and property were being denied without
due process of
law.

33

j.he

plaintiffs in Brown

,

as mentioned,

were successful

in their litigation through the equal
protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Since there is no equal protection of

the laws clause in the Fifth Amendment and the
District of

Columbia was under federal jurisdiction, relief was sought
through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The

Supreme Court, noting the difference between Brown and Bolling

,

considered the issue.
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which
applies only to the state.
But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.
The "equal protection of the laws" is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than
"due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply
that the two are always interchangeable phrases.
But
as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. 34
The Court in Bolling

,

thus, went on to declare school se-

gregation unconstitutional in the District of Columbia because
it denied the students attending racially segregated schools

due process of law.

33.

347 U.S.

34

Ibid

.

.

,

p.

497 (1954)
499.
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Of particular importance to the
concept of student constitutional rights was the declaration
that, "The right of a
student not to be segregated on racial
grounds in schools so

maintained is indeed so fundamental and
pervasive that it is
embraced in the concept of due process." 35
The Supreme Court
made this declaration in a 1958 desegregation
controversy
in-

volving Little Rock, Arkansas. By stating
that segregation in
a public school was a denial of
a "fundamental"
right,

Supreme Court established

a

the

precedent where alleged violations

of any "fundamental" right might be taken to
court.
The B r own^ Bo lling

,

and Cooper decisions involved racial

segregation and discrimination and paved the way for
suits where racial questions were raised.

a

host of

Racial questions

have centered essentially around the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the topic of this study.
ever,

these three decisions did provide

a

How

broad judicial frame

work for student suits to be considered under the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Brown emphasized the im-

portance of education for all, Bolling applied the concept of
due process of law in the public schools, and Cooper declared

segregation to be

a

violation of

a

fundamental right.

All,

as

mentioned, helped significantly to open the doors to litigation of "fundamental" rights that might be denied to students
as a matter of due process of law.

35.

Cooper v. Aaron

,

358 U.S.

1,

19

(1958)
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The Courts came to grips with the question
of due process
regarding college student disciplinary action in
1961, with

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education 36
.

Six Negroes who

were involved in repeated civil rights demonstrations
in Alabama, were expelled from the State University without
formal

charges or the chance to have
many legal scholars as

a

a

hearing.

Dixon

.

considered by

major landmark decision paving the

way for students' constitutional rights, established the pre-

cedent that the fundamental right of procedural due process
found in the Fifth Amendment should be afforded college stu-

dents in tax-supported institutions prior to expulsion for misconduct.

Deciding in favor of the six civil rightists, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of due process of law,

"Whenever

a

governmental body acts so as to in-

jure an individual, the Constitution requires that the act be

consonant with due process of law." 3 7

The Court reminded the

school officials by not giving the accused students notice of
the charges against them or the opportunity to be heard, vio-

lated one of our "fundamental principles of fairness." 38

They

made the distinction between student disciplinary problems and

criminal due process by pointing out that, "This is not to im-

36.

294 F.

2d 150

37

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

155.

38.

Ibid

.

,

p.

157.

(1961)
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Ply that

full-dress judicial hearing, with the
right to
cross-examine witnesses, is required." 39
Finally, Dixon
spelled out specific requirements that
would meet
a

the test of

procedural due process in future disciplinary
actions against
college students. These requirements set
forth by the Court
will be examined later in this study.
As students began to raise constitutional
issues before
the courts in the nineteen-sixties,

became increasingly difficult.

the problem of jurisdiction

Traditionally,

a

federal court

would accept jurisdiction in student disputes
only where

a

constitutional issue was at hand or judicial relief
had been

exhausted in state courts.

Once the Supreme Court expanded

the scope of "fundamental freedoms" through the
Fourteenth

Amendment, the federal courts were forced to accept controversies where constitutional rights were being denied by state
action

.

Landmark Student Suits 1961-1969
The most significant cases thus far to be considered in
this study paving the way for public school pupils' constitu-

tional rights were decided by the Fifth Circuit Court on July
21,

1966.

Burnside v. Byars4 °and Blackwell

39.

Ibid.

40.

363 F.

2d 744

(

1966

)

v.

Issaquena County

64

Board of Education 41

do,

for the first time, extend to high

school students the constitutional rights
to freedom of speech.
Both decisions centered about expulsion of
students who persisted in wearing "Freedom Buttons" in violation
of school
rules.

The students alleged their First Amendment
right to

freedom of speech was being denied them for want
of due process of law found in the Fourteenth Amendment.

Blackwell up-

held the suspensions because the students involved
were causing suostantial disruption to the school.

Burnside, on the

other hand, disallowed the suspensions for in their
exercise
of free expression,

the students did not disrupt the education-

al process.

Aside from the Barnette decision, Burnside is the first

major successful litigation of public school pupils against an

educational institution involving First Amendment rights.
.

as the Gi tlow

42

Just

decision in 1925 paved the way for future incor-

poration of the constitutional right of free speech to adult
citizens, Burnside extended this same First Amendment right to

public school pupils.

To quote the Court:

"The interest of

the state in maintaining an educational system is
one, giving rise to

a

a

compelling

balancing of First Amendment rights with

the duty of the state to further and protect the public school

41.

363 F.

2d 749

42.

Gitlow

v.

(1966)

New York

,

268 U.S. 652 (1925)
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system

.

The Fifth Circuit Court went on to declare the
right of
free speech to be

saying

,

a

constitutional right of high school pupils

"They cannot infringe on their students' right to free

and unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under
the

First Amendment to the Constitution, where the exercise of
such rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms do not

materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
°f appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.

The limitations imposed on the right of

school pupil to free

a

speech outlined in the Blackwell and Burnside decisions will
be discussed in detail in

later section of this study.

a

One year later the Supreme Court considered the problem
of minors as non-citizens without constitutional rights in
R e Gault 45 1967.
Gerald Gault, age 15, had been on proba,

tion for six months when he and another boy made an obscene

phone call and were subsequently caught.

After

a

hearing,

Gault was ordered confined to the State Industrial School in

Arizona for the period of his minority.

The decision resulted

in a six-year sentence in the reformatory.

The decision was

taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.

cause he was

minor,

a

alleged he had been denied the basic

43.

Burnside v. Byars

44.

I bid

45.

387 U.S.

.

,

749.

p.
1

Gault, be-

(1967)

,

363 F.

2d 744,

748 (1966)
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rights of: notice of charges, right to
counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to a transcript of the
proceedings, and
the right to appellate review.
In overturning Gerald Gault's confinement
order,

preme Court, in

the Su-

most important pronouncement, declared

a

"Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for
adults alone." 46 The reasons the Supreme Court used
in adjudi-

cating

Ga_u]_t

are important when considering constitutional

rights of public school pupils.
a

By stating that Gerald Gault,

minor of 15, had constitutional rights guaranteed by the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the door was now
open to the expansion and elaboration of constitutional rights

through subsequent court decisions.
ued,

"If a child is delinquent

— the

The Court in Gault continState may intervene.

In

doing so it does not deprive the child of any rights, because
he has none.
is entitled."

It merely provides the custody to which the child
47

The Court also questioned the Juvenile Court system by
stating.

Juvenile court history has ... demons trated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and has
not always produced fair, efficient, and effective
procedures. Departure from established principles

46

.

47.

Ibid

.

Ibid.

,

p

67

of due process have frequently resulted not
in an
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.^®

As far as

a

juvenile is concerned, the Court said,

"

. .

.

[t]

he

essentials of due process may be more impressive than thera49
The same logic is being applied by the courts as
peutic.
they consider school disciplinary policies today.

The essence of Gault rested on the dichotomy
tice for an adult and justice for

a

minor.

between jus-

In Arizona,

example, an adult's maximum punishment would have been

for
a

fine

of five to fifty dollars or imprisonment for not more than two

months.

Instead, Gault,

a

minor, received

a

six year sentence.

Also, defendants over the age of 18 would have federal consti-

tutional protection and Arizona constitutional and legal rights.
The Gault decision is most significant to this study of
students' constitutional rights for

a

number of reasons.

First,

the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States announced

that constitutional rights were "not for adults alone," expands

constitutional protection to non-adults.

This also strengthen-

ed the Fifth Circuit Court's ruling in Burnside which granted

freedom of speech rights to high school pupils.

Secondly,

the Supreme Court reminded the State that it can no longer treat

minors arbitrarily however benevolently the State's intentions
are.

This same reasoning applied to Gault in dealing with the

48.

Ibid.

49.

Ibid.
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Juvenile Courts could thereafter be applied to
another agent
of the state acting as p arens patriae the
public
,

tem.

school sys-

Thirdly, the decision paved the way for the
Supreme

Court to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee
public
school pupils

measure of constitutional protection.

a

In 1969 the most significant court decision to
date in

the area of student constitutional rights was handed
down by
the Supreme Court. 50

The Supreme Court in this important case

first declared that,

"First Amendment rights, applied in light

of the special characteristics of the school environment,

available to teachers and students." 51

are

Justice Fortas, in de-

livering the opinion stated, "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to

freedom of speech or expression

at the schoolhouse gate." 52

In holding that students have the constitutional right to free

speech and expression the court decided that the wearing of

armbands by public school pupils was

a

right to free expression in school.

The court reasoned,

lawful exercise of the
"In

52.

order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,

it must

be able to show that its action was caused by something more

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
50.
District, 89 S. Ct. 733 1969
)'

(

51

.

Ibid

.

Ibid.

,

p.

736
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than

a

mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness

that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint

The burden of showing material and substantial
interference with the educational process before denial
of freedom of
speech or expression could be curtailed was placed
on the

school officials in Tinker

.

The boundaries of the Tinker de-

cision will be discussed in detail later in this study,
but
the important thing to note here is that public school
pupils

had been granted the First Amendment right of freedom of speech
b Y the Supreme Court of the United States.

As in previous de-

cisions, again the importance of the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment was evident, for it is used to expand the
scope of constitutional protection to persons heretofore not

covered by that protection, pubic school pupils.
SUMMARY
From Barnette

.

where the Supreme Court declared public

school pupils have First Amendment rights to the free exercise
of religion,

to Dixon

,

where procedural due process rights

were granted to college students, to

Burnside

,

a

federal court ruling in

allowing high school students free expression, to

the Supreme Court's notion that constitutional rights "were

not for adults alone" in Gault

,

finally to the Tinker decision

which expanded constitutional protection to public school pu-

53.

Ibid

.

,

p.

738.
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Pi 1 s by the Su P rerne Court,

can be seen an evolutionary process

of the development of fundamental
fairness or due process of
law for students.
The process by which public school
pupils

have gained

a

measure of constitutional protection is thus

closely analagous to the broader expansion of
constitutional
rights to all citizens. Once the Supreme Court
confirmed the

principle that constitutional rights should be afforded
to public school students, the inevitable began to occur.
Courts,
through

a

broader interpretation of the concept of due process

of law found in the Fourteenth Amendment, began to
extend

other constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights to public
school pupils just as the courts had done for adult citizens
as indicated in Chapter Two.

The major court decisions defining the boundaries and

scope of public school pupils' constitutional rights in the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Amend-

ments, as well as the judicial reasoning for their decisions,

will be the topics for subsequent chapters in this study.

The

most significant area of student constitutional rights, that
of free expression in the First Amendment, will be examined

first.

CHAPTER

I V
1

FREE EXPRESSION AS A STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT
Symbolic Speech

There is no question today that public school
pupils

have the First Amendment right of freedom of
speech.
>

ss seen in the previous chapter,

this right.

afforded students

The task of the Courts today is to determine

the scope and boundaries of student First Amendment rights.

Interestingly enough, student suits alleging

a

violation of

freedom of speech have not involved speech per se but sym-

bolic acts of "expression" such as; armbands, buttons,
dress, hair and flag saluting.

The Supreme Court has repeat-

edly held, that non-speech activities closely akin to "pure
speech" are entitled to comprehensive protection under the

First Amendment.

2

The systematic expansion of free speech

to cover non-speech activities can be seen in a number of

recent Supreme Court decisions.
In 1940,

the right to picket became a constitutionally

protected act of freedom of speech in Thornhill

v.

Alabama .

During a labor dispute, the constitutionality of an Alabama
law was challenged.

1

.

District
2

.

3.

The law stated:

T inker v . Des M oines Independent Community School
89 S.Ct. 733“ll969)
.

'

Ibid .

,

p.

736

310 U.S. 89

(1940)

3
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Loitering or picketing forbidden.
Any person or
persons, who without a just cause
or leJS ScS.
near t0 ° r loiter about the
or'SfSV'S
business of any other person premises
P
firm
corporation, or association of people
eAaaaed’in
U
b
S
f ° r the P-poIefor
intent to influencing, or inducing
other persons
r
Wlth bUy f ra Sel1 to have bus
iness
dealings
dealinas with
T°
with, or 'h
be employed
by such persons firm
corporation, or associations of persons
for the
purpose of hindering, delaying, or
interfering with
injunng any lawful business or enterprise of
another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor;
but
nothing herein shall prevent any person
from soliciting trade or business for a competitive
bus^
4

i^r

»

'

'

'

iness.

Labor leaders in Alabama challenged the
statute on
grounds it denied them the rights of free speech,

assembly,

and petition.

The right to peacefully picket, denied them

by the Alabama statute, they asserted, should be
a consti-

tutionally protected act of free speech.

The Supreme Court

agreed with the assertion and declared Section 3448 unconstitutional.

The Court first pointed out the importance

of protecting freedom of speech as follow:

The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that
men may speak as they think on matters vital to
them and that falsehoods may be exposed through
the process of education and discussion is essential to free government.
Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to
discover and spread economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted and their
evil averted by the courageous exercise of the
right of free discussion. Abridgment of freedom of
speech and of the press, however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential

4.

Alabama Code 1923 Section 3448

’

5
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to effective exercise of the power of
correcting
error through the process of popular government.
We think that Section 3448 is invalid
on its face.
he freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed
by the Constitution embraces at the least
liberty
to discuss publically and truthfully all
matters
of public concern without previous
restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment. 5

In the 1960 s
•

court decisions resulted in the expansion

,

of freedom of speech to still other areas of
non-speech ac-

tivities.

Edwards v. .South Carolina

^
f

1963, afforded civil

demonstrations First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and assembly.

In the Edwards

decision, Negro high

school and college students peacefully marched to the State

House for the purpose of protesting laws discriminatory to
the citizens of South Carolina.

The demonstrators sang pa-

triotic and religious songs, clapped their hands, and stamped
their feet outside the Capitol.

police to leave the premises.

They were ordered by the
When they failed to comply,

arrests were made on the grounds of breach of the peace.

The Supreme Court overturned the breach of the peace convictions by the State of South Carolina on the grounds First

Amendment rights were violated; thus, the right of peaceful
demonstrations became an act of freedom of speech or expression .

Another form of freedom of speech was secured by the
courts in Brown v. Louisiana

5

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

95

6.

Ibid., pp. 101-102.

7.

372 U.S. 229 (1963)

.

1966.

Brown, a Negro, sat

74
8

down in a public library to protest its
segregation rule.
Upon his refusal to leave the library. Brown
was arrested
and convicted of breach of the peace and failure to
disperse
or move on in a public building when ordered.
The Supreme

Court in declaring Brown's action as an expression
of free
speech said.
We are dealing with an aspect of a basic
constitutional right the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech
and assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of grievance... As this Court
has repeatedly stated, these rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include
the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to
protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a
0
place where the protestant has every right to be...

—

Other civil rights cases'

1'

8

have strengthened the Supreme

Court's contention that demonstrations are symbolic speech

activities to be constitutionally protected.
Limits on Free Expression
An important point to consider in the study of First
10.

Amendment rights of free expression is the extent to which
governments may restrict the exercise of that expression.
The past affords us with many examples where a governmental

8.

383 U.S. 131

9.

Ibid

.

,

p.

(1966)

142.

N.A.A.C.Po v. Alaba ma. 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
See:
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button 371 U.S~ 415 Tl963); Cox v. Louisiana
379 U.S. 536 (1964);' and Ad der ley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
,

(1966)

.
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interest was compelling enough to restrict free speech.
v * United States

,

1919,

11

In

the Espionage Act of 1917

was challenged on the grounds it violated the First Amend-

ment right of freedom of speech.

The Supreme Court asserted

that free speech was not an absolute right and was never

intended to be so.

Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck announced

the now famous "clear and present danger" test on free speech

activities.

He stated,

"The most stringent protection of

free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in an theatre and causing a panic."

In sustaining Schenck'

conviction and upholding the validity of governmental interest
in restricting his speech the Court went on to say,

"When a

nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no court

could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." 1

Gitlow

.

3

mentioned earlier, is another significant deci-

sion where free speech was allowed to be restricted by

pelling governmental interest.

a

com-

Even though the Supreme Court

expanded freedom of speech as against state as well as federal

intervention through the due process clause of the Fourteenth

llo

249 U.S, 47 (1919)

12 ‘

Ibid -

,

p.

Ibid .

,

p. 56

13.

52
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Amendment, Gitlow's conviction
for distributing a document
advocating the overthrow of the
United States Government was
sustained.
However, the Court took a
different view in Terminiello
v. Chicago, 14 1949, where
it upheld a controversial
case in-

volving the issue of free speech.

Terminiello, in addressing

Chicago group called the Christian
Veterans of America,
condemned the conduct of some one thousand
protesters outside
the auditorium and, at the same
time, vigorously and viciously criticized various political
and racial groups whose act
ivities he denounced as inimical to
the nation's welfare.
He was arrested and convicted of
disorderly conduct by the
City of Chicago. In the often quoted
opinion overturning
Terminiello's conviction, the Supreme Court
established guidelines for those who would restrict the
First Amendment right
of free speech.
a

Accordingly a function of free speech under our system ^of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces
a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It may strike at unsettling effects as it
presses
for acceptance though not absolute,... is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience annoyance
or unrest. 15
'

14.

337 U.S.

15.

Ibid .

,

p.

1

(1949)
4.
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The Court concluded its eloquent pronouncement
by as-

serting that, "There is no room under our Constitution
for
a more restrictive view.
For the alternative would

lead to

standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or
dominant political or community groups."^
However, in the decade that followed Terminiello the

courts became moie restrictive of free speech due largely
to the fear of communism.

Dennis v. United States

,'*'

7

1951,

sustained the conviction of communist party members who sought
to overthrow the government by force and violence.

The Court

said:

Overthrow of the Government by force and violence
is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the
ultimate value of society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal
attack, it must follow that no subordinate value
can be protected.
If, then, this interest may be
protected, the literal problem which is presented
is what has been meant by the use of the phrase
'clear and present danger' of the utterances bringing about the evil within the power of Congress to
punish.
The pendulum began to swing back to the "clear and pre-

sent danger" test advocated by Justice Holmes beginning with
the Yates

19

decision in 1957.

The Courts today take a posi-

tion on restrictions of free speech more in line with the

16.

Ibid .

17.

341 U.S. 494 (1951)

18.

Ibid .

19.

Yates v. United States

,

,

p.

p.

4-5.

867.

354 U.S.

298 (1957)
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Terminiello decision of 1949.
By 1966 there were ample judicial
interpretation that

would allow the courts to expand the scope
of the First
Amendment to include symbolic speech activities,
such as
black armbands in the public schools. Also,
there were ample precedents to determine under what circumstances
acts
of expression could or could not be restricted
by the state.

Burnside and Blackwell
Burnside and Blackwell

.

mentioned briefly in Chapter

Three, were purposely decided on the same day by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

were suspended from
tons;

a

In Blackwell students

public school for wearing "SNCC" but-

they were forcing buttons upon unwilling receiptors,

disrupting classes, and displaying hostility and discourtesy
throughout the school.

As a result,

the students were not

allowed to wear the freedom buttons in school.

Those refus-

ing to comply with the school rule were suspended, resulting
in the litigation.

The Court, stressing the importance of the issue, said,
"Cases of this nature, which involve regulations limiting

freedom of expression and the communication of an idea,

which are protected by the First Amendment, present a serious constitutional question.

A valuable constitutional right

is involved and decisions must be made on a case basis,

keeping in mind always the fundamental constitutional rights

79

of those being affected."

2.0

The suggestion that these issues

be decided on a case by case basis is

a

crucial one, for the

courts have done just that in litigation on student constitutional questions.
In upholding the suspension of the students in Blackwell

the Fifth Circuit Court went on to say, "The constitutional

guarantee of freedom of speech “does not confer an absolute
right to speak' and the law recognizes that there can be an
In each case courts must ask whether

abuse of such freedom.

the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability,

justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger."

2

The court concluded by stating that,

"In this case the reprehensible conduct described above was

so inexorably tied to the wearing of the buttons that the

two are not separable."

Burnside

,

22

on the other hand, was decided in favor of

suspended pupils for material or substantial disruptions were
not created by the wearing of the buttons in their school.
The Court went to great length to point out that school officials, as agents of the state, are responsible for maintaining discipline necessary in the educational process.

The establishment of an educational program requires
the formulation of rules and regulations necessary
for the maintenance of an orderly program of class-

Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education
20.
363 F. 2d~~749~, 753 (1966)
o

Ibid .

,

pp.

22.

Ibid.

,

p.

21

753-754.
754

,
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rning
In formulati ng regulations,
includ™T^*
g hOSe P ertainin g to the discipline of school
T^
:

1

-

children, school officials have a wide
latitude of
discretion.
But the school is always bound by the
requirement that the rules and regulations be
reasonable.
I!

Thus school rules which assign students to
a particular class, forbid unnecessary discussion in
the
classroom and prohibit the exchange of conversation
be tween students are reasonable even though
these
regulations infringe on such basic rights as freedom of speech and association, because they are
classroom activities. 23
In

as opposed to Blackwell

.

students were ex-

pelled for violating a no button regulation, not for causing
disruptions.

The Court in an effort to abate the fears of

school officials that the judiciary might usurp their prerogatives, pointed out, "We wish to make it quite clear that

we do not applaud any attempt to undermine the authority of
the school.

We support all efforts made by the school to

fashion reasonable regulations for the conduct of their

students and enforcement of the punishment incurred when
such regulations are violated.

Obedience to duly constituted

authority must be instilled in our young people." 24
The Court concluded in Burnside

.

"They cannot infringe

on their students' rights to free and unrestricted expression,
as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment to the Consti-

23.

Burnside v. Byars

24.

Ibid .

.

p.

749.

,

363 F.

2d 744,

748 (1966)
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tution, where the exercise of such rights in the
school buildings and schoolrooms does not materially and
substantially

interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in
25
the operation of the school."
The "material and substantial
disruption" test, used by the Fifth Circuit Court in
noting
the differences between Blackwell and Burnside

.

was also a-

dopted by the Supreme Court in Tinker .
Tinker
Ti.nk e r v «
.

t'.y,-*-

«

.

1969

,

Des koines Independent Community School Dis-

arose from the suspension of public school pupils

one of them a junior high school student, from school until

their black armbands were removed.

The students were wearing

the armbands to protest United States involvement in the Viet-

nam War.

The protestors caused no disruptions and they did

not infringe upon the rights of others.

They were not allowed

to enter the schools solely because of the black armbands.

Justice Fortas, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
first acknowledged that public school pupils do in fact have

constitutional rights.

"First Amendment rights, applied in

light of the special characteristics of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students.

It can hardly be ar-

gued that either students or teachers shed their constitution-

25.

Ibid.
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al rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
26

gate."

After recognizing that students do have First Amend-

ment rights. Justice Fortas noted the obvious problems that

inevitably arise.
Our problem lies in the area where students in the
exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the
rules of the school authorities.... The problem
posed by the present cases does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of
clothing, to hair style, or deportment.
It does
not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even
group demonstrations... There is here no evidence
whatever of petitioners interference, actual or nascent, with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case
does not concern speech or action that intrudes
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other
students 2
'

In upholding the right of the students to wear the black

armbands in this case, it is worth considering at length the

reasoning of the Court in reaching this landmark decision.
The judicial reasoning in Tinker closely follows the attitude
toward free speech found in Terminiello

.

In our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression. Any departure
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.

Any variation may cause trouble. Any variation
from the majority °s opinion may inspire fear.
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the views of
another person may start an argument or cause a
But our Constitution says we must
disturbance.
take this risk, and our history says that it is
this sort of hazardous freedom this kind of
openness that is the basis of our national

—

—

Ti nke r v. DesMoines In dependent Community School
District, 8$ S.Ct, ?5T7 7T6 (19691
26.

27 .

Ibid

.

.

p.

737.
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strength and of the independence and vigor
of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious society.^®
On the right of free expression the
Court said,
In order for the State in the person of
school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than
a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
...Our independent examination of the record fails
to yield reason to anticipate that the wearing of
the armbands would substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights
of other students.

By promulgating the ban on armbands, the school officials

felt they were avoiding possible disruptions that might occur
in the future.

As just noted, the school officials in Tinker

were mot justified in the prohibition of armbands because they
only anticipated disruptions.
ly,

The Court asserted that,

"Clear-

the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion,

at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid mat-

erial and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible."

Since the

school officials offered no evidence that actual material and

substantial disruptions did, or would occur, the rule was held
unconstitutional.
The Court went on to make pronouncements that could

ultimately affect the fundamental relationship between the
public school pupil and his school.

737-738.

Ibid.

pp.

29.
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In our system, state-operated
schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials
do not possess absolute authority over
their stu
dents.
Students in school as well as out of
school are 'persons' under our constitution.
Thev
are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State
must respect, just as they themselves
must respect
their obligations to the State.
In our system
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit'
recipients of only that which the State chooses
to
communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially
a Pproved.
In the absence of a specific showing
of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.

The reasoning in Tinker continues, "A student's
rights,
therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours.

When

he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the

campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even in controversial subjects like the conflict in

Vietnam. ..."

32

The test used to determine if a student's rights may be

superseded by state action is outlined by Justice Fortas.
He said a student may be free to express his opinion,"... If

he does so without materially and substantially interf er/Tn^Z

with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of

others."

33

Clearly, the Supreme Court accepted in Tinker

31.

Ibid .

32.

Ibid .

33.

Ibid.

,

p.

740.
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the guidelines for regulating a student's
constitutional

rights suggested by the Fifth Circuit Court
in Burnside
The Court concluded Tinker by reminding
all that,

Constitution says that Congress
abridge the right to free speech.
it says.

and the States

.

"The

may not

This provision means what

We properly read it to permit reasonable
regulation

of speech-connected activities in carefully
restricted cir-

cumstances.

But we do not confine the permissible exercise

of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or
the four

corners of a pamphlet, or the supervised and ordained dis-

cussion in

a

school classroom." 34

Before considering the impact of Tinker and the cases
that have since followed in the lower federal courts, it is

worth noting the differences expressed by the minority on
the highest bench.

Justice Stewart concurred in the Tinker

decision but added,

"I

cannot share the Court's uncritical

assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amend-

ment rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults." 33

Justice Black,

a

foremost proponent of constitutional

rights for adults, dissented in Tinker .

He feared first

that the courts would be inundated with all sorts of suits

where students would seek to invalidate school rules on constitutional grounds.

34.

Ibid.

35

Ibid .

.

,

p.

741

The making of school rules and regula-
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tions would be effectively transferred to the
Courts.

To quote

Justice Black in his Tinker dissent, "The Court's
holding in
this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely
new

era in

which the power to control pupils by the elected
officials of
State supported public schools... in the United States
is in

ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court." 36
He went on to point out that children, because of
their

immaturity, do not possess the same fundamental rights as
adults.

"It may be that the Nation has outworn the old-

fashion slogan that 'children are to be seen not heard,'
but one may,

hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that

I

taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at
their age they need to learn, not teach." 37

Black also remind-

ed the Court one of the realities of our society.
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of
the country's greatest problems are crimes committed by the youth, too many of school age.
School
discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training our children
to be good citizens - to be better citizens... One
does not need to be a prophet or the son of a prophet to know that after the Court's holding today
some students in Iowa schools and indeed in all
schools will be ready, able, and willing to defy
their teachers on practically all orders. 38

Justice Black concluded his dissent with

a

warning.

"This case, therefore, wholly without constitutional reasons

36 .

Ibid .

37.

Ibid .

,

p.

745.

38 .

Ibid .

,

p.

746
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in my judgment, subjects all the public schools
in the coun-

try to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed,
but
39
maybe not their brightest, students."
Justice Black's

dissent raised some very real problems for the
future of public education.
Those who have been skeptical of the Supreme
Court's wisdom in extending constitutional rights
to public
school pupils, have also echoed Black's criticism.

However,

litigation involving public school pupils resulted because
of

abuses— abuses that Justice Black would be the first

to

condemn if adults were the victims of the constitutional
abuses in public education.

Ultimately, adult citizens, whom

Justice Black so vigorously insisted should be scrupulously
afforded constitutional protection of the Bill of Rights,

possessed a basic right to effect change denied to school
pupils, the ballot box.

Since public school pupils had no

say in the institution so important in their lives, why

shouldn°t the Courts insist that students be guaranteed the
very rudiments of justice, fair play, and due process?
At any rate, a close examination of subsequent litigation reveals that the Tinker decision still leaves many un-

answered questions concerning First Amendment, rights.
Critics assail Tinker on

a

number of points.

First the

circumstances surrounding the black armband controversy in
Des Moines were almost completely devoid of disruptions

39.

Ibid.

— dis-
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ruptions that might have impaired the educational
process.
In cases that have followed Tinker the lower courts
have

considered the merits of individual cases on the grounds
of
real or potential threats that disrupt school order. Acknowledging that students do have First Amendment protection
courts have been inconsistent at times in applying some sort
of uniform material and substantial disruption test.

Although

Tinke r offers little more than the material and substantial

disorder formula as a guideline for the courts to follow, the
court ruled that public school pupils are guaranteed constitutional protection through the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Using the due process clause, courts

have begun to determine the scope and boundaries of student

constitutional protection in cases since the 1969, Tinker
decision.

This study will now examine the significant post-

Tinker^ freedom of speech cases which have helped to determine

to what extent student free speech is guaranteed by the

United States Constitution.
Recent Decisions Upholding Student Acts of Free Expression
Two recent Federal District Court decisions

held students

Allegiance in

40

have up-

free speech rights involving the Pledge of

0

a

public school.

In Frain v. Baron

,

1969, a

307 F. Supp. 27 (1969); Banker v. Board of Public
Instruction of Dade County 314 F. Supp. 285 (1970T; See
Sheldon v. F annin 221 F. Supp. 766 (1963)
also:
40.

,

,
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student refused to leave his homeroom during the daily Pledge
of Allegiance.

School officials gave him the option of

standing silently or leaving the room while the Pledge was
taking place.

These options were granted to prevent dis-

order in the classroom.

The plaintiff felt the words "with

liberty and justice for all" were not true in America and he

considered his exclusion from the room a punishment for exercising his constitutional rights.

He urged not only a right

of non-participation but a right of silent protest by remain-

ing seated.

The Court first acknowledged the student’s new legal

status by pointing out, "The original
tion of the State

a

s

concern with limita-

power to compel a student to act contrary

to his beliefs has shifted to a concern for affirmative pro-

tection of the student's right to express his beliefs." 41

They continued by asserting that, "The student is free to
select his form of expression, so long as he does not materially infringe the right of other students or disrupt school

activities."

42

In deciding in favor of the student, the Court

concluded by stating, "The right in a peaceable and orderly
manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in
place where the protestant has every right to be,"

41.

Frain v. Barron

42 .

Ibid

43.

Ibid.

.

,

p.

32

,

307 F. Supp. 27,

30

43

(1969)

a

is his
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constitutionally protected right.

The Federal District

Court in New York followed pretty much the reasoning in
Tinke r to reach its conclusion to allow

a

public school pupil

to sit in silent protest during the Pledge of Allegiance.

The situation was similar in a Florida decision where

Andrew Robert Banks, a high school student, refused to stand
during the Pledge of Allegiance.

Because of Banks

0

violation

of "School Board Policy" Regulation 6122 which stated:

"Stu-

dents who for religious or other deep personal convictions,
do not participate in the salute and Pledge of Allegiance to
the flag will stand quietly," 44 he was suspended from school.
As in the previous Frain decision the Federal District

Court in Florida felt Banks was exercising his First Amend-

ment right of free expression.

The Court in Banks explained,

"The conduct of Andrew Banks in refusing to stand during the

Pledge ceremony constituted an expression of his religious

beliefs and political opinions.

His refusal to stand was no

less a form of expression than the wearing of the black arm-

bands was to Mary Beth Tinker.
to pure speech."

45

He was exercising a right akin

In concluding,

the Court said,

"The right

to differ and express one s opinions, to fully vent his First
'

Amendment rights, even to the extent of exhibiting disrespect
to our flag and country by refusing to stand and participate

Banks v. Board of Public Instru cti on of Dade Country
314 F. Supp. 285, 294 119707
44.

45.

Ibid .

,

p.

295.

,
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in the Pledge of Allegiance, cannot be
suppressed by the
46
imposition of

suspension.

Successful litigation in a Federal Court by
high school
students in 1970, expanded the scope of constitutional
protection of off-campus literature. In Hatter v. Los
Angeles
City Hi^h Scho o l District 47 Shasta Hatter and Julie
Johnson,
two high school pupils, passed out leaflets off
the school
.

grounds urging students to boycott the annual chocolate
candy
drive.

The two girls were protesting the school's dress code.

Shasta Hatter was subsequently suspended by school officials
for violating a rule,

"requiring all matter distributed or

exhibited on school property to be authorized by
member of the administration." 48

responsible

a

The Federal Court in Cali-

fornia ordered Shasta Hatter reinstated on grounds that the
school policy violated free speech and due process because
it had a chilling effect upon a student's right of free ex49
pression.

A recent Federal Court decision 50 included the right of

peaceful demonstration as a constitutional right of expression afforded public school pupils.

The litigation grew out

of racial problems in John Tyler High School over the selec-

46.

Ibid .

47.

310 F. Supp. 1309

46.

Ibid .

49.

Ibid

.

,

p.

p.

296.

(1970)

1310.

.

Dunn v. Tyl er Independen t School D istrict
50.
Supp. 528 0^71)

.

327 F.
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tion of cheerleaders.

The principal of the school arranged

names on the ballots so that four white and
two black cheerleaders would be elected. The blacks, numbering
38% of the

school protested the way the names were arranged.
cipal refused to change the ballots.

The prin-

Fires, vandalism, de-

monstrations and counter demonstrations followed.

Things

came to a head on March 21, 1971 when 250 to 300 blacks
walked
out of the school.
When school officials asked the demonstrators to leave the school grounds they complied.

The adminis-

tration sought to prevent further disturbances by requiring
each black student involved in the walkout to submit to an

individual conference with his parents present in order to
be re— admitted to school.

Some of the black demonstrators

refused to comply and remained excluded from school.

These

students sought court intervention because they alleged their

First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly were being

violated by the schools because the action for all practical
purposes would prevent students from demonstrating their beliefs

.

The Federal District Court in upholding the actions of
the students said,

"The regulation.

..

arbitrarily prohibits

all boycotts, sit-ins, stand-ins, and walk-outs without

limiting its proscription to such activities involving misconduct or the educational environment." 51

51.

Ibid .

,

p.

533.

The Court went
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on to explain its reasoning.

"it is apparent that all
such

activities are not materially and
substantially disruptive
2erse. Even in the context of the educational
environment,
such speech-related activity, while
traditionally subject to
greater regulation of time, place and
manner than is pure
speech, cannot be completely prohibited.
Free speech cannot
be a right that is given only to be so
circumscribed that it
exists in principle but not in fact. To
hold otherwise would
be to limit a student's free speech rights
to inappropriate
settings as to make an exercise of those rights
ineffectual." 52
The Federal District Court also reminded
school officials
that demonstrations could still be limited under
certain cir-

cumstances.

"Thus, while the

school officials

can certain-

ly prohibit disruptive activity in the nature of
boycotts,

sit-ins, stand-ins, and walk-outs that materially interfere

with the educational environment, they must do so in

a

manner

that strikes at the very evil they wish to prevent rather
than making all such activities, per se illegal." 53
Duirn

The

decision rendered by a lower Federal Court extended the

boundary of First Amendment free speech rights to include
peaceful demonstrations by high school pupils.

This was

accomplished through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Dunn also reflects a trend in judicial philosophy

52 .

ikid

53.

Ibid .

*

t

p # 534.

,

p.

535
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especially evident since the 1969, Tinker decision.

The

District Court illustrated this trend by summarizing
its position on First Amendment rights to freedom of speech..."

and

the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition
the Government for a redress of grievance, are
held by minors
as well as adults,

and that these rights must be respected by

governmental authority even in the context of the educational
environment.

54

Public school pupils also gained the constitutional right
to distribute anti— war leaflets in 1971.

A junior high

school student, who was denied permission by the Quincy School

Committee to distribute an anti-war leaflet and "A High School
Bill of Rights", appealed to the courts on the basis that his

First Amendment rights were violated.

The lower court sus-

tained the school committee's rule but ordered the school not
to interfere with the distribution of the material off the

school grounds if it did not materially disrupt the school.
The student appealed the lower court's decision upholding
the committee's rule banning the distribution of his material inside the school.

The Appeals Court said,
a court,

"

. . .

fwe

find it unlikely that

on completion of this case on the merits, could

uphold this attempt at regulating student conduct. ...

54.

F.

!Aj s

to

Ibid o

R.iseman v a
55.
2d 148 Cl9 71

School Committee of City of Quincy, 439
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be applied to First Amendment activities it is vague,
and does

not reflect any effort to minimize the adverse effect of
prior restraint...." 56
A case quite similar to Tinker arose in Texas when

a

group of Mexican-American children wore brown armbands to
school protesting various educational policies and practices

relating to their minority.

The students were suspended

until they removed their armbands for violating a dress code

which stated in part, "Any act, unusual dress, coercion of
other students, passing out literature, buttons, etc., or
apparel decoration that is disruptive, distracting, or pro-

vocative so as to incite students of other ethnic groups will
not be permitted."

58

In defense of the suspension,

"...Sev-

eral of the school officials offered their conclusions or

opinions that wearing of the armbands in violation of school

policy was

a

disruption in of itself." 59

The Federal District

Court in Texas, however, followed the Tinker decision and
found the threat of potential disruptions from the brown
59.
armbands
not to be such to warrant restriction of this act

of symbolic speech.

F.

56.

Ibid .

57.

Aquirre v. Tahoka Independent School D istrict
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p.

149.

Supp. 664 (1970)
58.
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The decisions reviewed in this section
show how the
courts have expanded the scope of a public school
pupils'

right of free expression since Tinker

Other recent decisions

.

have, however, been decided against students
thereby placing

certain limitations on free expression.
Recent Decisions Limiting Student Acts of Free Expression
Baker v. Downey City Board of Education

.

1970,

60

affirm-

the right of school officials to exclude obscene material

from the school environment.

In Baker,

student was sus-

a

pended from school for distributing admittedly profane and
vulgar material to other pupils outside the main gate of the
campus.

The plaintiff alleged his First Amendment rights were

violated by the school's action.

The Federal District Court

hearing the case declined to use Tinker or Burnside to support the plaintiff

°s

claim.

Since the issue in Baker was

profanity, Tinker and Burnside

.

which advocated the use of

the material and substantial disruption test to determine to

what extent government may regulate

a

student's First Amend-

ment rights, was not a controlling precedent.

The Court, in

dealing with the profanity issue said, "First Amendment rights
to free speech do not require the suspension of decency in

the expression of their views and ideas."

60 .

307 F. Supp.

61

Ibid .

.

,

p.

527

517 (1970)

6

The District
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Court concluded by pointing out that high school
students do
not have the same comprehensive constitutional protection
as

adults.

The right to critize and to dissent is protected

to high school students but they may be more strictly
cur-

tailed in the mode of their expression and in other manners
of conduct than college students or adults." 62

Another case similar to Baker arose from student possession of obscene materials in school.
Buren Public Schools

f)

^

1969

.

,

a

In Vought v. Van

high school student had been

previously warned by the school principal not to bring obscene
material to school.
resulted.

When he did a second time, expulsion

In the course of the trial, the plaintiff admitted

some of the words in the material in his possession were obscene, however, he alleged his First and Fourteenth Amendment

free expression rights were being violated because of the

expulsion.

The Court was not in sympathy with the student

and sustained the expulsion saying, "The exercise by the

defendants here of their obligation to prescribe and control

conduct in the schools

8

must be held to encompass the pro-

mulgation of rules concerning the extent to which and the
conditions under which obscene materials may or may not be

properly on the school premises."

62.

Ibid

63.

306 F. Supp.

64.

Ibid .

.

,

1388 (1969)

p 0 1392.

64

In conclusion,

the
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Federal District Court in Michigan said,
"...[VJe are constrained to conclude that the type of
regulation here cannot
be considered violative of this plaintiffs
First Amendment
rights." 65
It would appear that Baker and Vought

.

although adjudi-

cated by Federal District Courts, leave to school
officials
the discretion to determine what is and is not
obscene on
school property.

Whether or not the material causes

a

dis-

ruption is not the test used to determine if this is

a

sub-

stantial governmental interest to restrict the use of
the
material.

School officials can restrict a student's First

Amendment right of free expression if, in the their view,
the material is obscene.

However, cases reviewed in the

following section on the press show that materials on the
school grounds must be judged by certain criteria before

being excluded by school administrators as obscene.
A federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Katz v. McAulav 66
.

1971, upheld a New York Board of Regents regulation prohi-

biting the solicitation of funds from the pupils in the
public schools.

Students challenged this rule when they

were threatened with expulsion for distributing leaflets near
the school and soliciting funds from their fellow students.

65.

Ibid.

66.

438 F. 2d 1058 (1971)

99

They alleged the rule violated their First Amendment
right
of fiee speech.

The Court did not feel a student's freedom

of speech was violated,

stating:

Pupils are on school premises in response to the
statutory requirement that they attend school for
the purpose of formal education.
Where outside
organizations or individuals espousing various
causes seek to take advantage of the required assemblage of secondary pupils, as a captive audience,
to solicit funds, either directly or through the
agency of some of the pupils, for their particular
project or cause, they are in effect in competition
for the time, attention and interest of the pupils
with those who are seeking to administer, its effect is not so limited in time and it is plainly
harmful to the operation of the public schools.
If there is no regulation against it, literally
dozens of organizations and causes may importune
pupils to solicit on their behalfs and is foreseeable that pressure groups within the student
body are likely to use more than polite requests
to get contributions even from those who are in
disagreement with the particular cause or who
are, in truth, too poor to afford a donation. 67
The Court in Katz points out that the rule focused on

demonstrable harm and was constitutional.

a

Therefore the right

of pupils to solicit funds from school pupils even in the

vicinity of the school grounds was not considered an act of
"expression" protected by the Tinker decision.
Lipkis v. Caveney

68
,

1971, decided by the California

State Supreme Court placed limits on when and where

school pupil may exercise his right of free speech.

a

public
Tom Lip-

kis sought a writ of mandate to compel Van Nuys High School

67.

Ibid .

68.

App. 96 Cal. Rptr.

,

p.

1061.
779

(1971)
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officials to grant him a permit to stage
area during the noon hour.

a

rally in a lunch

The school officials declined

the permit because they felt a rally would
materially disrupt
the order in the school.

The principal pointed out that Lip-

kis had the opportunity, as did any student, to
express his

opinions in recognized campus activities such as the Noon

Forum and Discussion Group.
Lipkis with

They did not want to provide

captive audience while students were eating

a

their lunches.

in declining to issue the writ of mandate,

the California Court reasoned, "We emphasize that appellant

had adequate and concededly readily available forum in which
to exercise his right to free speech and to ventilate views

he entertained relative to any problems of his school, his

country or the world.

Puerile, abrasive and contemptuous

behavior cannot be whitewashed by constitutional incantations,
which, if we understand them, gave appellant the right to

expose in non-obscene language even the most unpopular views
but which do not require Van Nuys High School or the school

system to guarantee to him on the school grounds

a

captive

audience at the specific times he elects to address them.

.

Our Constitution extends no such guarantees to appellant or
,
„
anyone else."

69

Black high school students in Indiana, took

Amendment complaint to

69.

Ibid .

,

a

a

First

Federal Circuit Court without suc-

pp Q 782-783.
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cess

m

1970.

70

The litigation resulted when Negro
students

who comprised 13% of the high school
population sought to ban
what they consider symbols offensive to
their race.
They
protested their school flag resembled a Confederate

Flag, the

athletic team called "Rebels", the glee
club named the "Southern Aires" and homecoming queen the
"Southern Bell." The
Federal Distract Court rejected their
contention that their
First Amendment right of free speech was being
impinged upon
by the use of the offensive symbols.
"P; a intiffs allege that
the use of these symbols is offensive to the
Black students
at Southside, who comprise thirteen per cent of the
enroll-

ment, is flammatory, and has discouraged Blacks from
parti-

cipating in the various extracurricular activities of the
school.
They claim that due to the effect on the Black students,
the
symbols violate their First Amendment right of free speech." 7 ^
The Court pointed out that, "We fail to find any evidence
in
the

i

ecord that the Black students' right of free speech and

expression is being abridged by use of the Confederate symbols." 72
As a result of racial strife in a Chattanooga high

school, the school board adopted a rule forbidding students

from wearing "provocative symbols" on clothing.
Young,

73

Melton v.

1971, challenged this regulation on First and Four-

70.

Banks v. Muncie Community School. 433 F. 2d 292 (1970)

71.

Ibid.

p.

297.

72.

Ibido

p.

298.

73.

328 F. Supp. 88 (1971)
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teenth Amendment grounds.

Racial tension grew in the high

school after successful protests by students
resulted in the
school athletic team's name "Rebels" and the
school flag, the

Confederate Flag, being changed.
called in to restore order.

Police at one point were

In the midst of the charged

atmosphere, Rod Melton insisted on wearing a Confederate
Flag
on his clothing.

He was suspended for breaking the rule bar-

ring provocative symbols.

The Federal District Court was

not sympathetic to Melton's cause, citing the potentially ex-

plosive atmosphere at the high school as sufficient reasoning
to abridge First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
free ex-

pression.

The Court first reminded school officials of the

scope of limits on First Amendment rights by saying, "... The

Fi^st Amendment does not speak eguivocally, but rather is
broad and explicit in its scope.

Regulatory measures, no

matter how well intentioned or how sophisticated, cannot be
employed by public bodies if their purpose or effect is to

stifle

,

penalize, or curb the exercise of rights guaranteed
n

by the First Amendment."

A

Continuing, the Court pointed

"The exercise of free expression must on occasion be sub-

out,

ject to some limitations, otherwise such institutions as
churches, schools, and other places of public assembly, not
to mention courtrooms themselves would become Towers of Ba-

bel."

75

Citing the reasoning in Tinker, the Court said. "Fin-

74.

I bid

75

Ibid .

.

o

,

p c 96.
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ally it should be noted that 'symbolic speech,'
although not
always readily distinguishable from conduct and
accordingly

somewhat ill-defined in the law, is accorded First
Amendment
protestion the same as 'pure speech.' 76 Dispite the

fact that

symbols worn on clothing is an exercise of free
expression

protected by the Constitution, the Court in Melton did
allow
the ban on "provocative symbols" to stand because
similar

sym-

bols had caused disruptions in the past.

Tinker's "material

and substantial" test applied in Melton did warrant a
suffi-

cient governmental interest to restrict First Amendment
rights
A recent Federal Court opinion. Hill v. Lewis 77 1971,
.

illustrates to what extent the Tinker decision can be used as
a

controlling factor in student exercise of free expression.

Plaintiffs

,

students in 71st High School, Cumberland County,

North Carolina, were suspended for wearing armbands in protest
of United States policies in Vietnam.

The situation was po-

tentially explosive in the high school since 40% of the students' parents were military personnel stationed at Ft. Bragg,

North Carolina.

Before the students were suspended, counter-

demonstrations produced red, white, and blue armbands, that
caused chanting, congregating in hallways, and disruptions.

Polarization between the two groups, the anti-war and pro-war

76.

Ibid.

77.

323 F. Supp.

55

(1971)
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students, resulted in

a

tense school situation.

The Court

in sustaining the suspensions and the rule banning
armbands,

offered its interpretation of the Tinker decision.
The Court in Tinker found that the wearing of armbands was entirely divorced from any actually or
potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it, under the circumstances of that case.
Tinker did not involve aggressive, disruptive action
or group demonstrations.
Tinker did not concern
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the
school or the rights of other students.
In Tinker
the fear of disruption did not motivate the prohibition of armbands. The regulation was directed
against the principle of the demonstration itself.
The record in Tinker failed to disclose evidence
that school officials had reason to anticipate that
the wearing of armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students.
In Tinker the prohibition was directed at the wearing of black armbands.
Tinker involved a small number of participants, and students were dismissed for the sole
reason they wore the proscribed armbands. 78
.

Looking at the situation in 71st High School as

a whole,

the record showed clearly there was reasonable apprehension

that the threat of violence would produce

a

substantial and

material interference on the rights of others.
Free Expression in a Racially Tense School Situation
Cases thus far considered on free expression, using the

material and substantial formula in Tinker fall in line with
the Supreme Court

rights.

78.

,

s

interpretation of student First Amendment

However, one recent case 79 that upheld a school board's

Ibid

.

,

p.

58.

305 F. Supp. 742 (1969) sustained in Guzick v. Pre431 F. 2d 594 (1970)

79.

bus

11
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restrict a student *s .tirst Amendment right of free

r ight

expression, could place several limitations on that right if
the precedent is followed by other courts.

decided in 1969, and later sustained by
Court in 1970, upheld

a

a

Guzick v. Drebus
Federal Circuit

school board regulation that prohi-

bited students from wearing buttons, emblems or other insignia not related to

a

school activity.

The rule had been in

effect for 40-years in an East Cleveland, Ohio high school.
As in many other northern urban areas, population shifts re-

sulted in

a

change in the ethnic make-up of the student body.

A once predominately white school, Shaw High School, by the
time of the Guzick decision, had become

been the scene of racial violence.

a

70% black and had

School officials, fearing

potential disorders, kept the rule in force resulting in the

Guzick litigation.
Thomas Guzick, was suspended for wearing

a

botton that

said:

April

5

Chicago

GI - Civilian
Anti-V7ar

Demonstration
Student Mobilization Committee
Both the District and the Circuit Courts used Blackwell
in sustaining the rule prohibiting all buttons in the high

school.

The District Court pointed out that, "The presence

106
of these emblems, badges,

and buttons are taken to
represent,

define and depict the actual division
of the students in var80
ious groups."
The Court continued, "... The
buttons tend
to polarize the students into
separate, distinct, and unfriendly groups." 81 in concluding,
the Court said, “ . . fr] hat
.
if this policy of excluding buttons
and other insignia
is not

retained, some students will attempt
to wear provocative or
inciting buttons and other emblems," 8 ^
Therefore, they felt
all buttons must be excluded.
The material and substantial
test was used as the lower Federal Court
said, "The wearing
of buttons and other insignia will
exacerbate an already tense
situation. .. [which] will disrupt and interfere
with the normal
operation of the school. 8j
The reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court
followed that
of the lower court in Guzick o
"In our view, the potentiality
and the immenseness

of the admitted rebelliousness in the

84
Shaw students support the wisdom of the no-symbol
rule."

Here the Court applied

a

sort of "clear and present danger"

test to the public school setting.

out the realities of the situation.

The Appeals Court pointed
"We will not attempt

an extensive review of the many great decisions which have

80

*

Guzick v. Prebus

.

J05 F. Supp. 472, 476 (1969)

81.

Ibid o

82.

Ibid

.

.

p.

477.

83 c

Ibid

.

,

p.

479.

84.

Guzick v 0 Prebus, 431 F. 2d 594, 600 (1970)
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forbidden the abridgement of free speech.

We have been

thrilled by their beautiful and impassioned
language. They
are a part of our American heritage.
None of these masterpieces, however, were composed or uttered
to support the
wearing of buttons in high school classrooms.
We are not
persuaded that enforcement of such a rule as
Shaw High School's
no-symbol proscription would have excited like
judicial
classics.
Denying Shaw High School the right to enforce
this
small disciplinary rule could, and most likely
would, impair
the rights of its students to an education and
the rights of
its teachers to fulfill their responsibilities." 85

The Cir-

cuit Court went on to conclude that,
We must be aware in these contentious times that
America's classrooms and their environs will loose
their usefulness as places in which to educate our
young people if pupils come to school wearing the
badges of their respective disagreements, and provoke confrontations with their fellows and their
teachers... The buttons are claimed to be a form
of free speech.
Unless they have some relevance
to what is being considered or taught, a school
classroom is no place for the untrammeled exercise
of such right. ob

The decision in Gu z i ck creates a dilemna for future free

expression litigation involving public school pupils.
w g.ll

>

Hi 1

and Melton

85.

Ibid.

86 .

Ibid.

.

Black-

offered substantial evidence that stu-
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dents

,

in expressing themselves, would or did cause
material

and substantial disorders.

The school officials in Guzick

could only predict substantial disorders would result for
buttons had never before been allowed in the school.
An article in the Cleveland State Law Review points out

the inconsistencies between Tinker and Guzick

express one's point of view on
issue

a

such as the Vietnam War

constitutionally protected in
in Des Moines, Iowa;

,

a

.

"The right to

politically controversial
in an orderly fashion, is

racially homogenous high school

the same right is prohibited to students

in a high school in racially tense East Cleveland, Ohio." 87

The article thereby asserts that, "Racial refinement will have

been engrafted onto the holding in Tinker

1,88
.

if the Guzick

decision is upheld by the Supreme Court.
Summary
Students in the public schools today have been accorded

First Amendment protection by virtue of the Tinker decision
in 1969.

Court decisions following Tinker have sought to

define the scope and boundaries of student free expression.
Within the permissible boundaries of free expression, public
school pupils are allowed to speak, demonstrate, perform acts

87.
Ann Aldrich and Jo Anne V. Sommers, "Freedom of
Expression in Secondary Schools," Cleveland State Law Review

vol. 19 (January, 1970)
88o

Ibid .

,

p.

170.

,

169.

,
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of symbolic protest, and wear things that
denote symbolic

speech.

However, limits have been placed on a student "s
consti-

tutional right to free expression by the courts.

The most

important limitation has been offered by the Supreme
Court
in Tinker.

If,

in the exercise of his right to express him-

self freely, a student materially and substantially disrupts
the educational process, his free expression may be restricted.

The courts have also restricted student free expression

because of obscene material.
Still unresolved is the question of what causes a material and substantial disruption and whether or not First

Amendment activities can be restricted if there is
of a potential disruption.

a

threat

The courts will have to decide

these issues in the future.

Student First Amendment rights have also been expanded
to include freedom of the press,

the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER

V

PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Legal Guidelines for the Press in General
As seen in the previous chapter of this study the ju-

diciary through various court decisions has expanded the
scope of free speech in the First Amendment to include sym-

bolic acts of expression.
into this category.

The printed word certainly falls

The printed word also has

a

measure of

constitutional protection under freedom of the press in the
First Amendment.
Students involved in controversies relating to printed

matter in the public schools have therefore alleged, in ad-

dition to encroachment on their right to free expression,
violations of their right to

a

free press.

With the excep-

tion of some specific limitations to be examined later, a

student's right to a free press is governed basically by
the same guidelines spelled out for the press in general.

The major Supreme Court decisions establishing the guidelines for the national press will be examined first.

A landmark case in which the Supreme Court began to

define the boundaries of freedom of the press was Near v.

Minnesota

1.

.

^

1931, considered earlier in this study.

283 U.S. 697 (1931)

As

Ill

the landmark case holding a state law
unconstitutional for
violating freedom of the press. Near
prohibited states from

exercising "prior restraint" over the press.

The Supreme

Court said that a state may, of course,
properly forbid the
publication of "lewd, lascivious, salacious,
obscene and
filthy" matter. However, a restriction of
the press that
in effect constituted prior censorship
as in Near would not

be allowed.

The Supreme Court also pointed out in Near
that

whatever wrongs were published could appropriately
be punished through the state °s libel laws.
Another important freedom of the press decision was
v * Sullivan 2 adjudicated in 1964.

Civil

rights activists had published a full page advertisement
in
the New York Times called "Heed Their Rising Voices"
accusing the police of promulgating a "wave of terror" in Mont-

gomery, Alabama.

Written in rhetorical language the ad,

if taken literally, was essentially untrue.

Sullivan, a

Montgomery public official responsible for the police department, sued the Times for libel.
ed Sullivan damages.

An Alabama Court award-

On appeal to the Supreme Court of the

United States, however, the judgment was reversed.
In overturning the Alabama decision, the Supreme Court

said:

"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a

federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering

2.

376 U.S. 254 (1964)
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3
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official
conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with
•actual malice'— that is, with knowledge that
it

was false

or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."
B y requiring a public official to prove
"actual malice" the

role of the press as

a

watchdog over public officials' con-

duct in the performance of his job was effectively strengthened.
A 1957 case, Roth v. United States ^
.

defined the rela-

tionship between First Amendment rights of free speech and
press to the topic of obscenity.
a

The litigation grew out of

federal statute prohibiting the use of the mail for the

distribution of obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy materials.

Roth was convicted under the statute in a federal

court for using the postal system to mail obscene literature to his customers.

The Supreme Court in upholding the

trial court's conviction asserted that obscenity was not an

expression protected by the First Amendment.

The Court

also agreed with the instructions the trial court offered
to the jury in Roth .

The test in each case is the effect of the book,
picture or publication considered as a whole, not
upon whom it is likely to reach.
In other words
you determine its impact upon the average person

3.

Ibid., pp. 279-280.

4.

354 U.S. 476 (1957)
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in the community.
The books pictures and circulars must be judged as a whole, in their entire
context, and you are not to consider detached or
separate portions in reaching a conclusion.
You
judge the circulars, pictures and publications
which have been put in evidence by present-day
standards of the community. You may ask your self
does it offend the common conscience of the community by present-day standards.
,

The highest Court went further to define what might be

obscene by stating, "It is therefore vital that the standards
for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of

speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a

manner appealing to prurient interests." 6
The Supreme Court in Roth therefore established a three

part test to determine what materials might be considered obscene.

First, if the material offends the common conscience

of the community, secondly,

if the matter in question is with-

out redeeming social value and thirdly, if the material treats

sex in such a way that appeals to prurient interest, restrictions may be imposed on the press by the state on the grounds
of obscenity.

The Roth test is still used by the courts to-

day in determining what is obscene.

Another important free press case centered around the
problem of licensing.
lished guidelines where

.

Ibid .

,

p.

490

6.

Ibid .

.

p.

488.

5

A 1964 decision in Maryland estaba

state could be allowed to censor
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free expression.

The controversy in Maryland centered around

the State's refusal to license certain films it
considered to

be obscene.

A statute required films to be submitted to a

censor prior to their release.

The Court, recognizing the

difficulty in issuing licenses, pointed out that, "In the
area of freedom of expression it is well established that
one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that

delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an admin-

istrative office, whether or

not his conduct could be pro-

scribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he
.

applied for

a

license."

7

The Supreme Court offered guidelines by requiring a

censor to provide for procedural safeguards that would prevent the danger of

a

censor's decision from being final.

Three such rules emerged from Freedman

v.

Maryland in the

area of censorship.
1.

The burden of proof must rest with the censor.

2.

The censorship must be administered in such a way
to insure the censor's decision is not final.

3.

There must be procedures requiring judicial determination in order to impose valid final restraint.

These three rules are basic guidelines today for agencies to follow when censorship of material is being con-

•

Ibid .

,

p.

56

8.

Ibid .

,

p.

58.
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sidered.

Ginsberg v. State of New York

9
.

1968, raised the que-

stion of what might be obscene to minors.

Ginsberg, an op-

erator of a New York luncheon counter, was convicted under
a New York criminal obscenity statute which prohibited the

sale of obscene material to persons under seventeen.

charge resulted after Ginsberg had sold
zine to a sixteen year old boy.

a

The

•girlie" maga-

The magazine, however, was

not considered obscene for adults.

Ginsberg contended that

the constitutional freedom of expression did not depend on
a

citizen being an adult or a minor.

The Supreme Court re-

jected Ginsberg “s contention and offered specific guidelines

where material considered harmful to minors would be prohibited.

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Harmful to minors means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when it:
predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful
or morbid interests of minors, and
is patently offensive to prevailing standards in
the adult community as a whole with respect to
what is suitable material for minors, and
redeeming social importance
is utterly
for minors.

Controversies involving college presses have resulted
in important judicial pronouncements on a student's right

9.

10.

88 S ct. 1274 (1968)

Ibid

.

,

p.

1284

to a free press.

Dickey v. A1 abama

.

^
^

1967, affirming a

college student’s right to a free press has directly influenced a similar expanse of this right to public school
pupils.

In Dickey the Court said that,

"A State cannot

force a college student to forfeit his constitutionally

protected right of freedom of expression as a condition
to his attending a State supported institution."^

Dic-

key had been refused readmittance to one of Alabama's
schools because of his controversial editorial in support
of the University of Alabama's President’s stand on the

right of a free press in a university.

reinstatement as

student.

a

Dickey ordered his

These cases provide the jud-

icial framework by which litigation involving a public scho
ol pupil's right to a free press were decided upon by the

courts in the late 1960's.

Student Suits Alleging Violation of Free Press

There are a sufficient number of court decisions now
on a public school pupil's right to a free press estab-

lishing guidelines for school officials to follow when at-

tempting to regulate student printed matter.

Taken in

273 F. Supp. 613 (1967); see also:
Lee v. Board
11.
Regents of State Colleges 306 F. Supp. 1097 (1969); Antonelli v. Hammond 308 F. Supp. 1329 (1970); Trujillo v.
Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (1971)
,

,

!2.

Ibid .

.

p.

618.
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chronological order

,

these decisions follow a pattern that

firmly shows that students today have the constitutional
right
to freedom of the press.

A landmark case where public school pupils gained re-

cognition of First Amendment rights directly related to the

printed word was Zucker v. Panitz 13 1969.
.

Zucker, a high

school student in New York, was denied the right to publish
a

paid advertisement in the school newspaper opposing the

war in Vietnam.

He challenged the decision on the grounds

he was being denied his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.

The defendant sought to advance the theory, "...

That the publication is was not a newspaper in the usual
sense but is was a beneficial educational device developed
as part of the curriculum and intended to insure primarily

those who compile, edit and publish it." 14

to the benefit of

School officials contended that only purely commercial ads

would be accepted in the newspaper.
It is important to note here that the Federal District

Court in New York viewed a high school newspaper as an in-

strument for students to express their opinions.

The Court

stated, "We have found, from review of its contents, that

within the context of the school and educational environment, it is a forum for the dissemination of ideas."

13.

299 F. Supp. 102 (1969)

14.

Ibid .

,

p.

103.

15.

Ibid .

,

p.

105.

15

As
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a result,

the Court took the view that to prohibit the
pol-

itical ad would deny Zucker the right to express his
opinion
on the Vietnam War in a recognized "forum for the
dissemina-

tion of ideas".
soned,

Holding in favor of Zucker, the Court rea-

"It would be both incongruous and dangerous for this

Court to hold that students who wish to express their views
on matters intimately related to them, through traditionally

accepted non— disruptive modes of communication, may be pre-

cluded from doing so by that same adult community." 16

The

Zucker decision established a precedent that subsequent
courts have followed regarding the status of high school

newspapers, mainly that they are vehicles open to students
for the expression of their opinions.

Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District

.

1969

is an equally important landmark decision in the area of a

student's right to

a

free press.

The litigation resulted

when two pupils from Sharpstown Junior/Senior High School
in Houston, Texas were expelled because of their involvement

in the production and distribution of a "newspaper" called

the Pf lashlyte which criticized school officials.

officials were particularly upset by Pf lashlyte

.

School

since as

an underground newspaper, it was not under the control of

the school.

Sullivan and Fisher, the two high school students

16.

Ibid.

17.

307 F. Supp. 1328 (1969)
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involved, had been distributing the publication across
the

street from the school and in various shops and
stores frequented by students. Some students took the paper
into

class

thereby causing minor disruptions.

Upon guestionina by the

principal and the assistant principal, the two students ad-

mitted to distributing the newspaper.

They were advised

they were in serious violation of school regulations, espec-

ially because of their involvement in a "secret" organization, namely the Students For a Democratic Society.

At the

time of questioning by the school officials, neither student

was informed that disciplinary action would be taken.

Five

days later, Sullivan and Fisher were both expelled for the

remainder of the school year.

In spite of the students® pro-

mise to stop the newspaper if readmitted, the expulsion re-

mained in effect.
Using Tinker as the controlling influence, the Federal

Court broadened the scope of the First Amendment protection
to include newspapers in the public schools.

The

Court

asserted, "...Freedom of speech, which includes publication
and distribution of newspapers, may be exercised to its

fullest potential on school premises so long as it does not
1

unreasonably interfere with normal school activities."
However, the Court pointed out that a newspaper is subject

18.

Ibid .

,

p.

1340
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to some control by school officials even if it does not
ma-

terially and substantially disrupt the normal process of education.

Reasonable

,

non-discriminatory regulations regard-

ing the time, place, manner, and duration of distributing
a

non-disruptive publication on school premises would be

valid.

19
^

The action taken by the school administration against

Sullivan and Fisher was considered even more questionable
since they were distributing the newspaper off the school
grounds.

On this point the Court said, "In this Court's

judgment, it makes little sense to extend the influence of

school administration to off-campus activity under the theory that such activity might interfere with the function of
education. ... School officials may not judge a student's be-

havior while he is in his home with his family nor does it
seem to this Court that they should have jurisdiction over
his acts on a public street corner."

20

They reasoned that,

"A student is subject to the same criminal laws and owes the

same civil duties as other citizens, and his status as a

student should not alter his obligations to others during
his private life away from the campus."

19.

Ibid .

20.

Ibid.

21

Ibid.

.

,

p.

1341

21

121

The Federal District Court in Texas did leave
room for
possible exceptions to controlling off-campus
activities.
"Arguable, misconduct by students during non-school
hours
and away from school premises could, in certain
situations,

have such a lasting effect on other students that
disruption

could result during the next school day.

Perhaps then ad-

ministrators should be able to exercise some degree of influence over off— campus conduct.
this power to be questionable." 22

This Court considers even

The Court continued, "How-

ever under any circumstances, the school certainly may
not

exercise more control over off-campus behavior than over
on-campus conduct." 23
The fact that the Pf lashlyte was primarily intended for

discussions and comments affecting student-administrator relations, the disruptions were only minor, and the two stu-

dents were subject to the laws governing libel, slander,
and obscenity, the District Court held in favor of the two

students.

Sullivan effectively "incorporates"

a

public

school pupil's right to a free press by stating, "..Ex24. only oral expression, the publication of
cepting

paper'

a

'news-

is First Amendment activity in its purest form." 24

A case similar to Sullivan resulted when

a

student was

suspended for writing an off-school newspaper critical of

22 .

Ibid .

23.

Ibid.

Ibid .

,

p.

1342.
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school policies and authorities. 25

Scoville, the student in-

volved, was suspended for the remainder of his second
sem-

ester for "gross disobedience and misconduct".
noted that Scoville

1

s

The school

suspension was not because he

published and distributed an unauthorized newspaper on the
school grounds, but because of the objectionable content of
the paper.
a

"Grass High", the publication in question, was

newspaper of fourteen pages containing poetry, essays,

movie and record reviews, and

a

critical editorial.

The

school officials objected to parts in "Grass High" that called upon students to destroy material given to them by the

school for their parents.

Also considered objectionable

were comments alluding to the Dean as
a "sick mind"

a

man possessed with

and a statement, "Oral sex may prevent tooth

decay"
In using Tinker

.

the Circuit Court posed the question

at hand as, "...Whether the writing of "Grass High" and its

sale in school to sixty students and faculty members could

reasonably have led the boarcJ to forecast substantial disruption of a material interference with school activities." 26
The Court felt it did not and decided in favor of Scoville.
In doing so,

the school officials were reminded of one of

their primary functions in an educational institution. "While

Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Town25.
425 F. 2d 10 (1970)
111
ship High School District 204 etc
,

26.

Ibid .

,

p.

12

. ,

. ,
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recognizing the need for effective discipline in
operating
schools, the law requires that the school rules be
related
to the State interest in the production of
well-trained in-

tellects with constructive critical stances, lest
students'

imaginations, intellects and wills be unduly
chilled.
Dealing with the objectionable parts of the newspaper,
the Appeals Court did not condone its content but
considered
it within the confines of a student's right to free
expres-

sion.

"The 'Grass High' editorial imputing

a

'sick mind' to

the Dean, said the Court, "reflects a disrespectful and taste-

less attitude toward authority.

11

The Court further said

about the statement, "Oral sex may prevent tooth decay",
This attempt to amuse comes as a shock to an older generation but today's students in high school are not insulated

from the shocking but legally accepted language used by dem-

onstrators and protestors in streets and on campuses and by
authors of best-selling modern literature."
It is clear from Sullivan and Scoville that exclusions
of student newspapers could only be allowed where Tinker's
29.
material
and substantial disruption test could be met.

The-

refore, the First Amendment rights to a free press, is in
fact, a student constitutional right.

Scoville is also in-

fluenced by New York Times v. Sullivan for the "sick mind"

27.

Ibid .

28.

Ibid.

Ibid.

,

p.

14
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statement, although in poor taste, would not meet the test
of "actual malice".

Finally, Scoville also used the formula

suggested by the Supreme Court in Roth where the publication
in question was judged by present-day standards of the par-

ticular community involved to determine if it was objectionable.

As seen, the Appeals Court judged that "Grass High"

was not obscene by present-day standards.

Another important case in the area of

a

students' right

to a free press reaching the Federal Appeals Court system is

the recent Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education

30
,

1971.

Before deciding the case, the Circuit Court suggested the

complexity of the problems involved in this particular area
of constitutional law by saying,

"The problems raised by

this case defy geometric solutions.

The best one can hope

for is to discern lines of analysis and advance formulations

sufficient to bridge past decisions with new facts.

One must

be satisfied with such present solutions andcannot expect
a clear view of the terrain beyond the periphery of the im-

mediate case.

It is a frustrating process which does not
31

admit of safe analytical harbors."
The E isner controversy resulted when students in the
Stamford, Connecticut school system challenged

a

school

board rule requiring newspapers that were to be distributed

30.

440 F. 2d 803 (1971)

31.

Ibid,

,

pp. 804-805.
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in school would first have to be submitted
to the adminis-

tration for approval.

The lower court 32

held the adminis-

tration's rule to be an unconstitutional
abridgment of the
students' First Amendment rights. The
Federal District Court
relied heavily on Near v. Minnesota a
decision, as seen, that
,

held prior restraint of speech and press
unconstitutional.
The Federal Appeals Court sustained the lower
court's decision and the reasoning in the case has important
implications for public school pupils and freedom of the
press.

The rule in question promulgated by the Stamford
School

Board stated:
The Board of Education desires to encourage freedom of expression and creativity by its students
subject to the following limitation:
No person shall distribute any printed or written
matter on the grounds of any school or in any
school building unless the distribution of such
material shall have prior approval by the school

administration.

In granting or denying approval, the following
guidelines shall apply.

No material shall be distributed which, either
by its content or by the manner of distribution
itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly
operation and discipline of the school, will cause
violence or disorder, or will constitute an invasion of the rights of others.
In affirming the lower court's decision in Eisner

.

the

Appellate Court first expanded on the Stamford Board's rule

Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 314 F. Supp.

32.

832 (1970)
33.

803, 805

Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education. 440
(1971)'

F.

2d
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on school newspapers.

They said, "Unless the policy. . .pur-

ports to delegate greater power to restrain the distribution
of disruptive matter that Tinker allows, or unless it other-

wise unreasonably burdens students
it is valid."

34

0

First Amendment activity,

The Court went on to say that, "The policy

does not in any way interfere with students' freedom to dis-

seminate and receive material outside school property; nor
does it threaten to interfere with the predominate respon-

sibility of parents for their children's welfare.

The state-

ment [the board's regulation] is, therefore, in many ways nar-

rowly drawn to achieve its permissible purposes, and indeed

may fairly be characterized as a regulation of speech, rather than a blanket prior restraint." 35

The problem with the

rule was that the Board did not make specific the kinds of

disruptions it considered illegal, the criteria for censorship and where material could be distributed.
However, in affirming the District Court's decision in
Eisner, the higher court did so with significant reservations.

The difference in the judgment of the Appeals Court

36.

centered around the lower court's belief that all prior restraints are unconstitutional as seen in Near v. Minnesota

,

and that censors must follow the procedures stipulated in

Freedman v. Maryland .

34.

Ibid

35.

Ibid.

Ibid

.

.

p.

Near

808.

,

the Appellate Court pointed out,
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did not invalidate all previous restraint and
that restraints
on student newspapers would be constitutional if
the "material and substantial" disruption test could be
met.

The Court

further felt that requirements set forth for censorship
in

should not necessarily apply to student newspapers.
Freedman, for example, required judicial action
before

a fin-

al restraint by a censor could be legal.

Since the purpose of the Stamford School Board's rule
was not to suppress but to prevent disorders, the Federal

Circuit Court had this to say.

"We do not regard the Board's

policy as imposing nearly so onerous
was involved in Freedman

.

a

'prior restraint'

as

,

Also, we believe that it would

be highly disruptive to the educational process if a second-

ary school principal were required to take a school news-

paper editor to court every time the principal reasonably

anticipated disruption and sought to restrain its cause.

Thus,

we will not require school officials to seek a judicial de-

cree before they may enforce the Board's policy."

Eisner

however, suggested that "...If students choose to litigate,

school authorities must demonstrate a reasonable basis for

interference with student speech, and that courts will not
rest content with officials' bare allegation that such
basis existed."

37.

Ibid .

38

Ibid.

,

38

p.

The procedure requiring expeditious

810.

a

.
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review in Freedman, however, was held to be valid
in censoring student newspapers.
Details were further given why other aspects of the

board's policy made it invalid.
This policy is also deficient in failing to
specify to whom and how material may be submitted for
clearance. Absent such specifications, students
unreasonably proscribed by the terms of the
policy statement from distributing any written
material on school property, since the statement
leaves them ignorant of clearance procedures.
Nor does it provide that the prohibition against
distribution without prior approval is to be inoperative until each, school has established a
screening procedure." 0
As a result of the details spelled out by the Court for

the Stamford School Board on regulating student newspapers,

Eisner is particularly important for it offers any school

board guidelines for making rules and regulations on this
sensitive topic.
In the previously

mentioned controversy over the stud-

ent newspaper Pf lashlyte a Federal District Court in Texas

offered specific guidelines for the Houston School Board to

follow when regulating student printed matter.

^

The guide-

lines stated:
1.

39.

The rule must be specific as to places and
times where possession and distribution of
published materials is prohibited.

Ibid .

.

p.

811.

40.
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District
307 F. Suppo 1328 (1969)

.
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2.

The rule must be understandable to persons of
the age and experience of covered students.

3.

The rule must not prohibit or inhibit conduct
which is orderly, peaceful and reasonably quiet and which is not coercive of any other person's right to accept or reject and written
material being distributed subject to the rule.

4.

The rule may prohibit such distribution at
times and in places where normal classroom
activity is being conducted. Such rule may
not prohibit such distribution at other times
and places unless such prohibition is necessary to prevent substantial and material interference with or delay of normal school function.

The student press controversy in Houston was again in

court two years later in a second Sullivan v. Houston In-

dependent School District

.

^

The facts in the more recent

Sullivan decision were these.

Paul Kitchen, a junior at

Waltrip Senior High School, was selling

a

publication called

Space City to students off the school grounds.

bought

a

The principal

copy of the underground newspaper and later in the

day, suspended Kitchen for breach of school board policy until a conference could be scheduled with his father.

The

principal heard the word "goddamn" as Kitchen was leaving
his office after being notified of his suspension.

pension hearing was scheduled six days later.

The sus-

On the day of

the suspension hearing Paul was once again selling Space

City near the school grounds.

1152.

41.

Ibid

42.

333 F. Supp. 1149

.

,

p.

During a confrontation with

(1971)
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the principal the student used the word "fuck" after
he was

threatened with arrest.

Subsequently

,

the police were called

in to arrest Kitchen and he was later released.

A hearing

was held in the principal's office and an expulsion
was or-

dered for remainder of the semester.

The assistant superin-

tendent later affirmed the expulsion order leading to the
litigation.

The principal explained that he suspended the

student because he deemed the newspaper to be obscene.

This

decision was based on the fact an editorial used the phrase
"High School is fucked up"
The regulations governing student publications adopted

by the board after the injunction in the first Sullivan de-

cision said essentially that:

"A copy of the publication...

will be taken... to the principal, who may take up to one school

day for the purpose of reviewing such publication before its

general distribution".

The regulation also provided for the

board's attorneys to review the publication in question to

determine if it "contains libelous or obscene language or
advocates illegal action or disobedience to published rules
on student conduct adopted by the Board of Trustees".

The principal, however, did not follow the rules estab-

lished by the board for he suspended Kitchen the same day

because in his opinion, the publication was obscene.

Fur-

ther, it was not reviewed by an attorney as the rules re-

quired when the issue of obscenity was raised.

The Court,

in dealing with the obscenity question held that the phrase

"High School is fucked up" was not obscene.

The phrase did
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not meet the Roth test of treating sex in

a

manner appeal-

ing to prurient interests since, according to
present-day

standards, the expression meant the school was in bad
shape
and had nothing to do with sex.

Furthermore, the phrase was

taken out of context, something forbidden in Roth

publication, judged as

a

,

for the

whole by experts, was considered

to have substantial educational value.

The Baker and Vought

decisions in the previous chapter upholding the school official's judgment that the materials in question were obscene

differs from Sullivan because the students themselves admitted in these two cases that parts of their publications were

obscene.

Finally, the regulations that allowed a school prin-

cipal to review publications prior to distribution and for

attorneys to determine if a student publication might be obscene, was declared unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

The Court in the second Sul 1 ivan decision did make

a

significant point by asserting that school officials could
take immediate action in a "special emergency situation",

suggested
a

m

Crews v. Clones . 43

They spelled out when such

"special emergency situation" might arise.
The Court recognizes that exceptions necessarily
delimit every rule. In the emotionally charged
area of public school policy, a greater- thanusual degree of flexibility is perhaps essential...
in times of crisis, where lives and property are
seriously threatened, customary constitutional
protections may be temporarily curtailed in order

303 F. Supp. 1370 (1969); Crews v. Clones
43.
2d 1259 (1970)

.

432 F.
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to prevent the distruction of the system which
confers those rights. ^

Under this concept, similar to the clear and present danger theory and Tinker's material and substantial test, First

Amendment rights of a free press might be curtailed.
Summary
The cases reviewed here point out quite clearly that in

addition to the constitutional rights of free speech and expression, the Courts have recognized the extension of the

First Amendment right of free press to public school pupils.
Basically, subject to relatively minor restrictions noted in
the cases reviewed in this chapter, students have the same

constitutional rights to a free press as adults and this
right can be impinged upon only if the exercise of the right
results in a material and substantial disruption of the ed-

ucational process.

Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District
44.
333 F. Supp. 11497 1170 (1971)

,

CHAPTER

VI

REGULATION OF OFF-CAMPUS SECRET SOCIETIES
Introduction
As seen in Chapter Four, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent.

Community School District

.

1969, and subsequent court de-

cisions, mostly by the federal courts, have firmly establis-

bod that public school pupils are guaranteed the constitutional right of free expression,

symbolic or otherwise.

If in

the exercise of their constitutional right of free expression,

students assemble, petition or use the press, as long as it
does not materially and substantially disrupt the normal process of education, these three additional First Amendment

rights are also protected.

There is, however, one area of

freedom of assembly, membership in secret societies, fraternities, and sororities, that is now questionable in light
of recent decisions by the courts.
As long ago as 1912, the courts in California upheld

the suspension of a student for violating a state law designed
to prevent the formation and to prohibit the existence of

secret, oathbound fraternities in the public schools.'

1

'

On

the subject of secret societies in the litigation that chal-

lenged the law, the Court said, "It has been said of such

societies that they tend to engender an undemocratic spirit

Bradford v . Board of Education of City and County
18 Cal. App. 19, 21 p. 929 T^lTT
of San Francisco
1

.

.

2
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of caste, to promote cliques, and to foster a
contempt for

school authority."

The reasoning in Bradford that allowed

college fraternities and sororities to exist and at the same
time disallowed similar organizations in elementary and sec-

ondary schools, has been followed in a number of subsequent
decisions down to the present time.

Acknowledging the dif-

ference between college and high school students, the Cal-

ifornia Court contended that, "Normal schools and colleges
are attended by students who are preparing for the serious

affairs of life; and being older in years and with wider ex-

perience are better fortified to withstand any possible hurtful influence attendant upon membership in secret societies

and clubs than the younger pupils attending elementary and

secondary schools, who are less experienced and more impressionable.

3

Until the 1960 °s such cases banning secret societies

were not primarily challenged by students alleging violations of their lirst Amendment right to free assembly.

When

the issue was raised, the courts dismissed the notion with-

out discussion as being irrelevent.
trict No.

_1,

Mul tbinah County

5
,

4

Burkitt v. School Dis-

1952, for example said, "As

far as the federal constitution is concerned, the validity

2

.

Ibid

3

.

Ibid .

.

Alison M. Grey, "First Amendment Right of Association
for High School Student," California. Law Review vol. 55
(August, 1967), 914.
4.

,

5.

264 P. 2d 566 (1922)
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of such state legislation has been
authoratively deter-

mined..." £

by the Supreme Court.

As late as 1962

a

state court dismissed any consideration of
the First

Amendment for the reason that no debatable
constitutional
guestion was involved in secret societies.^
In 1966, a California law disallowing secret
soc-

ieties in the public schools was challenged by students.

Judy Robinson,

a

member of the "Manana Club" in

a

Sacra-

mento high school, sought to have the act declared unconstitutional on the grounds it encroached on her First Amendment right of free assembly.

She had been suspended

from school because of her membership in the club.

The

Court, in refusing to declare the act unconstitutional,

subscribed to the earlier Bradford decision.

The Court

judged secret societies to be detrimental and inimical to
the best interests of the public schools of the district

and to the government, discipline and morale of the pupils. 9
It was alleged by Miss Robinson that the Mariana Club

fostered charity, democracy, and literary activities and

6.

Ibid .

7.

Holroyd v. Eibling

8.

53 Cal.
9

.

,

p.

568.
,

—

186 N.E.

2d 200 (1962)

Robinson v. Sacaramento City Unified School District,
Rptr . 781 (19661
Ibid .

,

p.

782
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was not a secret society.

However, the Court, upon an ex-

amination of the club, did indeed declare it a
secret society since its new candidates were chosen solely
upon a

secret ballot by the existing members.

Similar restraints

upon adult citizens, the Court implied, would not
be constitutional.

The right of adults freely to join together

socially and to assemble for lawful purpose may be conceded
include the right to form and maintain clubs, secret or
non— secret, the right to be as snobbish as they choose, and
any attempt at interference with that right be legislative
or administrative mandate may well be said to be arbitrary,

unreasonable and therefore in violation of the First Amendment.

The Court avoided dealing directly with the issue of

free assembly by stating, “The First Amendment guarantee of
the right of free assembly as applied to adults (or even to

college students, concerning whose rights under the circumstances here involved we express no opinion) is not involved
here.

.
. .

“

^°

In avoiding the constitutional question of as-

sembly, the Court continued, "Here the school board is not

dealing with adults but with adolescents in their formative
years.... It is dealing under express statutory mandate with

activities which reach into the school and which reasonably

may be said to interfere with the edcuational process

,

with

the morale of high school student bodies as a whole and which

Ibid .

,

pp.

789-790.
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also may reasonably be said not to
foster democracy (as the
Manana constitution preaches) but to
frustrate democracy
(as the Manana Club by its admitted
activities practice)." 11
As seen
Robinson, the California state court
declared
a rule prohibiting secret societies
for adult citizens would
clearly be an abridgement of First Amendment
rights.
School
children, however, would not necessarily be
afforded the

m

same constitutional protection as adults since
they are in
their "formative years" and thus, subject to the
discretion of the school boards.

The fact that secret societies,

even though off-campus, tend to foster undemocratic
ideals

which might lower the morale of other students was considered by the court reason enough to reject the claim that
the students' First Amendment rights were being violated

by the state.

Incidentally, the Robinson decision has

a

good review of cases up to 1966 that have upheld state rules

prohibiting secret societies.
The most recent court decision the writer has been able
to find wherein students have alleged abridgement of their

right to freedom of assembly by the public schools is in
Pass el v. Fort Worth Independent School District

.

1968.

In the Passel litigation, students sought to enjoin the

school's officials from enforcing a rule adpoted by the

H

.

Ibid .

.

p.

12.

Ibid .

.

pp.

13.

429 S.S. 2d 917 (1968)

790.

788-789.

13
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Houston Board of Education in 1966 requiring
parents of all
students entering a junior or senior high
school in Sep-

tember, 1967 to sign a "Supplementary Application
for En-

rollment" form certifying that the student was not
and that he or she would not become

a

a

member

member of a high school

fraternity, sorority, or secret society.

The rule, the stu-

dents alleged, deprived them of their right to freedom
of

association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United

States Constitution.

The Texas Court, however, rejected the students' con-

tention saying,

"
0

..The legislative purpose is not to include

any educational organization which has standards or rules by
which... it is admitted that the basis for membership is by
the secret ballot of the clubs themselves rather than upon

rules which any student could qualify." 14

The Court went on

to add another dimension to the arguments prohibiting secret

societies in public schools declaring that such societies

promote invidious discrimination abhorred by the Supreme
Court of the United States.

In concluding that promoting

racial discrimination can be lawfully banned by public school
boards, Passel stated, "We think it well within the police

power of the State to adopt standards to guide the administration of our public school system and we will not substitute
our judgment for that of the Legislature or the School Board

14.

Ibid .

,

p.

923.
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unless there is some element of willful or intentional
dis-

crimination or some real threat of injury to vested property
rights. 15

School Board Regulations Prohibiting
Secret Societies and Recent Court Decisions
Granting Students First Amendment Rights
In view of the Tinker decision in 1969 which granted pub-

lic school pupils First Amendment rights, the legality of re-

gulating off-campus secret societies by school boards appears highly questionable today.

Alison M. Grey in an art-

"First Amendment Right of Association for High School

icle,

Student", "The right of association like other First Amend-

ment rights, "he

stated, "should be restricted only to fur-

ther a strong state interest, only in the absence of equally

effective alternative means of protecting the state

inter-

est, and only to the extent necessary to maintain the state
16
interest involved."
High school clubs and organizations

should thus be evaluated. Grey feels, on these terms.
Tinker offers the material and substantial formula as
a

pragmatic and legal test to determine when

a

student's First

Amendment rights may be abridged by school authorities.
binson

,

Ro-

for example, showed no evidence of actual disruption

or a potential material and substantial disruption to the

educational process.

15.

Ibid.

16.

Grey, p. 919

Organizations, on the other hand, that
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foster deliberate, invidious racial
discrimination bring
in a strong state interest and could be
disallowed

on the

grounds they violate the equal protection
clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as seen in Passel
.

^,1 1 ivan v
.

*

.

Houston Independent School District, dis-

cussed in the previous chapter on the press,

a

post-Tinker

decision, hinted at what attitude a federal court
might
take toward the regulation of off-campus societies
today.

The Court in Sullivan stated, "In this court's judgment,
it makes little sense to extend the influence of school
ad-

ministration to off-campus activity under the theory that
such activity might interfere with the function of education."

17

On the regulation of off-campus activities that

might interfere with school discipline, the Court speculated, "Perhaps then administrators should be able to ex-

ercise some degree of influence over off-campus conduct.
This court considers even this power to be questionable." 18

Court decisions involving the regulation of off-campus ex-

pression by school boards also have been held unconstitutional
as seen in the previous two chapters.

Marc A. Sheiness in an article in the Baylor Law Review
"Fraternities, Sororities, and Secret Societies in Public
School", alleges that the Theta Omega Phi sorority in the

Houston area has not been disallowed by school officials

17.

307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (1969)

18.

Ibid .

,

p.

1341.

.
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because the society is not in school, does
not bring discredit on the school, and that the members are
daughters of
school officials. 19 He points out that
inconsistencies

exist

m

which societies are allowed and not allowed.

Sheiness con-

eludes his article by offering the Tinker formula
as a more

consistent guide in regulating secret societies.

"

. .

.[Thus),

the students' right to attend school and his right to par-

ticipate in extracurricular activities should not be denied

him unless, he himself, by his own acts, has acted incorrigibly so as to materially and substantially interfere
with the proper maintenance of the school." 20
The

P

litigation over the Houston secret society

s ft r 1

,

did not end in 1968.

The higher court in Texas remanded

the judgment back to the district court for further pro-

ceedings on legal technicalities saying, "The case has not

been tried on its merits, and is not ripe for the rendition
of a final judgment."

21

The district court once again ren-

dered an unfavorable judgment against the students seeking
to have the ban on their club exempted from the Houston

School Board's determination that they were

a

secret society.

In addition to the reasoning offered in the initial Passel

decision it is significant to note that the Court of Civil

Marc A. Sheiness, "Fraternities, Sororities, and
Secret Societies in Public Schools," Baylor Law Review, vol.
XXII, (Summer, 1970), 374.
19.

20.

Ibid .

,

p.

378.

Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School District
21 o
440 S.W. 2d 61 (1969)

,

142

Appeals of Texas in affirming the judgment
of the lower
court agreed that the activities "substantially
and materially disrupted and affected the orderly
operation of
the school ." 22
It appears that the Texas Court saw the
necessity of

applying the Tinker First Amendment test in rendering
the

second Pass el decision.

Even though the students were un-

successful in their litigation against the Houston
School
Board

,

they established the precedent that secret socie-

ties would be considered on the basis of the material and

substantial test.

How influer. tial Passel will be in de-

termining future litigation involving secret societies
remains to be seen.

Summary
It is clear today that students are guaranteed all

the First Amendment rights by virtue of Tinker and subsequent

court decisions reviewed in this study.

Most likely, in

spite of the second Passel decision, if a student today

brought litigation into

a

federal court seeking to declare

regulations prohibiting off-campus, secret societies uncon-

stitutional for breach of free assembly, would be successful.
!

The courts undoubtedly will apply the Tinker material and

substantial test as the controlling factor to determine if

Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School District,
453 S.W. 2d 888 '(1970T~
22.

.

the secret society should be allowed.

seen in Passel

.

Courts might, as

justify regulations prohibiting secret

societies that encourage invidious racial discrimination.

However

,

that still leaves guestionable the status of non

disruptive off-campus secret societies and its relationship to a public school pupil

"s

right to free assembly.

CHAPTER VII
FOURTH AMENDMENT:

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states that it
is

,

"The right of the people to be secure ... against unrea-

sonable searches and seizures."

The amendment further re-

quires a search warrant to be issued upon probable cause

describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

The question of whether or not students are afforded

Fourth Amendment protection has been raised thus far in
only a few instances.

The cases where students have al-

leged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights are quite
similar.

In these cases, school officials or law enforce-

ment officers conducted searches and seized materials in
public schools without adhering strictly to Fourth Amend-

ment requirements.

The seized materials were later placed

in evidence during criminal prosecutions of the students in-

volved.

The courts in each instance have rejected the stu-

dents' contention that evidence seized in school should not

be admitted due to alleged violations of their Fourth Am-

endment rights o

However, in the few cases that have raised

the Fourth Amendment issue the courts have not completely

rejected the notion that students in the public schools be
afforded some measure of Fourth Amendment protection.
Charles M. Wetterer in his article, "Search and Seizure
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in Public Schools," raises a number of questions
that exist

between

public school and

a

Fourth Amendment rights.

a

pupil's relationship to his

He states, "Suppose the student

objects stenuously to the search and protests his innocence
and is, indeed, innocent of any wrong doing.

In conduct-

in a search, has the administrator violated the student's

rights?

May

a

student be later accused of

a

crime on the

basis of evidence uncovered in the search, will such evidence be admitted in court if procured without
rant?

a

search war-

If an administrator uncovers drugs or other contra-

band, must he call the police?

without

If police arrive a school

search warrant, must school authorities co-

a

operate and permit a search?

When

student agrees to a

a

search after being ordered to do so by

a

teacher or prin-

cipal has he waived his right of freedom from unreasonable
1

search?"

Because of the Supreme Court's insistance that states

conform to federal consi tutional standards,

2

and recent

court decisions holding certain types of searches and seisures unconstitutional

3

and judicial recognition of students'

constitutional rights, litigation on the questions posed by
Mr. Wetterer has resulted.

1.

Schools,"
2

.

3.

Charles M. Wetterer, "Search and Seizure in Public
vol I (Spring, 1971)
N. 0 L P E School Law J ournal
.

.

,

Mapp V. Phil
Bumper

v.

,

365 U.

S.

North Carolina

743

(1961)

391 U.S.

543

(1968)
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The massive drug problem prevalent in the
public schools
makes it necessary for immediate judicial
guidelines involving search and seizure. A public school obviously
is the

most readily available place where masses of young
people
are in close proximity to one another.

therefore affords drug pushers and user s
their transactions.

The public school
a

place to conduct

Parents, police, and school officials

in an effort to curb drug use and abuse, see as a major

goal the discouragement of harmful drugs on school premises.
This, of course, has implications for search and seizures.

Student Suits Raising the Fourth Amendment
The beginning of what turned out to be

a

lengthly and

complex judicial proceeding resulted when three detectives
bearing a search warrant directing the search of two high
school students, confronted Dr. Adolph Panitz, the vice-

principal of Mount Vernon High School in New York. 4

Dr.

Panitz summoned the two students to his office and they were
searched.

After questioning the students at length, Car-

los Overton, one of the students who were being questioned,

responded with "I guess so" or "Maybe" when asked if he
had marijuana in his locker.
principal, and

a

The detectives, the vice-

custodian proceeded to open Overton's

locker where marijuana cigarettes were discovered.

Later

People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 360 (1967), 283
4.
N.Y. 2d 20 (1967)

14

7

it was determined the search was not legal
for the warrant

did not authorize the search of Overton's
locker.

In the

litigation that followed, Overton moved to have
the evidence suppressed in a youthful offender proceeding.
The case raised a number of important questions
re-

lating to Fourth Amendment rights of public school pupils.
First, did Overton give his consent to the search?

he have been advised of his rights?

s^^^ched without a search warrant?

Should

Could his locker be
Finally, does a school

official have the right to search and seize contraband
from a school locker?
The trial judge dismissed Fourth Amendment considerations and ruled that the evidence against Overton could be

admitted on the ground that the board of education retained

dominion over school lockers through the vice-principal.
Appellate Term later reversed the trial court.

The

However,

the Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate de-

cision and allowed the evidence admitted, concluding that
Dr. Panitz consented to the search and that such consent was

binding on Overton.
The Court of Appeals of New York reasoned, "Not only

have the school authorities a right to inspect but this

right becomes

a_

duty when suspicion arises that something

of an illegal nature may be secreted there.

5.

Ibid

.

,

p.

25

[Emphasis supplied]
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The Court further asserted that, "When Dr.
Panitz learned
of the detectives
suspicion, he was obliged to inspect the
8

l ocker

This interest, together with the non-exclusive
nat-

.

ure of the locker, empowered him to consent to the
search by
the officers."

{Emphasis supplied]

Overton argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were

abridged because the vice— principal opened the door of his
locker, not because he was exercising a free supervisory

control over the locker in the interest of the school program, but because the invalid search warrant compelled him
to do so. A petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme

Court and in October, 1968, the highest court granted the

writ in

a

Per Curiam opinion, vacated the judgment and re-

manded the case for further consideration in light of the
recent Bumper decision.

7

Bumper v. North Carolina g
.

held that where coercion

was evident in a search, it would be unconstitutional on
the ground it is unreasonable.

Isolated on a mile-long

dirt road in North Carolina, a sixty-six year old Negro
grandmother, when confronted by four law enforcement officers who announced, "I have a search warrant to search

your house," said, "Go ahead," and opened the door.

A war-

rant was never shown Mrs. Bumper and in the search that

6

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

25

7.

Overton v. New York

8.

391 U.S. 543 (1968)

.

393 U.S. 85

(1968)
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followed, a .22 caliber rifle instrumental
in Bumper's conviction of rape was seized. The Supreme
Court, in holding
the search to be an unreasonable one, said,
"When

forcement officer claims authority to search

a

a

law en-

home under

warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant
has no
right to resist the search, jjf] The situation is
instinct
a

with.

..

coercion there cannot be consent.

By remanding the Overton case back to the New
York

Court in light of their recent Bumper decision, the
Supreme

Court was asking the judges to consider the possibility of
coercion in the search of Overton's locker.
the facts in Overton

.

Upon review of

the Court of Appeals of New York de-

clared there was no evidence of coercion at Mount Vernon

High School.

They concluded that the desks and lockers

were assigned to students for their use, under predetermined
conditions, one of which prohibited the storage of materials

which violate the law."^

Overton strongly asserted that it

was the school official's duty to make the search.
In a case of similar circumstance in California, the

courts revived the concept of
a

search of

a

iri

student's locker in

loco parentis to authorize
a

public school.

The idea

that a school official has control and responsibilities similar to that of a parent while the student is in school has

9

.

10.

Ibid .

,

p 0 560

People v. Overton

,

301 N.Y.S.

2d 479,

482 (1969)
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been eroded by the advent of student constitutional
rights.
Arnold Taylor, in the Kentucky Law Journal declares "in
loco
largely irrelevant."

_£arent_is_

Dona ldson

stands

iri

,

1969,

However, in the case, In

the Court judged the vice-principal

loco parentis and is not a governmental official

subject to Fourth Amendment requirements when conducting
search.

a

Therefore, they viewed, the Fourth Amendment not to

be an issue in the case.

A student in Ponderosa High School in Placeville, California approached the vice-principal of the high school and
told him a purchase of speed could be easily made in the building.

The vice-principal advised the student to make the

purchase.

Later, after the purchase of the drugs was made,

the locker of the student who sold the pills was searched
and four-and-one-half packs of marijuana and a plastic bag

containing marijuana was seized.

Fifteen year old Donaldson

sought to have the evidence in court against him suppressed
on the grounds the search and seizure was unreasonable and
in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

in a criminal proceeding.

The Court was not in sympathy with Donaldson saying in
part, "We find the vice-principal of the high school not to

Arnold Taylor, "With Temperate Rod: Maintaining
11.
Academic Order in Secondary Schools," Kentucky Lav; Journal,
58 (1969-1970), 624.
vol
•

12.

75 Cal. Rptr .

220 (1969)
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be a governmental official within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment so as to bring into play its prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
one

Such school official is

of the school authorities with an obligation to main-

tain discipline in the interest of a proper and orderly

school operation, and the primary purpose of the school of-

ficial's search was not to obtain convictions, but to secure evidence of student misconduct.

That evidence of

a

crime is uncovered and prosecution results there from should

not of inself make the search and seizure unreasonable." 1
It would appear here in Donaldson the Court is stretching

the point when it considers the search of a known drug

pusher's locker in a school to be only for evidence of

breach of school rules.

Obviously, the vice-principal, in

this case, acting in the best interest of the school, fully

intended to have the pusher arrested.
in Donaldson by saying,

The Court concluded

"...Principals and teachers are di-

rected to exercise careful supervision over the moral con-

ditions in their respective schools, the use of narcotics
is not to be tolerated,

and students are required to comply

with the regulations and submit to the authority of the teachers .

"'1

'

4

The Court in effect in the Donaldson decision viewed

13.

Ibid .

,

p.

14.

Ibid .

,

pp.

222

222-223

152

the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to public school officials

subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.

This

view, however, as mentioned, is impractical for in the event
of a search, evidence seized, if admissible in a court of

law could lead to the conviction of serious crimes.

The

California Court further saw no reason why the school officials could not search the lockers from time to time without
a

warrant if they suspected something illegal to be there.

Other courts have not taken the same view of searches and
seizures as the California Court.
In a Kansas

case^ not involving drugs, Madison

a high school student,

Stein,

was charged and convicted of second

degree burglery and grand larceny.

A motion to suppress the

evidence used to convict him was made alleging the search
and seizure conducted in his high school violated his Fourth

Amendment rights.

The facts of the case are these:

On Jan-

uary, 1968, a music store was robbed and the next day two

police officers visited the principal of Stein's school.
With Stein's consent and in his presence, his locker was

searched and a key to a bus depot locker was found there.
The bus depot locker, the key to which was found in Stein's
locker, turned out to contain the goods stolen from the music

store.

The Court turned down Stein's contention that the

search in school was illegal, and also ruled that there was

15.

State v. Stein

,

Kan., 456 p. 2d

1

(1969)
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no coercion involved.

The Court further concluded that Stein

did not need to be informed of his rights since he
consented
to the search.

The argument that Stein 's Fourth Amendment rights were

not impinged upon because of the nature of

a

high school looker

was upheld as the Court stated "... It does not possess all
,

the attributes of a dwelling, a motor vehicle, or a private

locker .... The possessor's right of possession is exclusive;
it is protected from unwarranted intrusion as against the

world.

The principal of Ottawa High School testified that

he has custody and control of, and access to, all lockers
at the school; that he has a master list of all combinations
to all combination padlocks, and a key which will open every

locker.

He testified also that he opened Stein's locker on

his own judgment."

Concerning the nature of high school lockers, the Kansas Court said, "Although a student may have control of his

school locker as against the school and its officials,

a

school does not supply its students with lockers for illicit
use in harboring pilfered property or harmful substances.
We deem it a proper function of school authorities to in-

spect the lockers under their control and to prevent their
use in illicit ways or for illegal purposes.

We believe this

right of inspection is inherent in the authority vested in

16.

Ibid .

,

pc

3
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school administrators and that the same must
be retained
and exercised in the management of our schools
if their ed-

ucational functions are to be maintained and the
welfare of
the student bodies preserved." 17

Overton

,

Donaldson

,

and Stein all essentially agree on

one basic premise— —that school officials have the right

if

not the duty, to search school lockers upon probable cause
that something illegal might be there and the searches do

not infringe on a student's Fourth Amendment rights.
Can a school official search a student off the school

grounds without violating his Fourth Amendment right to be

secure from an unreasonable search?

The courts in New York

ruled that a school official could conduct

a

search and sei-

zure three blocks from the school in People v. Jackson 18 1971.
.

The Coordinator of Discipline went to a classroom and asked

Andre Jackson to follow him to his office.

On the way the

school official noticed a bulge in Jackson's pants pocket.

Upon arriving at the office, Jackson bolted out the door
and down the street.

Three blocks from the school the Co-

ordinator of Discipline caught the student who had his hand
inside his pocket.

As the Coordinator of Discipline held

his wrist, he ordered Jackson to give the contents to him.

The bulge turned out to be a set of narcotics "works".

17.

Ibid.

18.

319 N.Y.S.

2d 731

(1971)
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syringe, eyedropper, needle, etc.

The "works" were turned

over to a police officer who was also pursuing Jackson at
the request of the school administrator.
In the litigation that followed, a lower New York court

suppressed the evidence on the grounds that the Coordinator
of Discipline, as a government official, had searched Jack-

son without probable cause in violation of his constituThe Appeals Court however, reversed the judg-

tional rights.

ment citing the idea that the school officer was acting in
loco parentis

The Court said, "A school official, standing

.

in loco parentis to the children entrusted to his care, has,

inter alia, the long honored obligation to protect them while
in his charge, so far as possible, from harmful and danger-

our influences, which certainly encompasses the bringing to

school by one of them of narcotics and 'works

0

whether for

sale to other students or for administering such to himself
or other students."

19

The reasoning followed pretty much

that used by the courts in Overton and Donaldson as the New

York Court stated,

"

.

.

Jj]t

would not be unreasonable and un-

warranted that he [the Coordinator of Discipline] be permitted
to search the person of a student where the school official

has reasonable suspicion that narcotics may be found on the

person of his juvenile charge.

Such action, of an invest-

igatory nature, would and should be expected of him.

Being

justified, he would still be performing this important fun-

19.

Ibid

.

,

p.

733.
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ction,

though three blocks from school, necessitated
by the

flight of this errant boy.

As I view the incident, the Co-

ordinator's function and responsibility went with him
during
the chase that took him and the boy away from the
school.

The Court thus allowed the Coordinator, who was in "hot
pursuit" of the student to conduct the search three blocks

from the school building.

Jackson also raised the point that he was coerced by
the school official in the search of his person, prohibited

by Bumper

.

This contention was dismissed also on the premise

that since the school official was acting
the force he applied was legal.

in.

loco parentis

The Court said of the co-

ercion issue:
A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with
the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor
for a special purpose, may use physical force, but
not deadly force, upon such minor or incompetent
person when and to the extent that he reasonably
believes it necessary to maintain discipline or
to promote the yolf are of such minor- or incom^
petent person /'^ [Emphasis supplied]

A lengthy, but important conclusion offered by the
Court in Jackson illustrates the genuine concern of the
courts over the problem of searches and seizures in schools.
As noted, the rigid standard, probable cause, may
not be imposed upon a school official if he is
expected to act effectively in loco parentis

20.

Ibid .

21.

Ibid

,

p.

733-734.

1

57

While we are far advanced from the days of the
Little Red Schoolhouse, such advancement has
also brought great ills. Rampant crime and drug
abuse threaten our schools and the youngsters exposed to such ills. Much could be written about
the ponderous problems that beset parents and
school authorities in their efforts to prevent
and stave off the conditions all about us. We
are well aware of the gravity of these conditions.
There is no need for enlargement. In consequence,
greater responsibility has fallen upon those charged
with the well-being and discipline of these children.
What they may do in that regard should be
weighted, on balance, with the full appreciation
of their duties and the nature of that greater
responsibility. Only then can reasonableness be
concluded in the context of the prevailing circumstances relating to the Fourth Amendment. Reasonable restraint is imposed, less what the school
officials do shall take the form of authoritarian
behavior, trammeling the rights of the students
entrusted to them. Toward that end, a basis foundeclat least upon reasonable grounds for suspecting that something unlawful is being committed or
about to be committed shall prevail before justifying a search of a student when
school of^
ficial is acting in_ loco parentis
.

An important point to consider in this study of student

constitutional rights is the fact that the lower New York

Court held in favor of the student of the grounds his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated by the search of
ficial.

a school of-

Even in reversing the lower court, the Appeals Court

in New York implied that a student does have the constitu-

tional right ot be secure from unreasonable search and se-

izure by stating, "What the Constitution forbids is not all

searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.

22.

Ibid .

,

p.

736.
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Each search must be determined in its own
setting." 23
ally, in Jackson

,

Fin-

the Court did suggest that a school of-

ficial could not stop a student on the street
at any time
and conduct a search which does to a degree
grant a mea-

sure of protection to students against unreasonable
searches.

Summary
Students in the public schools today have yet to be

accorded the full constitutional protection found in the

Fourth Amendment.

Mainly because of the drug problem the

courts have granted school officials wide discretion to

conduct searches of students and their lockers by reviving
the eroding

loco parentis doctrine.

in.

A school official

acting in place of the parent may, upon probable cause, le-

gally search

a

student or his locker.

The courts point out

that the Constitution does not say a person shall be free
from any search but an unreasonable search.

In the few

decisions to date the courts have stated that searches by
other students or a random search by

a

school official on

the street would be unreasonable and therefore unconstit-

utional.

Otherwise, the provisions in the Fourth Amendment

that are mandatory in adult searches and seizures, the

courts have held, are not applicable in a public school.

23.

Ibid

.

.

p.

733.

CHAPTER VIII
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Introduction
The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capitol
otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces
°r
the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any case to be a witness against
himself, not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
,

The Sixth Amendment states:
In the criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.

There are two kinds of due process in constitutional
law today, substantive and procedural.

Substantive due pro-

cess consists of a judicial review of the substance of a

state or federal act to determine if an individual has been

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law 0

The expansion of substantive due process mentioned

in Chapter Two came about through a broader interpretation

of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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beginning in the late Nineteenth Century.
Procedural due process is found in the Fifth
and Sixth
Amendments and is designed to prohibit the
government from

limiting

m

any way the individuals personal or
property

rights without following certain procedures.

As shown in

Chapter Two, through a number of significant court
decisions, the procedures found in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments

have come to cover actions by the states

Nowhere has the expansion of constitutional protection
to public school pupils been more important than
in the area

of procedural due process 0

In a number of recent decisions

relating to the suspension and expulsion of students, the
courts have determined that many of the procedural require-

ments set forth in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are now

binding on school officials,.

Students at the present time

are not accorded the full guarantees found in the Fifth and

Sixth Amendments 0 However, the courts have stated that school

officials must follow certain procedures before expelling or

suspending students in order to guarantee them fundamental
fairness o

This chapter will show to what extent procedural

due process has been granted to public school pupils by the

courts
As a result of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the im-

portance of education in Brown v. Board of Education of To peka

,

^

lo

1954, education came to be considered by the courts

347 UoSc 483 (1954)

as a "right" of American children*

In Brown

.

Chief Justice

V7arren said,

Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society o
It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation
of good citizenship*
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his ev-'
vironment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education .

Courts thereafter began to examine public school sus-

pensions in light of procedural due process requirements.

Practically speaking, the threat of permanent expulsion from
a

high school today could ultimately be more serious to an

adolescent than many sentences imposed by the courts in crim
inal cases.

A most significant landmark decision that led to the

granting of procedural due process to public school pupils
was

Re Gault .

In_

Gault

.

previously mentioned in Chapter

Three of this study, had a significant impact on student

rights in general, but more importantly because the decision
"incorporated" parts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
include protection for juveniles.
in Gault

.

Following the precedent

these procedures have since been expanded to pub-

lic school pupils in subsequent litigation 0
a

Gerald Gault,

minor involved in a juvenile proceeding, was ordered con-

2

°

Ibid .

'

p 0 49 3.

fined to

a

state industrial school for a period of six years

without a notice of charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, privilege against selfincrimination, right to

a

transcript of the proceedings and

the right to appellate review,,

^

The Supreme Court saw in the juvenile proceeding a de-

nial to Gerald Gault of fundamental fairness and due process

of law.

Since the consequences of the juvenile proceeding

were so severe, six years of incarceration, Gault, even though
he was 15 years old, should have been guaranteed the rudiments

of procedural due process.

Regarding the Sixth Amendment re-

quirement that the accused be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, the Supreme Court in Gault said,
"Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be

given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings
so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded

and it must set forth the misconduct with particularity."^
On the right to counsel, the highest court contended
"A proceeding where the issue is whether the child

that,

will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss
of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a

felony prosecution.

The juvenile needs the assistance of
5

counsel to cope with the problems of law."''

3

o

387 U.S.

1

(1967)

4.

Ibid p

,

p„

33.

5

Ibid .

,

p0

36

Gault also
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added other rights for juveniles.

In the words of the Court

"It would indeed be surprising if the privilege
against self-

incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not
to children.

The language of the Fifth Amendment is unequ-

ivocal and without exception.

Because of the serious consequences in the juvenile

proceeding against Gault, procedural due process was deemed
necessary.

The same reasoning, previously mentioned, is be-

ing applied in litigation arising out of public school sus-

pensions and expulsions

— that

the seriousness of an expul-

sion warrants some measure of procedural due process to pro-

tect public school pupils.

Procedural Due Process and College Students
In a number of instances,

court decisions relating to

constitutional rights of college students helped pave the

way for later expansion of these same rights to public
school pupils.

The expansion of procedural due process

rights to students in the secondary level is no exception.

A 1943 case 7

raised the due process issue when stu-

dents from the University of Tennessee were expelled for

selling final examinations.

The plaintiffs sought judicial

intervention because they were not confronted by or informed
of the witnesses against them.

6

o

7c

Ibid .

,

The Tennessee Court rejected

p 0 47

State v. Hyman

,

171 S.W. 2d 822

(1943)

the students

contention saying,

0

"The due process clause of

the Constitution ... can have no application where the
govern-

ing board of a school is rightfully exercising its inherent

authority to discipline students." 8
Two decades later, however, a Federal Circuit in Ala-

bama made the concept of due process applicable to college
student suspensions in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education

9
,

1961.

Six Negro students in the Dixon litigation

were summarily expelled from an Alabama State college for

participating in

a civil

rights demonstration without the

consent of the college president.

Formal charges were not

placed against the students nor were they granted
prior to their expulsions 0
Court saw the problem as,

a

hearing

In this landmark decision,

the

"Whether due process requires not-

ice and some opportunity for hearing before students at a

tax-supported college are expelled for misconduct.
swer that question in the af f irmative 0

tinued,

We an-

The Court con-

"Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure

an individual, the Constitution requires that the act be

consonant with due process of lawo"^

With this pronounce-

ment, college students were afforded constitutional pro-

tection of due process in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

8°

Ibid .

9.

294 F. 2d 150 (1961)

.

p.

827.

10.

Ibld o

,

p.

11

Ibid Q

.

p 0 154

.
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The almost unlimited authority of school
officials over college students regarding expulsions was thus
ended with Dixon .
The fundamental principles of fairness would
now require notice and a right to be heard in college
expulsions.

Realizing the far-reaching implications of their
decision, the Court said,

"We are confident .. .[fhat due process

requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before

a

student at a tax-supported college is expelled for
misconduct." 12
The Circuit Court went on to offer some important
guidelines

college administrators to follow that would insure stu-

dents faced with the possibility of expulsion the rudimentary

elements of fair play.
ing standards.

"They should.

.

.comply with the follow-

The notice should contain a statement of the

specific charges and grounds ... and an opportunity to hear

both sides." 1

The Court finally pointed out that all of

the procedural safeguards in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
are not accorded students as they stated,

imply that

a

"This is not to

full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to

cross-examine witnesses, is required c " 14

12.

Ibid .

13.

Ibid .

14.

Ibid 0

.

p.

158.

,

p.

159.

Dixon is mentioned

See also:
Due v. Florida A &H . University 233 F» Supp Q
Woody
v. Burns
Fla., 188 So Q 2d 56 (1966); Es(1963);
teban v 0 Central Missouri State College 45 F.R.D. 133 (1968);
Scoggln v c L incoln University 291 F c Supp Q 161
(1969); Str icklin Vo Regents of University of Wi scons in 297 F. Supp.
Scott v 0 Alabama State Board of Education 303
416 (1969)
F. Supp. 163 (1969); French v. Bashful. 303 F c Supp D 1333 (1969)
.

393

.

.

.

.

,
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here because recent court decisions on secondary
student ex-

pulsions refer to the guidelines offered in this important
case

When considering Br own

,

Gau 1

and Dixon

,

the jucicial

precedents were therefore available in the late I960

's

that

the courts to proclaim that certain aspects of procedural

due process should be afforded public school pupils 0

What

specifically the courts have decided are procedural rights
of students will be considered next 0
The Right to Counsel

Madera v c Board of Education of City of New York 15
,

raised the issue of the right to counsel in
pupil

°s

guidance conference.

continuous behavioral problems
from the seventh grade.

a

public school

After more than a year of
,

Victor Madera was suspended

Victor's parents were notified of

the suspension and were requested to be present in a Guid-

ance Conference fifteen days later, with regard to their

son's suspension.

The parents sought to have an attorney

present at the Guidance Conference.

However, the school

officials denied the request citing a school board rule
that provided:

"Inasmuch as this is a guidance conference

for the purpose of providing an opportunity for parents,

teachers, counselors, supervisors, et al .

,

to plan educa-

tionally for the benefit of the child, attorneys seeking

15

386 F 0 2d 778 (1967)

to represent the parent or child nay
not participate.- 16

The Wader as successfully obtained a
temporary restrain-

ing order from a district court which would
allow them representation by counsel. However, the Second Circuit
Court
of Appeals reversed the decision on the grounds
that the con-

sequences of the Guidance Conference were not serious
enough
to warrant representation by counsel in order to
protect

Victor Madera's interests.

most that could happen to

The Court pointed out that the
a

student after

a

Guidance Con-

ference would be to have him transferred to another class or
school.

He could, but only with parental permission, have

been transferred to

a

school for the socially maladjusted.

The District Superintendent after the Guidance Conference

also could have referred the student's case to the Bureau
of Child Guidance, another social agency, or the Bureau of

Attendance for court action.

In any case,

these agencies

would afford Victor procedural due process when dealing with
him.

The Court said,

"At the most,

the Guidance Conference

is a very preliminary investigation, if it can be consid-

ered an investigation at all.

After the conference, aside

from a school reassignment, if any, a whole series of further investigations, hearings and decisions must occur before the child is subjected to any of the serious consequ-

16°

Ibid .

,

p.

780
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ences which the district court suggested
follow for the juvenile involved in a District Superintendent's
Guidance Conf17
erence.
There was, however, another important
point considered
by the Court in Madera— if a student was
not allowed counsel
at a Guidance Conference should he
still be afforded the protection of due process? On this question, the
Court answered
in the affirmative saying, "The right to
representation by
counsel is not an essential ingredient to a fair
hearing in
all types of proceedings 0
is twofold.

-

1

Thus, the importance of Madera

First, even though the student did not gain the

right to counsel in

"guidance conference", the Court did

a

recognize the Gault reasoning that counsel would be guaranteed if the outcome of

a

school hearing could have serious

consequences for a student and that in any type of hearing

involving

a student,

he should be accorded fairness.

Sec-

ondly, the Court recognized the necessity to limit the use

of counsel for very pragmatic reasons stating,

"Law and

order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our

respective educational systems 0

The courts should not usurp

this function and turn disciplinary problems, involving sus-

pension, into criminal adversary proceedings

17.

Ibid .

.

p.

18 0

Ibid .

,

p 0 786.

19.

Ibid o

,

£>p.

785.

788-789.

— which

they are
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Cosme v. Board of Education of City
of New York 20 1968,
followed pretty much the reasoning in
Madera by upholding
the Board of Education's refusal to
permit a student's parents to be represented by counsel at a
conference called to
discuss the student's temporary suspension
from school because of misconduct.
Permanent exclusion from school however would allow the assistance of counsel.
.

Notice and Hearing
A year after Madera, in still another New York
case, the
state courts expanded the concept of procedural due
process
to a controversy involving the State Regents
Examinations.
Goldwini v « Allen, 2

resulted when Marsha Goldwin was ac-

cused of cheating on the New York State Regents Examination
by the Acting Principal of her high school.

She broke down

and confessed to cheating when confronted with the evidence

against her 0

The next day Marsha recanted her confession

but the Acting Principal reported to the State Regents any-

way that she had cheated on the examination 0

The Regents,

acting on the letter, suspended Marsha's privileges related
to the examination.

Marsha brought suit claiming she was

denied her constitutional rights because the action against
her was taken without a hearing.
The Court found in favor of Marsha because the suspension

270 N.Y.S. 2d 231:
20.
2d 970 (1968)
21 o

281 N.YoS. 2d 899

aff’d without opinion 281 N.Y.S.
(1968)
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of her examination privileges was certainly serious
for a

student in the New York public schools 0

She would have pro-

blems being admitted to a college, she would be ineligible
for a scholarship and would not receive a state diploma.

Without

a

diploma Marsh’s future job prospects would also

be questionable.
f ession

The Court also commented on Marsha's "con

"

It is not the intention of the court to set out
guidelines pursuant to which school authorities
may interview a student with regard to cheating
and under no circumstances does the court believe that the rules defined in Miranda v Q State
of Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct 0 1602, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694, apply here.
However, it has been
held that one involved in an administrative proceeding may not be deprived of rights under the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 0 [Citations omitted] This court questions the efficacy of the statements elicited from infant petitioner's initial explanation was intended to disprove that statement ? which the school authorities
.

found not credible.

The Court pointed out that a student is not afforded all
the judicial proceedings mandatory in a criminal case.

How-

ever, the New York Court questioned the fairness of using

Marsha's "confession" as the sole basis for the action taken
against her.

The Court, in fact, reminded school officials

they did not want to interfere in school affairs, but if

students were not accorded fundamental fairness when the

consequences of administrative action are serious, the courts

would intervene.

22

o

Ibid., pp. 905-906
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Two cases where the plaintiffs alleged
violations of

First Amendment right in 1969, also raised the
question of
a denial of procedural due process
rights.
In both Sullivan
v. H ouston Independent School Di strict 23
and Vought Vo Van
.

~~ n

Schools 24 students were successful in their

-

.

claim that school officials had violated their
procedural
due process rights.

The Federal District Court in Vought

said that suspended students must be afforded
procedural due

process provided in Dixon .

Therefore, he should have been

given a statement of charges,

a

hearing, confronted by the

witnesses against him and an opportunity to present his own
defense

before the school officials expelled him for pos-

sessing obscene materials.
A Federal Court in Sullivan spelled out standards of

procedural due process

a

school board must follow before it

could suspend students involved in an underground newspaper.
The Court said the requirements were:
1.

A formal written notice of charges and of the
evidence against him must be provided to the
student and his parents or guardian.

2.

A formal hearing affording both sides ample
opportunity to present their case by way of
witnesses or other evidence Q

3.

Imposition of sanctions only on the basis of

23.

307 F. Supp. 1328

(1969)

24.

306 F. Supp. 1388

(1969)

25

Ibid .

c

.

p.

1393.
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substantial evidence,, 26
H°bson_ v. D ailey , 27 1970,

is an example of gross abuse

of fairness by school officials in the expulsion of a
student,,

Deborah Lynn Cleves, seventeen, was excluded from her high
school in Tennessee after participating in

monstr ation .

a

civil rights de-

Initially she was suspended for three days for

cutting class and leaving school without permission while de-

monstrating in Memphis in support of a local Black labor
union's efforts to win recognition*.

In a protest over her

three day suspension, Deborah picketed her school the next
day o

As a result, she was given a Board Suspension for pick-

eting in front of the school and inciting students not to enter the building.

After a conference involving the Assistant

Superintendent, Deborah, and her mother, Deborah was expelled
for the remainder of the year.

At this point Deborah thought

she had no further recourse and began picketing the school

again where she was subsequently arrested.

A Juvenile Court

Probation Officer told Deborah during her arrest that if she

would sign a form admitting to the offense of disorderly conduct, of which she was not guilty anyway, she would be allowed to go back to school.

Deborah willingly signed the form

and later appeared back at school.

This time the school de-

nied her readmission citing also the reason that she admitted-

Sullivan v e Houston Indepen den t S chool District
26.
307 F. Supp 0 1328, 1346 (1969)
27

o

309 F. Suppo 1393

(1970)

,
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ly was disorderly in a demonstration outside the school.

Deborah then sought counsel.
vised she could go to

a

Her attorneys were later ad-

different school in the city.

attended the new school c

She

However, after a short time Deborah

sought readmission into her former school resulting in the

litigation

Deborah claimed the school officials had violated her
due process and equal protection rights of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

The Federal Court, recognizing the obvious abuses

of due process in the case, ordered Deborah back to her ori-

ginal school.

They said the school officials had not given

her a hearing, had suspended her without prior notice, had

obtained inaccurate information, had not informed her she
could appeal and had not substantiated the charges against
28
u
her

A federal court in Illinois added

a

fourth procedural

requirement, a fair and impartial decision, in Whitfield v.

Simpson o

29

Marquitta Whitfield was expelled by

a

school

board for one year for gross disobedience and misconduct.
The Court upheld the expulsion and pointed out what proce-

dures should be made available to public school pupils by
stating,

"The test of whether or not one has been afforded

procedural due process is one of fundamental fairness in the
light of the total circumstances.

28.

Ibid .

29.

312 F. Supp. 889

.

p.

1401.
(1970)

No particular method of
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procedure is required for due process, but what is
required
is:

(1)

Adequate notice of the charges;

portunity to prepare for and meet them;

(2)

impartial decision."

An orderly hear-

(3)

ing adopted to the nature of the case; and

Reasonable op-

(4)

A fair and

The Court here in Whi t fi eld is not

prescribing any one particular formula for procedural due
process but does say that the four essentials just mentioned
are necessary to insure fairness.

One of the most important decisions thus far adjudica-

ted on student procedural due process rights is the recent
V/illiams v. Dade County School Board 31 1971.
.

Courts have in the last few years ruled

that various aspects

of Dixon should apply to public school pupils.

Dade County School Board

.

Other Federal

V/illiams v.

1971, decided by a Federal Court,

made the Dixon procedural safeguards applicable to public
school students.

The litigation grew out of a challenge to

Regulation 5114 of the Dade County, Florida Board of Education which allowed the superintendent of schools to give

a

thirty-day suspension to school pupils in addition to a prin-

cipals ten-day suspension without benefit

of hearing.

Tyrone Williams, a senior at Miami Killian Senior High
School, was charged with participating in

a

mob attack.

He

was given a ten-day suspension by his principal and later the

30.

Ibid .

31.

441 F. 2d 299

.

p.894.
(1971)
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superintendent imposed an additional thirty dav
suspension
on the student.

Williams alleged his procedural due pro-

cess rights were violated by the lengthy suspension
because
he was not afforded a hearing.
In Williams the Court made Dixon applicable to
public

school long-term suspensions by saying,

"Though Dixon dealt

with the expulsion of college students, we feel that to deprive even a high school student,

'in these days”,

school days may indeed cause serious harm O

o 0

of 40

we see no reason

why these Dixon procedural safeguards ought not be required
before adding an additional 30-days." 32
These decisions clearly demonstrate that students in
the public schools today facing possible long-term suspen-

sions or expulsion do have the constitutional right to written notice of the charges and a hearing.

Confrontation
The Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against
the accused became a right of public school pupils in a re-

cent New Jersey decision, Tibbs v. Board of Education of

Township of Franklin 0

33

In the Tibbs decision, Tanya Tibbs

was accused by others, not identified, of physically as-

saulting another student.

32

0

I bid

33

o

276 A. 2d 165

.

,

p.

Due to the fear of possible

302.

(1971)
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recriminations the board of education, in the
subsequent
hearing, withheld the names of those making

the accuation

against Tanya.

The board suspended Tanya and the New
Jersey

Commissioner of Education affirmed the suspension.

The de-

cision was then taken to the New Jersey Courts
where it was
overturned.
The New Jersey Superior Court would not accept
the argu-

ment that presenting the witnesses against the accused
in the
school board hearing would be too dangerous. The Court
went
on to add,

"I

therefore conclude that in the context of such

a case as this not only should the accusing witnesses
be id-

entified in advance but also, as

a

general matter and absent

the most compelling circumstances bespeaking a different

course, be produced to testify and to be cross-examined." 34

The Length of Suspensions and Procedural Due Process

A number of decisions in this chapter demonstrate that

certain procedural safeguards are guaranteed to students
facing expulsion from school.

Suspensions however, part-

icularly short-term suspensions, pose
blem.

a

different legal pro-

3ould a student be afforded procedural safeguards if

he is facing a one or two week suspension?

Recent court de-

cisions have dealt specifically with this problem 0

Conflict-

ing decisions however, have made the guidelines unclear 0

34„

Ibid,

,

p.

170.
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A Federal Court in Baker v. Downey Ci
ty Board of Education 35 1970, already mentioned in connection with
First

Amendment rights, pointed out that, "Due process is not

fix-

a

inflexible procedure which must be accorded in every si—

ed,

tuation." 3 6

The Federal District Court in California went

on to say, regarding a ten day suspension, that

"

I

. 0 .

f

the

temporary suspension of a high school student could not be

accomplished without first preparing specifications of char3 es

<

,

giving notice of hearing, and holding a hearing, or any

combination of these procedures, the discipline and ordered
conduct of the educational program and the moral atmosphere

required by good educational standards, would be difficult
to maintain."

37

Later in the same year a ten-day suspension without

hearing was allowed by

a

a

Federal District Court in Florida.

Banks v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County 3R 1970,
,

upheld a Florida statute which permitted principals to suspend students for ten days without affording prior notice or
a hearing.

The Court said the right to a hearing is subject

to limitations imposed in order to insure the orderly admini-

35.

307 F. Supp. 517 (1970)

36

0

Ibid .

,

p.

37.

Ibid .

t

pp. 522-523.

38.

314 F. Supp. 285

522.

(1970)
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stration of education,,
dent immediately

In order to remove a disruptive stu-

in some cases, the teacher would have to

,

leave the classroom for the hearing.

If a teacher could not

remove a disruptive student immediately, all would
suffer,,
In Banks the Court contended,

"Public school children sus-

pended for misconduct are not criminals „

The legal processes

due them are less exacting than that due one who is accused

under a criminal statute." 39

The Court rejected the Dixon

requirements pointing out that a college suspension is far
more serious than a public school suspension. 49
a ten-day suspension without hearing did not,

Therefore,

in the view of

this Court, impinge upon a student's right to due process.

A Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 41 in 1971 also upheld
a ten-day suspension of a student in Connecticut without a

hearing.

Molly Farrell,

a

high school sophomore in Clinton,

Connecticut, was suspended for ten days after being involved
in a "sit-down" protest,,

She alleged her suspension denied

her procedural due process because there was no written notice, hearing, or the confrontation of witnesses against her 0

Molly was, however, well aware of

a

rule that automatically

allowed a ten-day suspension of students who disrupted the
school.

The school board first authorized a fifteen day sus-

291.

39.

IfcLcL

40.

Ibid .

41.

Farrell v. Joel

Po

.

f

p.

292.
.

437 F. 2d 160 (1971)
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pension then lowered it to the proper ten-day
limit, but upheld the suspension stating, " 0 Appelants
9

actions were clear-

ly improper and prompt discipline of some
sort was justified. 1,42
Ihe Federal Circuit Court went on to reason
that, "...In cases

of minor discipline particularly, parent, student,
and admin-

istrator should remember that substitution of common
sense
for zealous adherence to legal positions is not
absolutely

prohibited.

1,43

A more recent Federal Court ruling was made regarding

another ten-day suspension in Florida. 44

board in Port Myers, Florida adopted

a

in 1968, the school

policy that automati-

cally suspended students for participating in demonstrations
and walkouts at school.

Later, in February, 1970, one-hun-

dred Black students walked out of school to voice their grievances over school policies »
behaved.

The group was orderly and well

They were subsequently suspended by the principal

for ten days.
In this particular instance the Federal Court saw a

denial of due process in the suspensions even though they

were temporary.
out

— whether

The Court declared,

"The nature of the walk-

it was non-violent or tumultuous

— is

irrelev-

ant to the due process issue, although it would be relevant
to the First Amendment issue.

Whether the students walked

out peaceable or riotously, they were still entitled by due

42.

43.

.

Ibid .

.

p.

Ibid .

.

pp. 163-164

163.

Black Students Etc ., Ex Rel
317 F. Supp. 1211 (1970)
44.

.

.

Shoemaker v. Williams

,

180

process to

disorderly

hearing.

a
,

Due process protects the orderly
and

even as it protects the innocent and the
guilty.'*45

The Court also took the position that,

"Due process requires

that an accused be offered an opportunity
to have his guilt

determined by

a fair

hearing prior to the imposition of pe-

nalties for the alleged misconduct." 46

Further, the Court

concluded in the decision "...Oflhat due process prevents
defendants from suspending

a

student for

a

substantial period

of time without first affording the student an adversary hearing.

A suspension for ten days is a suspension for

stantial period of time."

a

sub-

Evidently in this situation,

the courts saw the necessity for a hearing regarding the sus-

pension of a student for ten days because of involvement in
a

First Amendment question.

Automatic suspension for ten

days in the exercise of expressing an opinion could here have
a

"chilling effect" on a student's First Amendment rights.

Williams v. Dade County School Board 46 already mention.

ed previously in this chapter, upheld

pension that did not provide for

a

ten-day school sus-

a hearing.

However, the

Court would not allow the superintendent of schools to impose
an additional thirty-day school suspension without procedural

45.

Ibid.

.

pp 0 1214-1215.

46

Ibid.

.

p.

47 o

Ibid.

.

p 0 1216 o

CO

•

1215.

441 F. 2d 299 (1971)
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due process safeguards.

pal's right to impose

realized the need in

The Appeals Court upheld the
princiten school day suspension
because it

a

a

public school situation for the
admini-

stration to act quickly in some cases
to prevent further serious disorders. To deny a student
the right to a hearing
for an additional thirty days,
however, was to deny a student
fairness. The Court said of the additional
suspension,
We feel we must state, at the outset,
that we are
not dealing with the power of the school
to discipline its students. Nor are we concerned
with the
guilt or innocence of appellant. We focus
only on
t e school's procedure for the
disposition of the
case.
further, we note that though the record indicates there may have been considerable disruption
the school at the time appellant was first
suspended (for ten days), we are concerned with the
imposition of the additional 30 day suspension which
was given without benefit^ of an effective hearing
and at a later time.^9
|_Emphasis suppliedj

m

The Court continued by pointing out that the suspension,
an eight week loss of school time, was a serious penalty
for
a

public school pupil today.
We realize, of course, that it is not necessary
that students be given the kinds of procedural protections reserved for those accused of serious
crime.
Nevertheless, we feel that a penalty of this
magnitude ought not be imposed without proper notice of the charges, and at least an attempt to ascertain accurately the facts involved and to give
the student an opportunity to present his side of
the case. 5(J

At the present time it is not clear whether students

should be afforded procedural due process in suspensions that

49.

Ibid o

.

p 0 301.

5°.

Ibid .

.

pp.

301-302.

182

do not exceed ten days.

The Williams decision does
make it

clear that suspensions of students for
thirty school days
without notice and a hearing violates
a student's constitutional rights „

Summary

Public school pupils today

/

through the extension of

procedural due process to them, have considerable
constitutional protection when facing possible long-term
suspensions
and expulsions.
Since the denial to an adolescent

of the op-

portunity to attend school is viewed in

a

very serious light

by the courts, certain constitutional safeguards have
been

deemed necessary to protect the student's interest.

Although

the courts have not included all the Fifth and Sixth Amend-

ment procedural due process requirements, the courts have
stated that many aspects of these two amendments are student

constitutional rights.

The courts have held that students

facing long-term suspensions or expulsions shall be allowed:
1.

Counsel

2.

Formal written notice of the charges.

3.

A formal hearing.

4.

Adequate time for both sides to prepare,,

5

0

To be confronted by the witn esses against him„

6

0

The right to cross-examine witnesses.

7.

A fair and impartial decision,.

These safeguards listed above have been determined by the
courts to be student constitutional rights „

They offer public

183

school pupils today substantial protection
that was practically nonexistent only a few years ago.

CHAPTER

IX

STUDENT RIGHTS UNDER THE EIGHTH, NINTH
TENTH AMENDMENTS

AND

Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment states,

"Excessive bail shall not

be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and un-

usual punishments inflicted."

Students in two 1971 cases

al-

leged that school officials inflicted cruel and
unusual punishment upon them thereby violating their Eighth Amendment

rights
In Ware v Q Estes

,

a

high school student sought to

restrain the Dallas Independent School District from admin-

istering corporal punishment without the permission of the
student or parent.

punishment through

The school system provided for corporal
a

rule that stated:

Principals are authorized th administer and reasonable punishment, including detention, corporal
punishment, suspension for a period not to exceed
ten school days at a time, or recommendation for
expulsion from school.
The students alleged that the rule in question violated

the Eighth Amendment by allowing the infliction of cruel and

unusual punishment of students 0

The students also asserted

that the rule had been abused by Dallas school officials in
the pasto

The Federal District Court hearing the case, how-

lo

328 F 0 Supp. 657 (1971)

2

Ibid .

.

,

p. 658.

18 5

ever

,

rejected the students' contention by pointing out that

even if the policy was abused in Dallas it did not mean the

policy was unconstitutional.

4

Corporal punishment, as it was being administered in
Dallas, meant that a student would be hit on the buttocks

with

wooden paddle.

a

The Court avoided the issue of the

value of corporal punishment in the educational process

stating that it was not within the Court's competence or
function to pass on the merits of corporal punishment.

District Court concluded in

VJ

ar

The

that a student is adequately

protected because if the punishment is unreasonable or excessive, the perpetrator will be criminally and civilly

liable.

5

"The law and policy," said the Court,

"do not

sanction child abuse." 0
A case previously reviewed in conjunction with First

Amendment rights also raised the question of cruel and unusual punishment,,

District

7
,

Press v. Pasadena Independent School

1971, sought to have an eighth grade girl re-

admitted to school after she had been suspended for par-

ticipating in a disruptive demonstration

0

She alleged her

suspension for the remainder of the spring term was cruel

3.

Ibid o

4.

Ibid o

.

p 0 659 0

5

0

Ibid .

,

p 0 660.

6

o

Ibid.

7

326 F 0 Supp 0 550

(1971)
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and unusual punishment and therefore violated
the Eighth Am-

endment.

The Federal District Court in California hearing the
case rejected the student's argument and held that the
Eighth

Amendment only applied to criminals.

In the words of the

plaintiff has not been the subject of any crim-

1

inal sanction, and has not been abused, tortured, or other-

wise brutalized, she is clearly not within the...
endment." 0

[Eighth] Am-

The application of the Eighth Amendment to pub-

lic school pupils was therefore rejected by the Court in

Press

.

The Eighth Amendment has also been raised in
"long hair" cases.

a

number of

Students seeking the removal of school

rules requiring them to cut their hair have alleged the rules

promulgate cruel and unusual punishment.

Thus far, the

courts have refused to recognize the cutting of

a

student's

hair to be cruel and unusual punishment subject to the protection of the Constitution.
Efforts by students to have the constitutional protection of the Eighth Amendment extended to them have to this

day not been successful.

Courts have taken

a

position that

the Eighth Amendment only applies to criminals.

They further

view corporal punishment in schools to be legal and if abused
by school officials, state criminal and civil statutes are

available for remedies.

8

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

564.
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Rights Reserved to the People
The Ninth Amendment, which states,

"The enumeration in

f

^Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage other retained by the people", and
the

Tenth Amendment, "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the

people", have both been raised in connection only with "long

hair" cases.

The central point in these cases is the con-

tention that a student's right to wear his hair long is an

individual right not subject to regulation by any government.
It is a right, students allege, that is "reserved to the

people".

Students cite as

wold v. Connecticut

g
,

a

controlling precedent, Gris -

and its "penumbra doctrine

The

0

"penumbra doctrine", mentioned earlier in this study, es-

tablished "zones of privacy" in the Bill of Rights that are

guaranteed constitutional protection.

Students seeking the

right to wear long hair in the public schools claim

a

of privacy" extends to their grooming preferences 0

Until

"zone

very recently the courts have rejected the application of
the Ninth Amendment as a Griswold right in "long hair" con-

troversies stating that Griswold was limited to the privacy
10

between husband and wife in the home."'

9

o

10.

381 U.S. 479

Griswold

.

held

(1965)

King v. Saddleback Junior College

,

445 F. 2d 932

(1971)
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unconstitutional

a

Connecticut statute that made the use of

birth control devices illegal 0
However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in

hair" case just decided, reversed Bishop v. Colaw

Supp 0 445 (1970), on the grounds that

a

.

a

"long

310 F.

public school pupil

did possess a constitutional right to govern his appearance

under the Ninth Amendment. 11

The Court stated:

"...Some have referred to the right to govern apperance as 'fundamental' others as 'substantial',
others as 'basic', and still others as simply as
a 'right'.
The source of this right has been found
within the Ninth Amendment, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the privacy penumbra of the Bill of Rights. A close reading of
these cases reveals, however, that the differences
are more semantic than real.
The common theme underlying decisions striking down hair style regulations is that the Constitution guarantees rights
other than those specifically enumerated and that
the right to govern one's personal, appearance is
one of those graranteed rights."
The Bishop decision, rendered in 1971, extends Ninth

Amendment protection to public school pupils.

The Court

felt school regulations governing personal appearance tran-

scended

a

right to privacy guaranteed by the Ninth Amend-

The implications of this decision are yet to be seen

ment.

since it is so recent.

The following chapter in this study

will show that other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have

rejected the reasoning the Eighth Circuit Court followed

11
12

.

450 F. 2d 1069 (1971)

Ibid .

,

p.

1075.
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in deciding Bishop .

In any case

;

Bishop should not have too

much influence on the broad perspective of student constitutional rights since it was adjudicated on
the right of students to wear long hair.

a

narrow issue,

While the pro-

tection of the Ninth Amendment has been granted to students
in at least one instance,

as seen in Bishop

,

the Tenth Am-

endment, raised by students only in conjunction with "long

hair" controversies, has up to now been rejected by the courts.

CHAPTER

X

"LONG-HAIR" AND PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS

Introduction
So voluminous are court cases involning "long hair" in

the public schools, the topic warrants a separate chapter in

this study of student constitutional rights.

This study has

reviewed no less than seventy-five court decisions on long
hair which far out number all other suits in which students
1

have sought constitutional relief through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The cases are so nu-

merous that only appellate decisions will be reviewed here.

The inability of the courts to provide

a

clear and consis-

tent ruling on the status of "long hair" applicable on

nationwide scale has generated
of its importance.

a

The cases, by

a

controversy far in excess
and

large, seek to prevent

school officials from suspending students who choose to

wear their hair long in violation of adopted dress codes.
On occasion, students have alleged in court that rules pro-

hibiting "long hair" in the public schools violate constitutional rights in as many as the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
2
have rejected the whole controversy as a
Some courts

1.

Bouse v. Hipes

2.

Freeman v. Flake

,

319 F. Supp. 515 (1970)
.

448 F. 2d 258 (1971)

i9i

constitutional issue viewing the problem as one that
should
loft strictly for school administrators to resolve.
Other courts

3
,

realizing the importance of "long hair" to

public school pupils

,

have conscientiously sought to adjud-

icate the litigation on sound constitutional principles.

The inconsistencies of the court decisions promulgated by
"the

long hair" dispute have generated confusion and con-

sternation among educators, not only on the status of hair,
but over the whole area of student constitutional rights in

general
Undoubtedly, many school officials view the regulation of student grooming as an area of no concern of the
courts, state or federal.

They feel judicial intervention

on such a "minor" controversy is an infringment of their

administrative prerogratives

controversy takes on

a

However, the "long hair"

.

very serious note where students

are denied attendance in schools that promulgate rules ban-

ning excessively long hair.

The courts, therefore, became

involved in the controversy because of the serious con-

sequences imposed on students who insisted on wearing their

hair long.
Can a male student wear his hair as long as he wants
to in a public school?

The answer to the query

depends

The First, Seventh, and

upon where the student lives.

Eighth Circuit Courts have ruled in favor of the student

3.

Richards v. Thurston

,

424 2d 1281 (1970)
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while the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit

4

Courts have upheld school regulations prohibiting long
hair.

The beginning of this legal controversy can be traced

back to the 1965, Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro

decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Leonard, a high school student who claimed his "Beatletype" hair cut was essential to his performance in a band,

was suspended by Attleboro school officials until he cut

his hair shorter.

Leonard contended the school’s action

was unreasonable and arbitrary, and that "long hair" was
in no way connected with the successful operation of a

public school.
The Massachusetts Court, however, ruled in favor of
the board’s action stating,

"The Court’s function in re-

viewing this type of ruling is limited in the light of
the broad discretionary powers which the law confers upon
a school committee.

We will not pass upon the wisdom or

desirability of a school regulation."
its reasoning by saying that,

5

The Court concluded

"We are of opinion that the

unusual hair style of the plaintiff could disrupt and impede the maintenance of a proper classroom atmosphere or
decorum.

This is an aspect of personal appearance and

hence akin to matters of dress.

4.

212 N.E. 2d 468 (1965)

5

Ibid c

.

,

p o 472.

Thus as with any unusual,

immodest or exaggerated mode of dress, conspicious departures from accepted custom

in the matter of haircuts could

result in the distraction of other pupils." g
As male long hair styles became more and more common
in the late sixties, suspensions began to increase.

Re-

cognition by the federal courts of student constitutional
rights through the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment resulted in appeals by suspended students to
hear their cases on constitutional grounds.

As a result,

Federal District Courts have been inundated with "long
hair" cases.

A significant number of "long hair" cases

have also reached Circuit Courts of Appeal, the court level

directly below the Supreme Court of the United States.

The

highest court has yet to rule on "long hair" in the public
schools and they specifically ruled out long hair and dress
codes as an issue on the landmark Tinker decision in 1969.
The decisions rendered by the Appellate Courts, pro and con
will now be reviewed.

Appellate Court Decisions Favoring Students
Court decisions holding in favor of students in "long
hair" disputes have centered essentially around two points.

The most recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Richards v. Thurston

6.

Ibid.

1970, on "long hair" rejected the

notion that a student’s right to wear long hair is

a

con-

stitutionally protected act of symbolic expression under
the First Amendment or a Griswold "right to privacy".

In-

stead, the Court, in ruling against school officials" re-

strictions on hair length, stating that, "We believe that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment estab-

lishes a sphere of personal liberty for every individual,

subject to reasonable intrusions by the state in furtherance of legitimate state interest." 7

The Court went on to say that regulating the style of
one’s hair was not a legitimate state interest.

The Court

continued by pointing out that, "...Liberty seems to us an
incomplete protection if it encompasses only the right to
do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with

those personal aspects of our lives which have no direct

bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty."

Q

Finally, in Richards the Court said, "We conclude that

within the commodious concept of liberty, embracing freedoms great and small, is the right to wear one’s hair as
he wishes."

9

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its most recent "long hair" decision,

7

.

10

Richards v. Thurston

8.

Ibid.

9

Ibid .

,

p.

1285

followed an earlier Seventh

,

424 F. 2d 1281, 1284 (1970)
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Circuit decision, .Breen v. Kahl

11
,

1969.

Because of his

long hair, Tyler Crews was denied admission
to North Central High School in Marion County, Indiana.
Holding in fa-

vor of the student, the Court reasoned,

"

. .

.[sjince

the im-

pact of hair regulations extends beyond the schoolhouse
gate, the degree of state infringement on personal
rights
is significantly greater than in many other areas of
school

discipline."

satisfy

a

In Crews

the school officials failed to

.

burden of substantial justification reguired be-

fore a state may impinge upon a person's liberty.

The

fact that one's hair could not be worn short in school and
long out of school was an important factor in

a

favorable

decision for Tyler Crews.
Another reason used by

a

Federal Circuit Court where

litigation was favorable to a student in

a

"long hair"

controversy has been the extension of the Griswold right
to privacy found in the Ninth Amendment.

The Eighth Cir-

cuit recently rejected both the First and Seventh Circuit

Courts

arguments and applied the Griswold formula which

0

would not allow school rules to regulate

a

student's hair

style because it violated his constitutional right to pri-

Bishop v. Colaw

vacy.

,

mentioned earlier in Chapter Nine,

stated, "We believe that, among those rights retained by

11

.

12 .

296 F. Supp.

702 (1969); Aff'd 419 F. 2d 1034 (1969)

Crews v. Clones

,

432 F. 2d 1259, 1264 (1970)

the people under out Constitutional form of
government, is
the freedom to govern one's personal appearance." 15

Lower

federal courts, in addition to the Federal Appeals Courts,

have applied the First Amendment 14

and the equal protec-

tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 15 in striking down

rules and regulations prohibiting "long hair" in the public

schools

Appellate Court Decisions Favoring School Boards
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that have ruled in

favor of school officials in the "long hair" dispute center their reasoning essentially around the points that the

regulation of grooming codes should be resolved by school
administrators, not the courts, and any evidence of dis-

ruption justifies upholding the school board rule in order
to protect the orderly process of education.

decision, Jackson v. Dorrier

upheld a suspension of

13.

Clonces

,

a

1

In

a 1S70

the Sixth Circuit Court

.

high school pupil in Nashville,

450 F. 2d 1069, 1075 (1971); see also:
432 F. 2d 1259 (1970)

Crews v.

See:
Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education
14.
250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 5 2 0 (19 6 777" Meyers v.
Areata Union High School District, 269 Cal. App. 2d 549,
65 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969)

,

Zachry v. Brown 299 F. Supp. 1360 (1967);
Griffin v. Tatum. 300 F. Supp. 60 (1969); W estley v. Rossi
15.

See:

305 F. Supp.
16.

706 (1969)

424 F. 2d 213 (1970)

,

.
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Tennessee for wearing long hair, stating:
In the absence of infringement of constitutional
rights, the responsibility for maintaining proper
standards of decorum and discipline and a wholesome academic environment at Donelson High School
is not vested in the federal courts, but in the
principal and faculty of the school and the Metropoliton Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.

Jackson, the high school pupil involved in the controversy, denied his long hair was an act of expression, there-

by removing any question of First Amendment protection.
In a more recent decision,

the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals said, "The argument that the right of
determine his own hair length is
I

process is without merit 00 .„"

a

a

student to

matter of substantive due

O

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals saw

'.'long

hair" as

minor problem compared to the awesome difficulties invol-

a

ving southern schools recently ordered to desegregate 0 19
•

Concerning litigation reaching the Fifth Circuit Court over
the suspension of three Negro students who refused to shave,

they said,

"The case is such that the District Court felt

somewhat put-upon by having to fit
into an inordinately busy schedule 0

blem for school administrators.

Ibid .

18 0

Gf ell Vo Rickelman

19 o

Georqi

.

controversy over shaving
It was viewed as a pro-

We share this view a

The

pp. 218-219 0

17 0

,

a

,

441 F 0 2d 444, 447 (1971)

Stevenson v. Board of Education of Wheeler County
426 F 0 2d 1154 19 70l
(

,
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entire problem seems miniscule in light of other
matters involving the school system. The rule in question is
founded

on a rational basis, and that it was not arbitrarily
appliedo
It follows that no substantial federal constitutional
que-

stion was presented.

There the matter ends 0

"

2^

The Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently used the same rea-

soning in other "long hair" cases they have adjudicated. 21
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also recently ruled
in favor of upholding regulations restricting the length of

male students

hair.

•

Their reasoning is basically the

same as other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that have

ruled in favor of school boards.
Flake stated,

The Court in Freeman v.

"We are convinced that the United States Const-

itution and statutes do not impose on the federal courts the

duty and responsibility of supervising the length of
dent's hair.

a stu-

The problem, if it exists, is one for the states

and should be handled through state procedures Q

missing the litigation in Freeman

,

"

23

In dis-

the Court declared,

"The

hodgepodge references to many provisions of the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment show uncertainty

20 o

Ibid p

.

as to the

p 0 1150.

See:
Farrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist rict
21.
392 F. 2d 697, 393 U.S. 856, 89 S. Ct 0 98 (Certiorari deniedT
(1968); Davis v. Firment 408 F. 2d 1085 (1969); Griffin v.
Tatum 425 F» 2d 201 (1970) Wood v 0 Alamo Heights Indepen dent School District 433 F. 2d 355 (1970)
,

;

,

,

22

0

23.

Freeman v 0 Flake
Ibid p

,

p.

259

o

,

448 F. 2d 258 (1971)

.
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existence of any federally protected
right ." 24
Tenth Circuit Court said of -long
hair- cases,

Finally, the

-Complaints

which are based on nothing more than
school regulations of
the length of a male student's hair
do not directly and shar _
p
ly implicate basic constitutional values
and

therefore, should

not be subject to constitutional protection. 25

The Tenth Cir-

cuit Court followed similar reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit
in Kina v. Saddleback Junior College 26
1971, in deciding
against students in the "long hair" dispute.
.

Summary

Unfortunately, both for public school administrators
and
the courts, the "long hair" problem continues to
grow.

Beards,

sideburns, and longer hair seem to be an acceptable norm
in
some parts of the country.

The pressure on schools seeking

to prevent these styles of grooming is mounting.
as seen,

The courts,

are still unable to resolve the controversy.

Students

are still suspended from school for violations of grooming

codes and the courts are hearing more cases.

It would appear

the Supreme Court will have to step in and resolve the dil-

emma one way or the other for the federal courts are so sharply

divided on the whole "long hair" issue.

24.

Ibid .

.

p. 260.

25.

Ibid .

.

p.

26.

445 F. 2d 932

262.
(1971)
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The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, re-

cently complained that the Supreme Court has on several occasions refused to review the constitutional question of "long

hair" regulations. 2 7

The justices further stated,

"What little

guidance we have from the Court in this area is conflicting." 28
A clear-cut ruling on the status of "long hair" would be of

great benefit to the area of student constitutional rights
for it would end a well publicized legal controversy the

courts have thus far been unable to settle.

27.

B ishop v.

28 o

Ibid

Colaw

,

450 F c 2d 1069, 1071 (1971)

CHAPTER

XI

CONCLUSION
Impact on Students
The growth and expansion of constitutional rights to in-

clude students is having
today.

a

broad impact on public schools

Students, by virtue of various court decisions, may ex-

ercise their right to free expression in school.

Symbolic acts

of protest, demonstrations, and speech are all constitutionally

protected rights of public school pupils.

Limits on these rights

will be determined by the material and substantial disruption
test proscribed by Tinker in most cases.

If in the exercise

of free expression a student materially and substantially dis-

rupts the educational process then such expression may be re-

stricted

.

The right of a student to be guaranteed freedom of the press
has also become

a

student constitutional right.

Students today

may print and distribute in and around schools pretty much what
they choose.

The courts have consistently held that student

expression in

a

newspaper is their constitutional right and that

student newspapers should be governed by the same guidelines
as all newspapers.

Constitutional protections such as these are allowing
students to voice their concerns over things they do not like.
In addition to broad social and political issues, students are

expressing discontent over the schools they attend.

They aie

making their voices effectively heard on such things as dis-

cipline, dress, teachers, physical environment and
the cur-

riculum.

One result has been more student participation
in

the decision making process in public schools.

Judicial recognition that students have certain rights,
places an additional measure of responsibility upon the students.

In the exercise of a pupil's right to free expres-

sion, for example, he now has the responsibility of not
in^ ringing

upon the rights of others.

Also, in the exercise

of the right to a free press, students have the responsibility
of maintaining the recognized ethics of journalism.

Any

means that would allow students the opportunity of assuming
a

greater burden of responsibility should be welcomed by ed-

ucators.

What other way can best prepare adolescents to make

the tremendous decisions of choosing a mate for marriage, a

college, or an occupation?

Students used to responsibil-

ities will be able to make sounder, more mature decisions

upon the termination of their public school experience.
The inclusion of procedural due process rights to be

constitutionally protected rights of students has also had
a tremendous impact on students.

Students today have been

afforded rights that give them considerable protection before they can be expelled or suspended for long periods of
time from school.

Legal counsel is also being made available

to students by organizations such as the American Civil Lib-

erties Union to insure that a student's constitutional rights
are not violated when they are suspended.

No longer can
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public school pupils be summarily expelled at the arbitrary
will of school officials.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendment pro-

cedural due process rights guarantee students facing

expul-

sion and long term suspensions today fundamental fairness.

Impact on School Officials
The impact of student constitutional rights has cer-

tainly been evident to school officials.

A main concern of

teachers, administrators, and school board members is the

feeling that court decision granting students constitutional
rights will undermine their authority and control over students.

Discipline in

a

public school is necessary, many

maintain, before the educational process can even begin.
A close examination of court decisions on student rights

indicates clearly the justices have gone at great length to

point out that they are not trying to usurp the powers of school
administrators.

The courts realize the tremendous problems

school administrators have today in running the public schools.
They have taken great care to emphasize that any attempts to

disrupt the ed ucational process will not be tolerated.

Many

courts have commented on the merits of control and discipline
in the public schools as a necessary part of the educational

process.

What the courts are saying, however, is that all

pupils must be treated justly, fairly, and reaanably by school

officials

Pedagogical and legal philosophies clash, not on the

fundamental idea that there must be authority, control, and
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discipline in public schools, but on the degree of
authority
authority that can allow arbitrary restrictions on a

student's

fundamental rights.
If school officials treat students justly, fairly,
and

reasonably the courts, organization such as the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties Union and various neighborhood legal
aid groups will be satisfied.

Recommendations by the Am-

erican Civil Liberties Union,

University Professors,
School Principals,
of Education

4

3

tyie

American Association of

The National Association of Secondary

and the Massachusetts State Department

suggest

a

reexamination of attitudes by school

administrators toward student rights.

Thus, a conscientious

effort by public school administrators to foster, not merely

tolerate student rights will go

a

long way in keeping them out

of court.

Recognition of student constitutional rights has direct implication for the classroom teacher.

Students who

Academic Freedom in the Secondary Schools
ican Civil Liberties Union [New York, 1969).
1.

,

Amer-

"Joint Statement of Rights and Freedoms of Students",
2.
American Association o_f University Professors Bulletin vol.
,

1968).

54 (June,

Robert L. Acker ly, The Reasonable Exercise of Au thority National Association of Secondary School Principals
(Washington 1969).
3.

,

,

Guidelines for Student Ri ghts and Responsibilities
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Education (Bos4.

ton

,

1971

)

,
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choose to voice their opinions in

a

constructive manner in

the classroom can no longer be considered as recipients
of
a

one-way education.

The idea that education is totally

teacher directed and teacher oriented is being replaced by
free and open discussions and an exchange of ideas.

The

result should be a better education for students and teachers seeking this process.
The advent of student constitutional rights also raises
the issue of accountability.

Students with the constitutional

right to criticize, protest, and demonstrate can point out to
the general public problem areas in the schools.

Administra-

tive decisions are now subject to free and orderly discus-

sion by students which makes the administrator more accountable for his actions.

Teachers, too, feel the pressure of

accountability due to students voicing their concerns.

Such

things as poor teaching have come under constant attack by

students.

Notwithstanding, the general public becomes aware

of these concerns through the media, thereby keeping them

better informed of what is happening in the public schools.
The extension of procedural due process rights has had

broad administrative implications regarding student expulsions and long term suspensions.

School officials may no

longer expel or suspend students without following certain

procedures designed to guarantee students fundamental fairness.

Now administrators seeking to expel a student must

conduct an investigation, gather evidence on both sides,
give notice of the charges, and provide for a fair hearing.
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School boards will have to devote time hearing expulsion
cases
and judge them fairly and impartially,,

Adherance to these

due process procedures will inevitably be time consuming to

school officials.

However, the courts feel the inconvenience

to school officials is worth protecting the students' rights.

A federal judge in a recent decision suggested that

school officials should not just tolerate student constitutional rights but that they should foster them.

Hopefully, in

the future with a greater understanding of this body of law,

school officials will choose to foster rather than to resist
or merely tolerate student constitutional rights, and this,
in turn, may lead to a more meaningful and satisfying ex-

perience for all those involved.
The Need for Further Research
The number of court decisions in the field of student

constitutional rights has been increasing substantially each
year.

Continued research on this topic will be necessary

just to keep abreast of the judicial interpretations of the

various controversies.
There is also

a

need for research in closely related

areas to the expansion of student constitutional rights to

public school pupils through the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

The equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, for example, has important implications
for student constitutional rights and should be examined.

20 7

In the last four years President Nixon
has made four ap-

pointments to the Supreme Court.

The President has made it

clear that he has sought justices whose legal
philosophies
are "conservative" or "strict constructionist
"
as opposed to
the "liberal" ideals of the Court in the Warren
Era.

it re-

mains to be seen what impact, if any, the recent appointees
will have on student constitutional rights.

Further research

will be necessary to answer this question.
Finally, further research is needed on the topic of stu-

dent constitutional rights that will contribute to

a

better

understanding of this whole area of law, an understanding that
is becoming more necessary for those in the field of public

education today.
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